•  156
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1): 1-31. 2013.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as objec…Read more
  •  156
    Realism and causation
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148): 253-277. 1987.
  •  146
    [1] Experience is a real concrete phenomenon. The existence of experience entails the existence of a subject of experience. Therefore subjects of experience are concretely real. [2] The existence of a subject of experience in the lived present or living moment of experience, e.g. the period of time in which the grasping of a thought occurs, provably involves the existence of singleness or unity of an unsurpassably strong kind. The singleness or unity in question is a metaphysically real, concret…Read more
  •  139
    Cognitive phenomenology: real life
    In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 285--325. 2011.
    Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience: occurrent experience of linguistic representati…Read more
  •  102
    The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 149-155. 2000.
  •  91
    ‘The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 111-141. 2015.
    Many think John Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent and circular. It's neither of these things. The root causes of the misreading are [i] the mistake of thinking that Locke uses 'consciousness' to mean memory, [ii] failure to appreciate the importance of the ‘concernment’ that always accompanies ‘consciousness’, on Locke's view, [iii] a tendency to take the term 'person', in Locke's text, as if it were only some kind of fundamental sortal term like ‘human being’ or ‘thinking thi…Read more
  •  82
    In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is standardly used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, most unclear that this usage is appropriate, and Lewis himself raised a doubt about it
  •  82
    Princeton. 2011/2014.
  •  82
  •  81
    Free Agents
    Philosophical Topics 32 371-402. 2004.
    In this paper I try to give an account of necessary and sufficient conditions of true freedom of action, of true or ultimate responsibility, even while acknowledging that such ultimate responsibility is impossible, because one of the conditions—being causa sui, or absolutely self-originating—is unfulfillable. I consider various forms of the ‘able-to-choose’ condition on freedom, and summarize the argument in part III of my book Freedom and Belief for the seemingly paradoxical claim that one of t…Read more
  •  75
    The Self
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  74
    Realistic materialism
    In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. 2003.
  •  68
    Nicholas Everitt's objection to my discussion of the regularity theory of causation is a common one. Ithink it misses the point, but the point it misses is in a way a delicate one, and hard to express, and the general worry he expresses is a natural one. For that reason it is important, and its importance is reflected in the fact that it is very difficult to find a satisfyingly substantive way of stating the difference between regularity theories of causation and non-regularity theories of …Read more
  •  64
    The Self
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.
    This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen
  •  64
    Knowledge of the World
    Noûs 36 (s1). 2002.
    reprinted as 'Can We Know the Nature of Reality As It Is In Itself' in Galen Strawson, Real Materialism, 2008: Many hold that it is impossible in principle for finite creatures like ourselves to know anything of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we can be said to know the nature of the qualitative character of our own experiences (as it is in itself) just in having them. I argue that there is no insuperable obstacle to knowledge of the nature of non-mental con…Read more
  •  57
    The minimal subject
    In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    This article examines the metaphysics and phenomenology of the self or subject of experience. It suggests that the phenomenological description of the minimal subject requires no reference to body, environment, or social relations and argues for a thin conception of subjectivity which equates the subject with the experience itself. Under this principle of minimal conception, the subject does not exist if the person is asleep. It contends that the profound metaphysical question about experience a…Read more
  •  55
    L’intentionnalité est un phénomène essentiellement mental, essentiellement événementiel et essentiellement expérienciel . Toute tentative de caractérisation de l’intentionnalité qui la sépare de l’expérience consciente est confrontée à deux problèmes insurmontables. D’abord elle est obligée de reconnaître que presque tout – y compris même les particules subatomiques – est doté d’intentionnalité. En conséquence de quoi, tout ce qui est doté d’intentionnalité en est beaucoup trop – peut-être infin…Read more
  •  50
    The unhelpfulness of determinism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 149-56. 2000.
  •  48
    This book argues that in fact it is Locke 's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid.
  •  47
    Underestimating the Physical
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 228-240. 2019.
    Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about the physical than…Read more
  •  45
    Against 'Corporism': The Two Uses of 'I'
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4): 428-448. 2009.
    In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that ‘both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ‘I’, in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other’ . I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible ‘Cartesian materialist’ sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the…Read more
  •  38
    Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism, and on the sesmet theory of subjectivity
    In D. Skrbina (ed.), Mind that abides: panpsychism in the new millennium., . pp. 33-65. 2009.
  •  34
    Panpsychism? Reply to commentators, with a celebration of Descartes
    In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism?, . 2006.
    Reply to commentators on the paper 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism'
  •  33
    The impossibility of ultimate responsibility?
    In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science, Oup/british Academy. 2011.
    This chapter argues that the mere fact that a decision has not been fully caused by previous events suggests that these are simply random events for which a person cannot be properly held morally responsible. Whatever the laws governing the formations of our decisions, it is simply not possible that a person can be morally responsible for their actions. For either they are caused to do what they do by events outside their control, or their actions are the result of random processes.
  •  32
    Oh You Materialist!
    with B. Russell
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10): 229-249. 2021.
    Materialism in the philosophy of mind — materialismPM — is the view that everything mental is material (or, equivalently, physical). Consciousness — pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on — certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousness — consciousness! — is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view intro…Read more
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