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Vann McGee

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    88
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  •  Events
    2
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 More details
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Probability
  • All publications (88)
  •  64
    S. N. Artemov. Arithmetically complete modal theories. Six papers in logic, American Mathematical Society translations, ser. 2 vol. 135, American Mathematical Society, Providence1987, pp. 39–54. , vol. 14 , pp. 115–133.) - S. N. Artemov. On modal logics axiomatizing provability. Mathematics of the USSR—Izvestiya, vol. 27 no. 3 , pp. 401–429. , pp. 1123–1154.) - S. N. Artemov. Nonarithmeticity of truth predicate logics of provability. Soviet mathematics—Doklady, vol. 32 , pp. 403–405. , pp. 270–271.) - V. A. Vardanyan. Arithmetic complexity of predicate logics of provability and their fragments. Soviet mathematics—Doklady, vol. 33 no. 3 , pp. 569–572. , pp. 11–14.) - S. N. Artemov. Numerically correct provability logics. Soviet mathematics—Doklady, vol. 34 , pp. 384–387. , pp. 1289–1292.)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1): 329-332. 1991.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogics
  •  2
    The analysis of" a; is true" as
    In André Leon Jo Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.), Circularity, Definition and Truth, Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. pp. 255. 2000.
  •  164
    The degree of the set of sentences of predicate provability logic that are true under every interpretation
    with George Boolos
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (1): 165-171. 1987.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogics
  •  164
    Revision
    Philosophical Issues 8 387-406. 1997.
    Liar ParadoxFormal EpistemologyRevision Theory of Truth
  •  246
    Logical commitment and semantic indeterminacy: A reply to Williamson
    with Brian P. Mclaughlin
    Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (1): 123-136. 2004.
    Many-Valued LogicEpistemic Theories of VaguenessSemantics
  •  328
    Field’s logic of truth
    Philosophical Studies 147 (3): 421-432. 2010.
    Liar Paradox
  • Truth, Vagueness and Paradox. An Essay on the Logic of Truth
    Studia Logica 51 (2): 340-341. 1992.
    Logical Semantics and Logical TruthParadoxes
  •  91
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 102 (408): 518-. 1993.
  •  135
    The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity
    Philosophical Review 100 (3): 472. 1991.
    Liar Paradox
  •  165
    Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (10): 530-539. 1989.
    Liar ParadoxTheories of Truth, Misc
  •  99
    Review: Two Conceptions of Truth? Comment (review)
    Philosophical Studies 124 (1). 2005.
    Truth
  •  248
    Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schema
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3). 1992.
    Liar ParadoxTarskian Theories of Truth
  •  387
    Inscrutability and its discontents
    Noûs 39 (3). 2005.
    That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many." Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word "rabbit," they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that "When I use 'rabbit,' I refer to rabbits" is made true by …Read more
    That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many." Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word "rabbit," they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that "When I use 'rabbit,' I refer to rabbits" is made true by the meaning of the word "refer." The reference relation is extended to other languages by translation. The explanation for this peculiarly egocentric conception of semantics-questions of others' meanings are settled by asking what I mean by words of my language-is to be found in our practice of predicting and explaining other people's behavior by empathetic identification. I understand other people's behavior by asking what I would do in their place
    The Model-Theoretic ArgumentThe Indeterminacy of TranslationIndeterminacy and Inscrutability of Refe…Read more
    The Model-Theoretic ArgumentThe Indeterminacy of TranslationIndeterminacy and Inscrutability of ReferenceDisquotationalism about TruthDeflationism about Truth, Misc
  •  83
    2000 Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic
    with A. Pillay, D. Hallett, G. Hjorth, C. Jockusch, A. Kanamori, and H. J. Keisler
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (3): 361-396. 2000.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  •  449
    Distinctions Without a Difference
    with Brian McLaughlin
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1): 203-251. 1995.
    Supervaluationism
  •  112
    Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth
    Hackett. 1990.
    Awarded the 1988 Johnsonian Prize in Philosophy. Published with the aid of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
    Liar Paradox
  •  32
    Afterword: Trying (With Limited Success) to Demarcate the Disquotational-Correspondence Distinction
    In Bradley P. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court Press. pp. 143-152. 2005.
    Disquotationalism about Truth
  •  6
    There's a Rule for Everything
    In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute generality, Oxford University Press. pp. 179--202. 2006.
    Unrestricted Quantification
  • Structures and the Hyperarithmetical Hierarchy. Knight has directed or co-directed seven doctoral dissertations in mathematics and one in electrical engineering. She served on selection panels for the NSF Postdoctoral Fellowships, on program committees of numerous meetings, and as an editor of The Journal of Symbolic Logic (1989-1995) (review)
    with D. Haskell, G. Hjorth, C. Jockusch, A. Kanamori, H. J. Keisler, and T. Pitassi
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (1). 2000.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  33
    Ramsey and the Correspondence Theory
    In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth, Hänsel-hohenhausen. pp. 153-168. 2002.
    Correspondence Theory of Truth
  •  180
    Logic, Logic, and Logic
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (1): 58-62. 2001.
    LogicsLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  •  146
    Finite matrices and the logic of conditionals
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3). 1981.
    Logic of Conditionals
  •  323
    Timothy Williamson, vagueness: London and new York: 1994 (review)
    with Brian McLaughlin
    Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (2): 221-235. 1998.
    Epistemic Theories of VaguenessSemantics
  •  85
    Comments on NUTE and Sanford
    Noûs 25 (2): 212-213. 1991.
  •  27
    The Philosophical Review: Vol. 106, No.1, January 1997
    Review of Metaphysics 51 (1): 208-208. 1997.
  •  139
    A puzzle about
    with Agust&Iacuten Rayo
    Analysis 60 (4): 297-299. 2000.
  •  97
    Reply to Christian Piller
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 229-232. 1991.
  •  46
    [Omnibus Review]
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1): 329-332. 1991.
    Reviewed Works:S. N. Artemov, B. M. Schein, Arithmetically Complete Modal Theories.S. N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, On Modal Logics Axiomatizing Provability.S.N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, Nonarithmeticity of Truth Prdicate Logics of Provability.V. A. Vardanyan, E. Mendelson, Arithmetic Complexity of Predicate Logics of Provability and Their.S. N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, Numerically Correct Provability Logics
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogics
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