•  40
    The author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version of liberalism is sufficiently accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism. The conclusion is that the founding premise of political liberalism admits of a counterexample; there is a version of comprehensive liberalism that is sufficiently pluralistic.
  •  16
    In his _Democracy and Tradition_, Jeffrey Stout confronts the problem of religious reasons in public deliberation. He finds Rawlsian "public reason" proposals unsatisfactory, and attempts to devise a better account. The authors argue that Stout's view does not avoid the problems attenindg the Rawlsian position.
  •  146
    For well over a decade, much of liberal political theory has accepted the founding premise of Rawls's political liberalism, according to which the fact of reasonable pluralism renders comprehensive versions of liberalism incoherent. However, the founding premise presumes that all comprehensive doctrines are moral doctrines. In this essay, the author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doc…Read more
  •  40
    Social Epistemology and the Politics of Omission
    Episteme 2 (2): 107-118. 2006.
    Contemporary liberal democracy employs a conception of legitimacy according to which political decisions and institutions must be at least in principle justifiable to all citizens. This conception of legitimacy is difficult to satisfy when citizens are deeply divided at the level of fundamental moral, religious, and philosophical commitments. Many have followed the later Rawls in holding that where a reasonable pluralism of such commitments persists, political justification must eschew appeal to…Read more
  •  41
    Socratic Citizenship
    Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2): 4-10. 2006.
    For contemporary democrats, Socrates is a paradox: he is both the paragon of intellectual integrity and the archenemy of democracy. In this essay, the author attempts to navigate this paradox. By offering a revised account of the Socratic elenchus and an examination of Socrates’ objections to democracy, the author proposes a view according to which Socrates provides a compelling image of democracy citizenship. This image is then used to criticize and inform current versions of deliberative democ…Read more
  •  16
    Sidney Hook, Pragmatism, and the Communist Party: A Comment on Capps
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 39 (4). 2003.
  •  54
    Responses to my critics
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1). 2009.
  •  23
    Religion, respect and Eberle’s agapic pacifist
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (3): 313-325. 2012.
    Christopher Eberle has developed a powerful critique of justificatory liberalism. According to Eberle, justificatory liberalism’s doctrine of restraint , which requires religious citizens to refrain from publicly advocating for policies that can be supported only by their religious reasons, is illiberal. In this article, I defend justificatory liberalism against Eberle’s critique
  •  29
    Sustaining democracy: folk epistemology and social conflict
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4): 500-519. 2013.
    No abstract
  •  18
    Response to Lever
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (1): 82-85. 2015.
  •  38
    ExtractA few years ago, I, an American, was giving a talk at a political philosophy conference in the United Kingdom. My topic was religion in democratic politics, and I delivered what I thought was a splendid line of argument supporting the idea that religion has at most a highly constrained role to play in democratic politics. The audience was appreciative enough, but during the question and answer session, there emerged the charge that my paper had addressed a uniquely ‘American’ problem, a p…Read more
  •  44
    Skepticism and the democratic ideal
    Think 6 (16): 7. 2008.
    Robert Talisse argues that skepticism is required for a healthy democracy, and provides some illuminating and amusing examples of popular dismissive attitudes towards skepticism
  •  61
    Rawls on pluralism and stability
    Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 15 (1-2): 173-194. 2000.
    Abstract Rawls ?s political liberalism abandons the traditional political?theory objective of providing a philosophical account of liberal democracy. However, Rawls also aims for a liberal political order endorsed by citizens on grounds deeper than what he calls a ?modus vivendi? compromise; he contends that a liberal political order based upon a modus vivendi is unstable. The aspiration for a pluralist and ?freestanding? liberalism is at odds with the goal of a liberalism endorsed as something …Read more
  •  12
    Reply to Clanton and Forcehimes
    Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2): 185. 2009.
    In this reply I respond to the article "Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy?" by J. Caleb Clanton and Andrew T. Forcehimes, in this journal issue
  •  128
    Precis of a pragmatist philosophy of democracy
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1). 2009.
    This short paper summarizes the main line of argument in my book, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy* (Routledge, 2007), which is the subject of a forthcoming symposium issue of the journal *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*.
  •  14
    Responses to My Critics: TalisseRobert B.Pragmatist philosophy of democracy
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1): 90-108. 2009.
  •  75
    Religion in politics: What's the problem?
    Think 12 (33): 65-73. 2013.
    ExtractA few years ago, I, an American, was giving a talk at a political philosophy conference in the United Kingdom. My topic was religion in democratic politics, and I delivered what I thought was a splendid line of argument supporting the idea that religion has at most a highly constrained role to play in democratic politics. The audience was appreciative enough, but during the question and answer session, there emerged the charge that my paper had addressed a uniquely ‘American’ problem, a p…Read more
  •  15
    My response to Ralston's paper "In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life," both presented at the Eastern APA meeting (2008).
  •  11
    Problems with galston’s pluralist liberalism
    Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1): 221-229. 2004.
  •  77
    Contemporary liberal democracy employs a conception of legitimacy according to which political decisions and institutions must be at least in principle justifiable to all citizens. This conception of legitimacy is difficult to satisfy when citizens are deeply divided at the level of fundamental moral, religious, and philosophical commitments. Many have followed the later Rawls in holding that where a reasonable pluralism of such commitments persists, political justification must eschew appeal to…Read more
  •  24
    Reply to Karin Jønch-Clausen and Klemens Kappel
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1): 267-271. 2016.
  •  77
    On the Supposed Tension in Peirce’s “Fixation of Belief”
    Journal of Philosophical Research 26 561-569. 2001.
    Recent commentaries on “The Fixation of Belief” have located and emphasized an inconsistency or “tension” in Peirce’s central argument. On the one hand, Peirce maintains that “the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry”; on the other, he wants to establish that the method of science is superior to all other methods of inquiry. The tension arises from the fact that whereas Peirce dismisses the methods of tenacity, authority, and a priority on the grounds that they cannot fulfill the …Read more
  •  42
    Pluralism frustrates liberalism's conception of legitimacy. The attempts by Rawls and Galston to preserve liberal legitimacy in light of pluralism are critically engaged, and found lacking. The paper closes with a sketch of an "agonistic" liberalism.
  •  36
    Puzzles and Perplexities: Collected Essays (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 27 (1): 87-89. 2004.
  •  21
    Pragmatism and the cold war
    In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This is a short essay written for the forthcoming *Handbook of American Pragmatism* (Cheryl Misak, ed., Oxford University Press). The author argues that the standard narrative, according to which pragmatism went into eclipse in the years of the Cold War is nonviable.
  •  22
    New Trouble For Deliberative Democracy
    Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 12 (1): 107-123. 2017.
    Robert Talisse | : In the past two decades, democratic political practice has taken a deliberative turn. That is, contemporary democratic politics has become increasingly focused on facilitating citizen participation in the public exchange of reasons. Although the deliberative turn in democratic practice is in several respects welcome, the technological and communicative advances that have facilitated it also make possible new kinds of deliberative democratic pathology. This essay calls attentio…Read more
  •  6
    Pluralism and Liberal Democracy (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 33 (1): 151-158. 2007.
  •  85
    Pluralism and liberal democracy
    Social Theory and Practice 33 (1): 151-158. 2007.