•  757
    ‘the Self’
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6): 405-428. 1997.
    Recommends an approach to the philosophical problem about the existence and nature of the self in which the author models the problem of the self rather than attempting to model the self. It is suggested that the sense of the self is the source in experience of the philosophical problem of the self. The first question to ask is the phenomenological question: What is the nature of the sense of the self? But this, in the first instance, is best taken as a question explicitly about human beings: as…Read more
  •  7
    Episodische Ethik
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (5): 651-675. 2008.
    Der Beitrag unterscheidet zwischen episodischen und diachronischen Persönlichkeiten. Episodische Persönlichkeiten leben emotional stark in der Gegenwart und verfügen im Gegensatz zu diachronischen Persönlichkeiten nicht über ein Narrativ, welches sie ihre Gegenwart und Vergangenheit als eine Einheit empfinden lässt. Der Autor führt vor, dass episodische Persönlichkeiten trotz ihres psychologisch nur schwach ausgeprägten Verhältnisses zu ihrer eigenen Vergangenheit moralfähig sind
  •  22
    Owning the Past Reply to Stokes
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4): 3-4. 2011.
  •  311
    Mental ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaniety
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3): 227-257. 2003.
    It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought and judgement essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action-intentional, voluntary and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought and judgement neither are nor can be a matter of action; and any spontaneity they involve can be connected with freedom only when the word 'freedom' is used in the Spin…Read more
  •  168
    The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    This lucid book is the first to be wholly dedicated to Hume's theory of personal identity, and presents a bold new interpretation which bears directly on ...
  •  14
    I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject
    In S. Prosser and F. Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 202-223. 2012.
    I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fa…Read more
  •  75
    The Self
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  207
    ‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even if it is not sufficient
  •  163
    Real Materialism: And Other Essays
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.
  •  91
    ‘The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 111-141. 2015.
    Many think John Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent and circular. It's neither of these things. The root causes of the misreading are [i] the mistake of thinking that Locke uses 'consciousness' to mean memory, [ii] failure to appreciate the importance of the ‘concernment’ that always accompanies ‘consciousness’, on Locke's view, [iii] a tendency to take the term 'person', in Locke's text, as if it were only some kind of fundamental sortal term like ‘human being’ or ‘thinking thi…Read more
  •  311
    Freedom and Belief
    Oxford University Press. 1986.
    On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of …Read more
  •  186
    Red and 'red'
    Synthese 78 (February): 193-232. 1989.
    THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRU…Read more
  •  139
    Cognitive phenomenology: real life
    In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 285--325. 2011.
    Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience: occurrent experience of linguistic representati…Read more
  •  31
    The impossibility of ultimate responsibility?
    In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science, Oup/british Academy. 2011.
    This chapter argues that the mere fact that a decision has not been fully caused by previous events suggests that these are simply random events for which a person cannot be properly held morally responsible. Whatever the laws governing the formations of our decisions, it is simply not possible that a person can be morally responsible for their actions. For either they are caused to do what they do by events outside their control, or their actions are the result of random processes.
  •  64
    Knowledge of the World
    Noûs 36 (s1). 2002.
    reprinted as 'Can We Know the Nature of Reality As It Is In Itself' in Galen Strawson, Real Materialism, 2008: Many hold that it is impossible in principle for finite creatures like ourselves to know anything of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we can be said to know the nature of the qualitative character of our own experiences (as it is in itself) just in having them. I argue that there is no insuperable obstacle to knowledge of the nature of non-mental con…Read more
  •  16
    Knowledge of the world
    Philosophical Issues 12 (1): 146-175. 2002.
  •  831
    The Bounds of freedom
    In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460. 2002.
    The shortest form of the Basic Argument against free will and moral responsibility runs as follows: [1] When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find yourself—because of the way you are. [2] If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do you must be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. But [3] You cannot be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. So [4] You cannot be fully…Read more
  •  30
    Humeanism
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1): 96--102. 2015.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, not at all clear that this usage is appropriate. Lewis himself raised a doubt about it.
  •  31
  • Freedom and Belief
    Mind 97 (387): 481-484. 1988.
  •  28
    Reale intentionalität V.2: Warum impliziert intentionalität bewusstsein?
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 279-297. 2005.
    Intentionalität ist ein essenziell mentales, essenziell ereignishaftes und essenziell auf Erfahrung beruhendes Phänomen. Jeder Versuch, der die Intentionalität charakterisieren will und sie von der bewussten Erfahrung entkoppelt, sieht sich zwei unüberwindbaren Problemen gegenübergestellt. Erstens muss man einräumen, dass beinahe alles Intentionalität besitzt – bis hin zu den subatomaren Partikeln. Zweitens hat dies zur Folge, dass alles, was Intentionalität besitzt, viel zuviel davon besitzt – …Read more
  •  200
    The self and the SESMET
    In Journal of Consciousness Studies, Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 99-135. 2002.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article
  •  171
    Episodic Ethics
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116. 2007.
    I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
  •  82
    Postface
    Princeton. 2011/2014.
  •  2
    Models of the Self
    Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 2002.