•  23
    Menschen haben ein Anscheinsrecht (engl. prima facie right), Schusswaffen zu besitzen. Dieses Recht ist bedeutsam sowohl in Hinblick auf die Rolle, die Waffenbesitz im Leben von Waffenbegeisterten spielt, als auch auf den Selbstverteidigungsnutzen von Schusswaffen. Dieses Recht wird auch nicht durch den gesellschaftlichen Schaden privaten Waffenbesitzes verdrängt. Dieser Schaden wurde stark aufgebauscht und ist vermutlich erheblich kleiner als der Nutzen privaten Waffenbesitzes. Und ich lege dar…Read more
  •  11
    Einwanderungsbeschränkungen verletzen das Anscheinsrecht (engl. prima facie right) Einwanderungswilliger, keinem schädlichem Zwang ausgesetzt zu werden. Dieses Anscheinsrecht wird nicht durch die wirtschaftlichen, fiskalischen und kulturellen Folgen der Einwanderung entkräftet oder verdrängt – und auch nicht durch die besondere Pflicht, welche der Staat gegenüber seinen eigenen Bürgern und speziell den Ärmsten unter ihnen hat. Er hat gleichfalls kein Recht, Bedingungen für die Staatsbürgerschaft…Read more
  •  131
  •  7284
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 4 discusses what products one should renounce, the value of abstract theory, why people who accept the arguments often fail to change their behavior, and how vegans should react to non-vegans.
  •  5382
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 3 discusses the idea that creatures have different degrees of consciousness, the sense that certain animal welfare positions "sound crazy", and the role of empathy in moral judgment.
  •  7406
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 2 discusses miscellaneous defenses of meat-eating. These include the claim that the consumer is not responsible for wrongs committed by farm workers, that a single individual cannot have any effect on the meat industry, that farm animals are better off living on factory farms than never existing at all, that we can’t be s…Read more
  •  17506
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 1 discusses the suffering caused by factory farming, and how one's intelligence affects the badness of suffering.
  •  5608
    There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3): 592-613. 2017.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a w…Read more
  •  496
    Jury nullification is justified by the principle that individuals are prima facie ethically obligated to avoid causing unjust harms. Safeguarding justice against unjust laws and punishments of the government is the central function of the jury.
  •  51
    Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi
    Logos and Episteme 5 (2): 223-229. 2014.
    I address Moti Mizrahi‟s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends that other epistemologicaltheories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either (a) are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or (b) have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC.
  •  187
    Probability and Coherence Justification
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 463-472. 1997.
    In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge , Laurence BonJour argues that coherence among a set of empirical beliefs can provide justification for those beliefs, in the sense of rendering them likely to be true. He also repudiates all forms of foundationalism for empirical beliefs, including what he calls "weak foundationalism" (the weakest form of foundationalism he can find). In the following, I will argue that coherence cannot provide any justification for our beliefs in the manner BonJour sugge…Read more
  •  279
    This is not a comprehensive style guide; rather, it focuses on the most common problems I have found in student writing. Sections A and B give general tips on how to write a paper (esp. a philosophy paper). Sections C-F list common errors.
  •  767
    Is There a Right to Immigrate?
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (3): 429-461. 2010.
    Immigration restrictions violate the prima facie right of potential immigrants not to be subject to harmful coercion. This prima facie right is not neutralized or outweighed by the economic, fiscal, or cultural effects of immigration, nor by the state’s special duties to its own citizens, or to its poorest citizens. Nor does the state have a right to control citizenship conditions in the same way that private clubs may control their membership conditions.
  •  109
    Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 525. 2000.
    Peter van Inwagen has presented a compelling argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, which he calls “the Consequence Argument.” This argument depends on a controversial inference rule, “rule beta,” which says.
  •  195
    Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification
    Journal of Philosophical Research 28 329--340. 2002.
    Richard Fumerton’s “Principle of Inferential Justification” holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton’s principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fume…Read more
  •  61
    The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (review)
    Philosophical Review 113 (2): 279-283. 2004.
    The free will literature is sufficiently voluminous that even philosophers already working in the area can profit from the Handbook. Beyond the survey articles, it provides a boon in the shape of summary statements and defenses, by several prominent writers on free will, of theories that they have developed at greater length elsewhere. It is, of course, impossible to discuss every article in the book; here I shall mention only a handful of the more salient.
  •  55
    Egoism and Prudent Predation
    Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5 (2). 2004.
  •  527
    Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (edited book)
    Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2001.
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external..
  •  4022
    Compassionate phenomenal conservatism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1). 2007.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met dema…Read more
  •  11293
    An ontological proof of moral realism
    Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2): 259-279. 2013.
    The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral reason. Thus, if moral realism might be true, then it is true
  •  377
    The problem of memory knowledge
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4). 1999.
    both the initial justification for adopting it and the justification for retaining it provided by seeming memories. This view captures our intuitions about justification in several cases, while none of the alternative views can.
  •  221
    The form of egalitarianism I am concerned with holds that equality in the distribution of welfare across persons is intrinsically good . In other words, it is good for people to be equally well-off, and bad for some to be better off than others, apart from consideration of any further consequences of such equality or..
  •  76
    Is Benevolent Egoism Coherent?
    Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 3 (2). 2002.
    Michael Huemer argues that there is a tension between two principles putatively essential to Rand's ethics: the principle of egoism, which states that the only reason for doing (or not doing) anything is that it will serve (or frustrate) one's own interests; and the principle that one must not sacrifice others. Huemer considers several arguments that Rand offers for the second principle but finds that each involves either implausible empirical assumptions or assumptions that conflict with egoism…Read more
  •  105
    People want things, and they tend to act in such a way as to get the things they want, to the best of their ability.1 Sometimes our wants conflict with each other, so that we are forced to choose between different things that we want. When this happens, we normally choose the thing that we want more, over the thing that we want less. Behaving in this way is what we call “rational”; more specifically, it is “instrumentally rational.” Instrumental rationality consists in choosing the means that be…Read more
  •  15
    Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee
    Philosophical Review 113 (3): 411-416. 2004.
    In “Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument”, I offered a reformulation and defense of the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism, including a response to Lewis-style compatibilism. In a recent response, Helen Beebee defends Lewisian compatibilism against my argument. In the following, I will show why Beebee’s defense does not succeed.
  •  310
    The drug laws don’t work
    The Philosophers' Magazine 41 (41): 71-75. 2008.
    Illegal drugs are not inherently unclean, any more than alcohol, tobacco, or canola oil. All of these are simply chemicals that people choose to ingest for enjoyment, and that can harm our health if used to excess. Most of the sordid associations we have with illegal drugs are actually the product of the drug laws: it is because of the laws that drugs are sold on the black market, that Latin American crime bosses are made rich, that government officials are corrupted, and that drug users rob oth…Read more