Lorenzo Peña

¿Están comprendidos los extranjeros en el ámbito de aplicación de los derechos y deberes fundamentales estipulados por las constituciones modernas? Lamentablemente, no. Ha habido, a lo largo de la historia, progresos y retrocesos en la conciencia jurídica de los derechos migratorios. Hoy tienden a establecerse cláusulas de libre circulación en los espacios de integración económica, al paso que, de manera general (y a salvo de dispensas individuales), viene prohibida la inmigración del sur al norte. Esa orientación actual es injusta. Ni se atiene a un principio de justicia natural ni respeta la tradición jurídica (en lo que comporta de derechos históricamente adquiridos). Es dudoso que tengan los estados derecho a prohibir la inmigración foránea. Menos aún es admisible que se considere un delito el auxilio a la inmigración no autorizada. Frente a los criterios hoy imperantes, este artículo formula la propuesta de reconocer el derecho universal humano de migración por todo el Planeta.

Introductory Remarks Why Paradigm Variation is Ensuant upon Contradiction How Externalistic Warrant Parries the Threat of [Truth] Relativism Why Not to Ward Relativism off by Means of Foundationalistic Justification Defending a relativistic View of Warrant A Transcendental Argument against [Truth] Relativism Towards [Partial] convergence A Gradualistic Paraconsistent Way to Convergence 7.1. - Perspectivism and Non Copulative Paraconsistent Logics 7.2. - The Strength and Weakness of Two Copulative Approaches to Paraconsistent Logic 7.3. - The Logic of Contradictorial Gradualism 7.4. - Implementing the Notion of Relative Truth Bibliographic References..

Recent work of Gustav Bergmann develops an ontological framework within which an account of relations has been sketched out. The approach is a kind of new logical atomism which has some of the features of an Aristotelian hylomorphism (of sorts). It recognizes a number of categories and groups of a hylomorphic kind, chiefly “determinates” and “subdeterminates”--the latter only indirectly or implicitly. Winsome though it is, the approach is flawed by certain difficulties it gives rise to, among them inability to speak of subdeterminates and failure of a relation to be had by a referent towards a relatum. Instead of having a sense, a relation is conceived of as a determinate which enters an arrangement whose existence and nature are not properly accounted for. Finally, Bergmann’s Ideal Language is assayed and shown not to be as useful philosophically in itself as he takes it to be.

Three (apparent ) deontic antinomies are discussed: the paradoxes of the watchman and the praiser, as weIl as deontic dilemmas. A paraconsistent deontic logic, Ad, is put forward whose underlying 1st-order calculus is an infinite-valued tensorial logic. Several arguments are offered bearing out be existence of deontic contradictions, while two ways of dealing with conditional obligation paradoxes within the framework of Ad are canvassed. While the aggregation rule and the ought-implies-can principle are upheld, sundry schemata are shown not to obtain which involve iterated deontic operators (most conspicuously: that whatever ought to be obligatory is obligatory; and that it is obligatory that whatever ought to be the case should in fact be the case).

Arthur Lovejoy's masterful, highly influential interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy has been almost neglected for decades now. This paper tries to rehabilitate Lovejoy's construal (with a number of adaptations) by delving into the underlying logical links connecting Leibniz's principles of order and gradation (the latter also called `law of continuity', `principle of transition' or `principle of the jumpless change': natura non facit saltus ) with other fundamental principles of his mature philosophy

The main starting point of many of the contributions collected into the book is the kind of Twin Earth considerations, along with meaning individualism. Is Putnam's claim about water in this world and a stuff in an alternative world being different materials?. Is meaning in the head? One seems allowed to be skeptical about the starting point of the debate between such as emphasize broad content and those who think that the basic semantic entities are narrow contents, which would fail to be world-dependent or world-oriented. The kind of motivations prompting the essays collected into the book are likely to be regarded as in need of a deeper elucidation by such as have been more or less influenced by Quine. Pettit & McDowell's collection of essays is one of the books most scholars interested in the confines of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind will find worth reading.