•  28
    Still Nowhere Else to Start
    In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 25. 2013.
  •  24
    Argumentation and the Social Significance of Reasons
    Episteme 12 (2): 309-317. 2015.
    Jennifer Nagel suggests that Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning can shed light on “why we commonly think of perceptually and testimonially supported judgments as justified despite feeling worried, on reflection, that only what is internally available can justify”. While I agree that there is indeed a natural path (or paths) from the argumentative theory to this asymmetry, and instability, in our epistemic judgments, I am not sure that it is quite the one that Nagel identifie…Read more
  •  19
    Meaning, Communication, and the Mental
    ProtoSociology 34 31-43. 2017.
    Thomas Reid (1710–1796) rejected ‘the theory of ideas’ in favor of perceptual direct realism and a fallibilist foundationalism. According to Reid, contact with the common and public extra-mental world is as much a part of our natural psychological and epistemological starting point as whatever special type of relation we have to the contents of our own minds. Like the general perceptual and epistemological views Reid was countering, an individualistic, idea-centered approach to language and comm…Read more
  •  19
    Goldman’s Knowledge in a Social World
    ProtoSociology 18 409-422. 2003.
    Knowledge in a Social World (KSW) is Alvin Goldman’s sustained treatment of social epistemology. As in his previous, ‘individualistic’ epistemology, Goldman’s lodestar is the idea that it is the truth-aptness of certain processes/methods which marks them out for our epistemic approval. Here, I focus on issues concerning the framework of KSW: Goldman’s claim that a correspondence theory of truth is favoured/required by his veritistic social epistemology (VSE); and the issue of whether a VSE of th…Read more
  •  18
    Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2): 260-261. 2002.
    Patrick Rysiew - Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 260-261 Book Review Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology Nicholas Wolterstorff. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 265. Cloth, $54.95. Interest in Thomas Reid has undergone a resurgence over the past several decades. Nicolas Wolterstorff's book is the latest addition to the growing Reid…Read more
  •  18
    Hume and Reid on Common Sense
    Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 10. 1992.
    The first half of this paper is concerned with drawing out the commonalities--and, more importantly, the differences--between the views of Hume and Reid regarding both the nature of common sense and the epistemological status of the basic deliverances thereof. (Thus,the author seeks to expose the falsity of the claim that Hume and Reid "differed more in words than in opinion.) It is then argued that Reid's conception of common sense is to be preferred over Hume's
  •  14
    Editorial
    Philosophical Studies 171 (1): 1-1. 2014.
    This special issue of Philosophical Studies consists of a selection of papers and Author-Meets-Critics sessions presented at the 2013 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco. Members of the 2012–2013 Program Committee chose the papers for presentation and offered recommendations for publication. The members of that committee are:Patrick Rysiew, ChairChrisoula AndreouNeera BadhwarTim BlackElizabeth BrakeJuan ComesañaPhilip CorkumAngela CoventrySh…Read more
  •  11
    First Principles as General, First Principle 7 as Special
    Analytic Philosophy 59 (4): 527-538. 2018.
  •  10
    Evidentness, Justification, and Belief
    In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. pp. 207. 2011.
  •  5
    Introduction
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-3. 2011.
  •  5
    Common Sense in Reid’s Response to Scepticism
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 146 (1): 33-47. 2021.
    Le sens commun est au cœur des conceptions épistémologiques de Thomas Reid. Pourtant, tout comme sa théorie positive, la réponse de Reid au scepticisme – ce qu’elle est censée établir et la manière dont elle le fait – est sujette à débat. Certes, dans la mesure où elle respecte et défend notre conception ordinaire de nous-mêmes comme détenteurs de connaissances provenant d’une variété de sources, toute réponse au scepticisme relève bien du « bon sens », compris au sens large. Reste que des comme…Read more
  •  5
    Pragmatism and Reid’s “Third Way”
    In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    It is uncontroversial that there is a historical connection between Reid and American pragmatism. What is unclear is whether, as has recently been suggested, Reid’s own views—in particular, his epistemological views—contain an important pragmatist element. This chapter agues in the affirmative, but suggests that commentators have mischaracterized the pragmatist character of Reid’s position, including his response to the skeptic: “the primacy of practice” constitutes an essential feature of his e…Read more
  •  4
    New Essays on Thomas Reid (edited book)
    Routledge. 2015.
    Thomas Reid was a contemporary of both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and a central figure in the Scottish School of Common Sense. Until recently, his work has been largely neglected, and often misunderstood. Like Kant, Reid cited Hume’s _Treatise_ as the main spur to his own philosophical work. In Reid’s case, this led him to challenge ‘the theory of ideas’, which he saw as the cornerstone of Hume’s theories. For those familiar with Reid’s work, it is clear that its significance extends well bey…Read more
  •  4
    Relativism and Contextualism
    In Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Wiley‐blackwell. 2011.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Classical Invariantism and the Ho ‐ Hum View Relativism and Contexualism: Clarifications and Distinctions Relativism and Contexualism: A Quick Look at Some Sample Views Flexibility and Disagreement, Charity and Error: A Common Motivating Idea, and a Common Objection Conclusion References.
  •  4
    Introduction to New Essays on Reid
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-3. 2011.
  •  2
    Philosophical Review Recent Issues 126 (1): 126-132. 2016.
  •  1
  • Contextualism in Epistemology
    Dissertation, The University of Arizona. 2000.
    Traditional epistemology is universalistic, in that it proceeds on the assumption that we can fully specify conditions making for the correctness of attributions of knowledge without adverting to 'context'. In Chapter 1 examples are adduced which cast doubt on this assumption, since they seem to show that the very 'contents' of such attributions are 'context-dependent'. But even if some form of 'contextualism' is thereby shown to be correct, if we are to avoid resting content with the foregoing …Read more