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39Aristotle against the determinist: Metaphysics 6.3International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1998): 127-136. 1998.The article tries to show that Aristotle's refutation of causal determinism in Metaph. 6.3 is grounded mainly on two assumptions: a. that there must be a first member of any causal chain, and b. that the origin and the outcome of the chain have to be of equal status.
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Sextus Empiricus, Against the LogiciansRhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 1 209-213. 2007.A review of Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, translated and edited by Richard Bett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005
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166Aristotle's notion of experienceArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1): 1-30. 2006.Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how exp…Read more
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32Richard Bett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (review)Philosophy in Review 30 (5): 315-317. 2010.
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17Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4): 381-383. 2012.Jonathan Barnes, Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, edited by Maddalena Bonelli. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. xi + 621 pp. £60.00, $110.00. ISBN 978–0–19–957751–4. Reviewed b...
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17Ancient Scepticism. By Harald Thorsrud. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009. Pp. 248 + xvi. ISBN: 978-0-520-26026-9 (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3): 219-223. 2013.
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83Sextus empiricus on the possibility of inquiryPacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4): 436-459. 2008.Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' inquiry, we should conclude …Read more
Filip Grgic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb
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Institute of Philosophy, ZagrebRegular Faculty
University of Zagreb
PhD, 1996
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |