•  87
    Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 299-317. 2002.
    The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology, stressing the d…Read more
  •  75
    Emotion and Action
    European Review of Philosophy 5 55-90. 2002.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the question whether and in what sense emotions might be said to provide reasons for actions or to rationalize them. This requires that one have a picture of the causal structure of actions that is sufficiently detailed for one to see how emotions can impinge on the proc-ess of action production. I present a two-tiered model of action explanation and try to exploit this model in a tentative account of the modes of in-volvement of emotions in the explanatio…Read more
  •  73
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this …Read more
  •  69
    It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the phil…Read more
  •  64
    Conscious experience and concept-forming abilities
    Acta Analytica 16 (26): 45-52. 2001.
    Pierre Jacob's book, What Minds Can Do , is mainly concerned with intentionality. Jacob's primary goal is to explain both how it is possible for a physical system to have intentional mental states and how the intentional content of such mental states can play a role in the causal explanation of behaviour. Yet, he also tackles the issue of the nature of conscious experience. I shall focus here on a claim he makes in connection with this latter topic. The claim (made at the very end of Chapter 2, …Read more
  •  54
    La dynamique des intentions
    Dialogue 42 (3): 447-. 2003.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its …Read more
  •  48
    Alterations of agency in hypnosis: A new predictive coding model
    with Jean-Rémy Martin
    Psychological Review 126 (1): 133-152. 2019.
  •  46
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which …Read more
  •  38
    The phenomenology of controlling a moving object with another person
    with John A. Dewey and Guenther Knoblich
    Cognition 132 (3): 383-397. 2014.
  •  37
    Attitudes propositionnelles, intentionnalité et évolution
    Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100 (3). 1995.
    La question du statut ontologique des attitudes propositionnelles et, corrélativement, celle de l'efficacité causale des contenus mentaux sont parmi les principaux problèmes actuellement débattus en philosophie de la psychologie. La théorie des systèmes intentionnels de Dennett, tout en accordant une valeur prédictive aux attributions d'attitudes propositionnelles, refuse aux croyances et désirs droit d'entrée dans une ontologie scientifique. Le but de cet article est de proposer une analyse cri…Read more
  •  36
    In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor attempts to reconcile the idea that psychological laws are characteristically intentional with the idea that their implementation is typically computational. In order to do so, Fodor must show that narrow contents are superfluous for the purposes of psychological explanation and that Frege cases are rare and constitute unsystematic exceptions. The paper contends that the argument Fodor offers in order to establish his claim is flawed. It argues that the pr…Read more
  •  35
    Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning: How Different Are They?
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6): 585-593. 2018.
    In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks.
  •  35
    Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia
    with Jean-Rémy Martin, Guillaume Dezecache, Daniel Pressnitzer, Philippe Nuss, Jérôme Dokic, Nicolas Bruno, and Nicolas Franck
    Consciousness and Cognition 30 (C): 62-72. 2014.
  •  34
    Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities
    Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1): 17-26. 2014.
    A central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual…Read more
  •  34
    Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents
    with Aïsha Sahaï, Andrea Desantis, Ouriel Grynszpan, and Bruno Berberian
    Consciousness and Cognition 67 44-55. 2019.
  •  33
    The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves pr…Read more
  •  33
    Commitments and the sense of joint agency
    Mind and Language (3): 889-906. 2022.
    The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss h…Read more
  •  28
    The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action
    with Ouriel Grynszpan, Aïsha Sahaï, Nasmeh Hamidi, Bruno Berberian, Lucas Roche, and Ludovic Saint-Bauzel
    Consciousness and Cognition 75 102820. 2019.
  •  28
    Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification
    with Marc Jeannerod
    Mind and Language 19 (2): 113-146. 2004.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of self‐identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self‐identification and in agency‐ascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are ce…Read more
  •  27
    Philosophie et psychologie (review)
    Dialogue 37 (2): 414-418. 1998.
    L’histoire des relations entre philosophie et psychologie est, on le sait, tumultueuse.
  •  25
    Holophobia
    Acta Analytica 12 105-112. 1997.
    Holophobia can be defined as the 'neurotic' fear that semantic holism, if not instantly extirpated by the most radical means, might be a deadly threat to intentional realism. I contend that Fodor exaggerates the threat that meaning holism poses to intentional realism and to a viable account of narrow content in terms of conceptual roles. He particular, he overestimates the relevance for intentional psychology of Quine's demonstration that a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction is out of re…Read more
  •  25
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which …Read more
  •  21
    Collective Emotion: A Framework for Experimental Research
    with Victor Chung and Julie Grèzes
    Emotion Review 16 (1): 28-45. 2024.
    Research on collective emotion spans social sciences, psychology and philosophy. There are detailed case studies and diverse theories of collective emotion. However, experimental evidence regarding the universal characteristics, antecedents and consequences of collective emotion remains sparse. Moreover, current research mainly relies on emotion self-reports, accounting for the subjective experience of collective emotion and ignoring their cognitive and physiological bases. In response to these …Read more
  •  21
    This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
  •  20
    The paper discusses the role affective factors may play in explaining why, in Capgras'delusion, the delusional belief once formed is maintained and argues that there is an important link between the modularity of the relevant emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.
  •  17
    Reduced sensitivity to social priors during action prediction in adults with autism spectrum disorders
    with Valerian Chambon, Chlöé Farrer, Pierre O. Jacquet, Marion Leboyer, and Tiziana Zalla
    Cognition 160 (C): 17-26. 2017.
  •  17
    Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action
    with Solène Le Bars, Alexandre Devaux, Tena Nevidal, and Valérian Chambon
    Cognition 195 (C): 104117. 2020.