•  53
    Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning from Peay
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3): 245-248. 2011.
    People with personality disorders should be treated fairly. Potential crime victims should be protected. That much is uncontroversial. The hard questions ask what is fair, when is protection adequate, and how should we achieve fairness and protection together. Peay outlines five main hurdles that the law must jump to reach these goals. All five raise serious challenges. To begin to address these challenges, we must first clarify what a personality disorder is. The notion of a personality disorde…Read more
  •  135
    Pyrrhonian skepticism (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skep…Read more
  •  3
    Perspectives on Climate Change (edited book)
    with Richard B. Howarth
    Elsevier. 2005.
    Explores the interplay between science, economics, politics, and ethics in relation to climate change and the international community.
  •  204
    `Ought' conversationally implies `can'
    Philosophical Review 93 (2): 249-261. 1984.
  •  141
    Nihilism and scepticism about moral obligations
    Utilitas 7 (2): 228-236. 1995.
    There are many disagreements about what people have moral obligations to do, but almost everyone believes that some people have some moral obligations. Moreover, there are some moral obligations in which almost everyone believes. For example, if I promise to give a talk at this conference, I have a moral obligation to do so. Of course, my obligation might be overridden. Moreover, even if my obligation were overridden, I would still have a moral obligation to give a talk at this conference
  •  89
    Philosophers have discussed virtue and character since Socrates, but many traditional views have been challenged by recent findings in psychology and neuroscience. This fifth volume of Moral Psychology grows out of this new wave of interdisciplinary work on virtue, vice, and character. It offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate virtue and character and related issues in m…Read more
  •  249
    Moral skepticisms
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are tru…Read more
  •  115
    Morality without God?
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a ...
  •  28
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism
    Philosophical Issues 12 (1): 305-328. 2002.
  •  4
    Moral Psychology, Vol. 4 (edited book)
    MIT Press. 2014.
  •  11080
    Moral Skepticism and Justification
    In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology, Oxford University Press. 1996.
  •  51
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  7
    Philosophers and psychologists discuss new collaborative work in moral philosophy that draws on evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain scienc…Read more
  •  40
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  4
    Moral Psychology Vol. 2 (edited book)
    MIT Press. 2008.
  •  19
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  29
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  34
    Leading philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists address issues of moral responsibility and free will, drawing on new findings from empirical science.
  •  53
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these volumes bring together some …Read more
  •  11
    Moral Psychology, 3 Vols. (edited book)
    MIT Press. 2008.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  3
    Moral Knowledge New Readings (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 1996.
    In Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven newly written essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The first chapter, written by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong…Read more
  •  146
    Moral intuitions
    with Liane Young and Fiery Cushman
    In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272. 2010.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of …Read more
  •  260
    Moral intuitionism meets empirical psychology
    In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  211
    Mixed-up meta-ethics
    Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 235-256. 2009.
    My topic is the old debate between moral realists and moral expressivists. Although I will eventually adopt a Pyrrhonian position, as usual, my main goal is neither to argue for this position nor to resolve this debate but only to explore some new options that mix together realism and expressivism in various ways. Nothing that I say will be conclusive, but I hope that some of it will be suggestive.
  • Moral heuristics
    with L. Young and F. Cushman
    In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. 2010.