•  756
    Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts
    Philosophical Studies 86 (2): 103-29. 1997.
    Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt
  •  78
    The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties.
  •  180
    Perception and evidence
    Philosophical Studies 170 101-113. 2014.
    Critical discussion of Susanna Schellenberg's account of hallucination and perceptual evidence.
  •  123
    Semantic values? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 201-7. 2002.
    Lance and Hawthorne have served up a large, rich and argument-stuffed book that has much to teach us about central issues in the philosophy of language, as well as sports trivia. I shall concentrate, not surprisingly, on points I either disagreed with or found unclear; there are many acute observations, particularly in the second half of the book, that fall into neither of these categories.
  •  199
    Consciousness and nonconceptual content (review)
    Philosophical Studies 113 (3): 261-274. 2003.
    Consciousness, Color, and Content is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye’s other writings. What’s more, I actually agree with much of it – fortunately for this symposium, not all of it. The book continues the defense of the “PANIC” theory of phenomenal consciousness that Tye began in Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995). A fair chunk of it, though, is largely independent of this theory: the discussion o…Read more
  •  133
    Knowing that I am thinking
    In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Soc. …I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you? Theaet. I agree…Read more
  •  367
    Spin control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World
    Philosophical Issues 7 261-73. 1996.
    We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good
  •  654
    In S. D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 1996.
    Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking
  •  125
    In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2009.
  •  87
    As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows
  •  318
    Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow
    Philosophical Studies 108 (1): 213-222. 2002.
    This paper discusses a number of themes and arguments in "The Quest for Reality": Stroud's distinction between "philosophical" and "ordinary" questions about reality; the similarity he finds between the view that color is "unreal" and the view that it is "subjective"; his argument against the secondary quality theory; his argument against the error theory; and the "disappointing" conclusion of the book.
  •  393
    David Hume, David Lewis, and decision theory
    Mind 106 (423): 411-728. 1997.
    David Lewis claims that a simple sort of anti-Humeanism-that the rational agent desires something to the extent he believes it to be good-can be given a decision-theoretic formulation, which Lewis calls 'Desire as Belief' (DAB). Given the (widely held) assumption that Jeffrey conditionalising is a rationally permissible way to change one's mind in the face of new evidence, Lewis proves that DAB leads to absurdity. Thus, according to Lewis, the simple form of anti-Humeanism stands refuted. In thi…Read more
  •  54
    Philosophy of Mind
    with Jaegwon Kim
    Philosophical Review 107 (1): 113. 1998.
    In the preface, Kim writes hopefully that his introduction to the philosophy of mind is “intended to be accessible to those without a formal background in philosophy”. The blurb at the end is more realistic: Philosophy of Mind is “a textbook for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students”. It is an admirable addition to Westview’s excellent Dimensions of Philosophy series. Brisk, workmanlike chapters profile the usual suspects: behaviorism, the identity theory, mind as computer and as caus…Read more
  •  443
    The epistemic significance of experience
    Philosophical Studies 173 947-67. 2016.
    According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended
  •  26
  •  22
    analytic tradition, from its early 20th-century roots in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell through Saul Kripke’s pioneering advances in..
  •  584
    Bad intensions
    In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, Oxford University Press. pp. 38--54. 2006.
    _the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all
  •  20
    Is snow white?
    Boston Review. 2005.
    CURRENT ISSUE table of contents FEATURES new democracy forum new fiction forum poetry fiction film archives ABOUT US masthead mission rave reviews contests writers? guidelines internships advertising SERVICES bookstore locator literary links subscribe
  •  677
    Something about Mary
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1): 27-52. 2002.
    Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.
  •  40
    Review of Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2013.
  •  1074
    European Review of Philosophy 3 (Response-Dependence): 199-223. 1998.
    In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
  •  664
    Experience and content
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 429-451. 2009.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the c…Read more
  •  17
    Review: Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content (review)
    Philosophical Studies 113 (3). 2003.
  •  45
    Two radical neuron doctrines
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 833-833. 1999.
    G&S describe the radical neuron doctrine in a number of slightly different ways, and we think this hides an important distinction. On the one hand, the radical neuron doctrine is supposed to have the consequence "that a successful theory of the mind will make no reference to anything like the concepts of linguistics or the psychological sciences as we currently understand them", and so Chomskyan linguistics "is doomed from the beginning" (sect. 2.2.2, paras. 2,3).[1] (Note that `a successful the…Read more
  •  68
    Comments on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine
    Dialectica 60 223-244. 2006.
    Cohen begins by defining ‘Color Physicalism’ so that the position is incompatible with Color Relationalism (unlike Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 7, and note 18). Physicalism, in any event, is something of a distraction, since Cohen’s argument from perceptual variation is directed against any view on which minor color misperception is common (Byrne and Hilbert 2004). A typical color primitivist, for example, is equally vulnerable to the argument. Suppose that normal human observers S1 and S2 are viewin…Read more
  •  8
    Semantic Values?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 201-207. 2002.
    Lance and Hawthorne have served up a large, rich and argument-stuffed book that has much to teach us about central issues in the philosophy of language, as well as sports trivia. I shall concentrate, not surprisingly, on points I either disagreed with or found unclear; there are many acute observations, particularly in the second half of the book, that fall into neither of these categories.