-
329“To See and Hear That Which is Not Present”: Aristotle on the Objects of MemoryPhilosophisches Jahrbuch 129 (2): 215-231. 2022.In this paper, we show that there are some strong philosophical and exegetical reasons to argue that according to the view developed in the first chapter of Aristotle’s De Memoria, the objects of memory are non-present, or absent, things and events rather than our past acts of awareness of them. We argue that on Aristotle’s account, the objects of memory can be particulars or universals, perceptibles or intelligibles, and that all these kinds of things are past in the same sense, namely, in the …Read more
-
302Aristotle on Deliberation and ContingencyIn Filip Grgić & Davor Pećnjak (eds.), Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Springer. pp. 103-115. 2018.The author discusses Aristotle’s notion of deliberation and shows that it differs considerably from the model of deliberation as is common in contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility. As opposed to the contemporary model, Aristotle’s account does not require that the deliberator has any belief (or lack thereof) concerning the availability of possible courses of action. However, the action chosen by deliberation, before it is performed, is still contingent––i.e. such that it…Read more
-
176Aristotle on the Akratic's KnowledgePhronesis 47 (4): 336-358. 2002.This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not meant to provide an explanation of …Read more
-
175Aristotle on Co-causes of One’s DispositionsElenchos 38 (1-2): 107-126. 2017.In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has a…Read more
-
166Aristotle's notion of experienceArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1): 1-30. 2006.Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how exp…Read more
-
128Aristotle's Rational Powers and the Explanation of ActionZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (1): 53-79. 2020.In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try t…Read more
-
127Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of SkepticismAncient Philosophy 26 (1): 141-160. 2006.In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.
-
122Aristotle's Teleological LuckFreiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 63 (2): 441-457. 2016.In this paper I discuss some problems with Aristotle’s characterization of lucky events as events which are “for the sake of something”. I argue that there is no special sense of the phrase “for the sake of something” when applied to lucky events. Qua event, a lucky event has come about for the sake of something and thus unqualifiedly belongs among things that come about for the sake of something. But qua lucky event, it has not come about for the sake of that thing it has come about qua event, …Read more
-
96Investigative and Suspensive ScepticismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 22 (4): 653-673. 2012.Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not po…Read more
-
83Sextus empiricus on the possibility of inquiryPacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4): 436-459. 2008.Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' inquiry, we should conclude …Read more
-
72Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of KnowledgeBochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 4 (1): 19-40. 1999.In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called Meno's paradox and the eristic arguments. This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a mann…Read more
-
65Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes AliveProlegomena 7 (1): 103-107. 2008.Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, xii + 209 pp.
-
56Review of Casey perin, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (8). 2010.
-
54Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (edited book)Springer. 2018.This book consists of eleven new essays that provide new insights into classical and contemporary issues surrounding free will and human agency. They investigate topics such as the nature of practical knowledge and its role in intentional action; mental content and explanations of action; recent arguments for libertarianism; the situationist challenge to free will; freedom and a theory of narrative configuration; the moral responsibility of the psychopath; and free will and the indeterminism of …Read more
-
39Aristotle against the determinist: Metaphysics 6.3International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1998): 127-136. 1998.The article tries to show that Aristotle's refutation of causal determinism in Metaph. 6.3 is grounded mainly on two assumptions: a. that there must be a first member of any causal chain, and b. that the origin and the outcome of the chain have to be of equal status.
-
32Richard Bett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (review)Philosophy in Review 30 (5): 315-317. 2010.
-
28Good Luck, Nature, and God: Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 8.2Res Philosophica 96 (4): 471-493. 2019.In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck (eutuchia) that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle’s account…Read more
-
23Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in AristotleInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3): 351-369. 2021.This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, bu...
-
20Apraxia, Appearances, and BeliefsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 441-458. 2016.According to the objection of inactivity (apraxia), the skeptics cannot live their skepticism, since any attempt to apply it to everyday life would result in total inactivity, while any action they would perform qua skeptics would be a sign that they abandoned their skepticism. In this paper I discuss the ancient Pyrrhonists’ response to the objection as is presented in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus argues that the Pyrrhonists are immune to the apraxia objection because it is based on…Read more
-
20Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism (review)Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 403-408. 2004.
-
17Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4): 381-383. 2012.Jonathan Barnes, Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, edited by Maddalena Bonelli. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. xi + 621 pp. £60.00, $110.00. ISBN 978–0–19–957751–4. Reviewed b...
-
17Ancient Scepticism. By Harald Thorsrud. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009. Pp. 248 + xvi. ISBN: 978-0-520-26026-9 (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3): 219-223. 2013.
-
13M. Tuominen, Apprehension and Argument: Ancient Theories of Starting Points for Knowledge (review)Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2. 2008.
-
10Ancient Scepticism (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3): 219-223. 2013.
-
8Alan Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean ScepticismCroatian Journal of Philosophy 12 403-408. 2004.
Filip Grgic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb
-
Institute of Philosophy, ZagrebRegular Faculty
University of Zagreb
PhD, 1996
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |