•  20
    Contemplating one's nagel1
    Philosophical Books 29 (1): 1-16. 1988.
  •  20
    Prichard on Causing a Change
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 127-138. 2017.
    This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H.A. Prichard’s against the view that to act is to cause a change; the argument is that causing is not an activity. The argument is important because of the recent emergence of an ‘agent-causation’ view according to which actions are the causing of changes by agents. I suggest a way of responding to Prichard’s argument, and then, profiting from one of his own conclusions, turn to consider the relation between neurophysiological changes …Read more
  •  18
    Practical Reality
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 436-443. 2003.
  •  15
    The Practice of Value
    Mind 114 (453): 189-192. 2005.
  •  14
    Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.
  •  14
    Honing Practical Judgement
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2): 410-424. 2020.
  •  13
    Intention and Permissibility
    with T. M. Scanlon
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 301-338. 2000.
    It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requ…Read more
  •  13
    Getting off the moral Hook
    Philosophical Books 31 (4): 193-200. 1992.
  •  13
    Aspects of Reason
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211): 274-279. 2003.
  •  13
    Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism
    with Marie McGinn
    Philosophical Review 101 (3): 684. 1992.
  •  13
    Intention and Permissibility
    with T. M. Scanlon
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 74 301-338. 2000.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against kil…Read more
  •  12
    Review: Replies (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
  •  12
    Précis of Practical Shape
    Philosophical Explorations 23 (2): 130-134. 2020.
    Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2020, Page 130-134.
  •  12
    Moral Reasons
    Ethics 106 (1): 187-189. 1995.
  •  9
    Bruce Aune, "Metaphysics: The Elements" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (48): 331. 1987.
  •  8
    Book revies
    Mind 91 (364): 618-621. 1982.
  •  8
    Supererogation
    Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133): 405-406. 1983.
  •  8
    Essentially Comparative Concepts
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2): 1-16. 2005.
    This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an ‘essentially comparative’ concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion is a conflation of two distinct notions which need not go together. This leads to a critical examination of Temkin’s arguments that certain central ethical concepts are essentially comparative. These arguments are often found wanting, as is Temkin’s treatment of the Person Affecting View