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13Mind and Mechanism (edited book)Yale University. 2001.An exploration of the mind-body problem from the perspective of artificial intelligence.
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21Optimization and connectionism are two different thingsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3): 483-484. 1989.
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20[Star] Penrose is wrongPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2 66-82. 1995.
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11Higher-Order Thought Rendered Defenseless: Review of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness by Rocco Gennaro (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4. 1998.
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28A little static for the dynamicists review of ShanahanInternational Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02): 361-365. 2011.
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1402On the Claim that a Table-Lookup Program Could Pass the Turing TestMinds and Machines 24 (2): 143-188. 2014.The claim has often been made that passing the Turing Test would not be sufficient to prove that a computer program was intelligent because a trivial program could do it, namely, the “Humongous-Table (HT) Program”, which simply looks up in a table what to say next. This claim is examined in detail. Three ground rules are argued for: (1) That the HT program must be exhaustive, and not be based on some vaguely imagined set of tricks. (2) That the HT program must not be created by some set of senti…Read more
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3We've been framed: Or, why AI is innocent of the frame problemIn Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma, Ablex. 1987.
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15Planning and ActingCognitive Science 2 (2): 71-100. 1978.A new theory of problem solving is presented, which embeds problem solving in the theory of action; in this theory, a problem is just a difficult action. Making this work requires a sophisticated language for‐talking about plans and their execution. This language allows a broad range of types of action, and can also be used to express rules for choosing and scheduling plans. To ensure flexibility, the problem solver consists of an interpreter driven by a theorem prover which actually manipulates…Read more
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Computationally Constrained BeliefsJournal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6): 124-150. 2013.People and intelligent computers, if there ever are any, will both have to believe certain things in order to be intelligent agents at all, or to be a particular sort of intelligent agent. I distinguish implicit beliefs that are inherent in the architecture of a natural or artificial agent, in the way it is 'wired', from explicit beliefs that are encoded in a way that makes them easier to learn and to erase if proven mistaken. I introduce the term IFI, which stands for irresistible framework int…Read more
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Yale UniversityRegular Faculty
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |