•  18
    11. The Missing Premise
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 178-188. 2014.
  •  32
    6. Confirmation and Verisimilitude
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 95-111. 2014.
  •  32
    Introduction to *Aboutness*
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-6. 2014.
  •  12
    Superproportionality and Mind-Body Relations
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1): 65-75. 2001.
    Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say tha…Read more
  •  973
    A Priority and Existence
    In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 197. 2000.
  •  20
    9. Going On in the Same Way
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 142-164. 2014.
  •  197
    Precis of aboutness
    Philosophical Studies 174 (3): 771-777. 2017.
    A lightning fast summary of Yablo, Aboutness, cutting many corners in the interests of brevity. The emphasis is on “ways.” Substituting “ways for S to be true” in for “worlds in which S is true” improves a number of philosophical explanations. The subject matter of S is identified with S’s ways of holding in a world, or failing, as the case may be. S contains T iff T is implied by S, and T’s ways of being true are implied by ways for S to be true ; this kind of way-implication is the same as sub…Read more
  •  554
    Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
  •  105
    Open knowledge and changing the subject
    Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 1047-1071. 2017.
    Knowledge is closed under implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness”? This paper compares two styles of explanation: evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; evidence bearing on P’s subject matt…Read more
  •  70
    Wide Causation
    Noûs 31 (s11): 251-281. 1997.
  •  230
    Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology
    Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10): 470-501. 2014.
  •  23
    7. Knowing That and Knowing About
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 112-130. 2014.
  •  118
    Things: Papers on Objects, Events, and Properties
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility - Intrinsicness - Cause and Essence - Advertisement for a Sketch of an Outline of a Prototheory of Causation - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? - Apriority and Existence - Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism - Abstract Objects: A Case Study - The Myth of the Seven - Carving Content at the Joints - Non-Catastrophic Presupposition Failure - Must Existence-Questions Have Answers?
  •  178
    Singling out properties
    Philosophical Perspectives 9 477-502. 1995.
  •  15
    A reply to new Zeno
    Analysis 60 (2): 148-151. 2000.