Timothy Brian Noone

In this remarkably ambitious book, Robert Pasnau has sought to trace out the story of medieval epistemology during its formative years, 1250 to 1350, and to draw conclusions both regarding the tenability of views advanced during the High Middle Ages and regarding the relation of medieval epistemology to early modern epistemology. In the history of cognitive theories, Pasnau discusses mainly the figures of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, and William of Ockham, although brief treatments are also included of Roger Bacon and William Crathorn. The conclusions that Pasnau draws are that none of the epistemological theories advanced by the principal authors treated is altogether satisfactory and that medieval epistemology provides a direct antecedent to early modern epistemology since, on Pasnau’s reading, even the cognitive theory of a figure such as Aquinas relies on a kind of representationalism.

Il Commento di Rufo alla Metafisica aristotelica è tradito integralmente nel Vat. lat. 4538 e parzialmente in altri quattro mss.: Erfurt, Bibl. Amplon., Q. 290 ; Praha, Archiv Prazského Hradu, M. 80 ; Oxford, New College, 285 ; Oxford, Bodl. Libr., misc. lat. C. 71 . Per l'ed. dello Scriptum sono stati utilizzati V, E, e N. In questa sezione del Commento , dove il francescano inglese si propone di conciliare la dottrina dell'immutabilità divina con la dottrina della creazione e dei futuri contingenti, l'A. individua la presenza di argomenti utilizzati da Roberto Grossatesta nel De libero arbitrio

This lecture treats the theme of habitual cognition in both its commonplace and unusual senses in the tradition of ancient and medieval philosophy. Beginning with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and its teaching on habits, it traces how the ancient and medieval Peripatetic tradition received and developed the idea of habitual knowledge. The lecture then turns to three case-studies in which the notion of habitual knowledge is used in unusual senses: Aquinas’s treatment of self-knowledge; Scotus’s account of human awareness of the concept of being; and Peter Auriol’s observations regarding memory and subconscious awareness in ordinary reptitive acts. Aquinas and Scotus seem to identify habitual knowledge in its unusual sense with the presence of an intelligible in the mind prior to actual cognition of that object. Auriol extends habitual knowledge to cover the cognitive state of someone performing an act without any conscious attention. The uses by both Aquinas and Scotus seem somewhat parallel to the use of habit or pre-conscious knowledge in Hume and Kant.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century by Bonnie KentTimothy B. NooneBonnie Kent. Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 270. Cloth, $44.95.In this admirably written study, Bonnie Kent presents researchers on medieval philosophy with a survey of moral psychology during the crucial period between the death of Thomas Aquinas and the summit of Duns Scotus’s career in the first decade of the fourteenth century. Although there have been many studies of particular issues in particular thinkers during this period and a generous presentation of texts with commentary by the great Dom Lottin (Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, 7 vols. Louvain, 1942–1954), there has not been any lengthy study to date devoted to the period of the late thirteenth century that focused on moral psychology and the will. Simply in drawing attention to this period in the history of moral psychology, Professor Kent has made a tremendous contribution to the study of medieval philosophy, since she has rendered accessible authors that are more often than not neglected and overlooked. Kent, in fact, attempts something more: she places her study in the framework of the general historiography of Scholastic thought and the more recent interest in medieval ethics prompted by those championing virtue ethics.In order to highlight the distinguishing features of recent studies on medieval ethical thought, Kent reviews the established interpretation of philosophy in the thirteenth century. In the opening chapter, entitled “Heroes and Histories,” she points out the features common to the scholarly approaches of Gilson, Van Steenberghen, and even Copleston: (1) a prominent role is assigned to schools and movements, especially Aristotelianism and Augustinianism; (2) metaphysics and epistemology are the primary objects of study along with the relation between philosophy and theology; and (3) the Thomistic point of view is the organizing principle for telling the drama of the period. The last feature means that the history of the period is fundamentally told as streams of influence leading to Aquinas, followed by the golden age of Aquinas and his contemporaries and succeeded by a gradual decline after Aquinas, leading to the demise of Scholastic thought. In the context of the established historiography, accordingly, the approach of Alasdair MacIntyre represents a restatement of the common view, but one more radical in form. Instead of being merely different schools or movements, Augustinianism and Aristotelianism are different worldviews with their own paradigmatic conceptions of rationality, each of which is subsumed into the higher synthesis of Thomism. According to MacIntyre, the passage to modernity is begun by Scotus whose innovative theses in moral psychology and ethics are considered revolutionary.Kent’s stated aim is to challenge the “standard story” found in Gilson and others as well as its revised version in MacIntyre’s writings by providing a detailed study of the [End Page 462] period just prior to Scotus and establishing precisely how revolutionary Scotus’s teachings were when compared to his immediate predecessors. She accomplishes this aim masterfully in a series of chapters dedicated to the sources of medieval thought and elements of moral psychology. Beginning with late thirteenth-century thinkers’ attitude toward Aristotle in her second chapter, she shows in considerable detail that there is little evidence for any serious anti-Aristotelianism in the vast majority of late thirteenth-century authors. Indeed, the posture of these thinkers was to separate Aristotle from radical Aristotelianism and Thomism in order to claim that ancient wisdom was on the side of Christian ethics and psychology. The only exception that Kent finds to this widespread attitude is in the writings of Peter John Olivi whose hostility to pagan philosophy is clearly evident.The focus in the next chapter is on ethical voluntarism, a position characterized by the endorsement of the superiority of will over reason, the claim that human freedom resides primarily in the faculty of the will, that the will can act contrary to reason’s judgment, and that the will, not the intellect, commands the lower powers of the soul. In detailing the advent of...

In this clearly written and impressive volume, Giorgio Pini has provided the first systematic book-length study of Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the categories and an extremely useful sketch of his views on logic generally. Divided into six chapters, the work covers the gamut of interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories over the course of the thirteenth century, ranging from the views of Robert Kilwardby and Albertus Magnus in the 1240s to the leading opinions of the 1280s and 1290s, those held by Radulphus Brito, Simon of Faversham, and Peter of Auvergne. Through this survey of historical background to Scotus’s logical, metaphysical, and theological works, the reader becomes readily acquainted with the systematic options for understanding categories, both in logic and in metaphysics, while appreciating all the more keenly the full bearing of Scotus’s own teaching.