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66Berkeley, an introductionBlackwell. 1987.This new introduction to the main themes of Berkeley′s philosophy assumes no previous knowlege of philosophy and will be accessible to first-year students and to the interested general reader. It also offers and defends its own interpretation of Berkeley′ position. Jonathan Dancy argues that we understand Berkeley′s idealism best if we take seriously his claim that realism (the view that material things have an existence independent of the mind) derives from a mistaken use of abstraction. Stress…Read more
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66On how to act - disjunctivelyIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 262--282. 2008.
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65Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual SynthesisPhilosophical Quarterly 42 (168): 393-395. 1992.
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64A Companion to Epistemology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1992.Epistemology - the theory of knowledge and of justified belief - has always been of central importance in philosophy. Progress in other areas of philosophical research has often depended crucially on epistemological presuppositions. This Companion, with well over 250 articles ranging from summary discussions to major essays on topics of current controversy, is the first complete reference work devoted to the subject. All the main theoretical positions in epistemology are discussed and analysed, …Read more
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63Responses to my criticsPhilosophical Explorations 23 (2): 187-199. 2020.Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2020, Page 187-199.
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61Discussion on the importance of making things rightRatio 17 (2): 229-237. 2004.Critical notice of 'From metaphysics to ethics' by Frank Jackson.
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59McDowell, Williams, and intuitionismIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 269-290. 2012.
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57Supervenience, virtues and consequences: A commentary onknowledge in perspective by Ernest SosaPhilosophical Studies 78 (3). 1995.
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50The Presidential Address: Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of MotivationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Jonathan Dancy; I *—The Presidential Address: Why there is really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95
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49Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.
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42Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-105. 2011.
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42Caring about JusticePhilosophy 67 (262). 1992.In the post-Gilligan debate about the differences, if any, between the ways in which people of different genders see the moral world in which they live, I detect two assumptions. These can be found in Gilligan's early work, and have infected the thought of others. The first, perhaps surprisingly, is Kohlberg's Kantian account of one moral perspective, the one more easily or more naturally operated by men and which has come to be called the justice perspective. This is the perspective whose claim…Read more
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40Review of Christopher W. Gowans: Innocence lost: an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing (review)Ethics 106 (3): 639-641. 1996.
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38Mystery to me—a delightful mystery, after a while, but a mystery nonethe-less. It was not until a few months before my Final Examinations that the light dawned and I began to feel at home in the subject. Still, I went on to do graduate work (in the form of the two-year Oxford BPhil) not so much out of any passionate interest in philosophy as from (review)In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 337. 2013.
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36From intuitionism to emotivismIn Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870-1945, . pp. 693-703. 2003.
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35Intention and PermissibilityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 301-338. 2000.It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requ…Read more