•  30
    Humeanism
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1): 96--102. 2015.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, not at all clear that this usage is appropriate. Lewis himself raised a doubt about it.
  •  30
    Précis of Mental Reality (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 433-435. 1998.
  •  28
    Reale intentionalität V.2: Warum impliziert intentionalität bewusstsein?
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 279-297. 2005.
    Intentionalität ist ein essenziell mentales, essenziell ereignishaftes und essenziell auf Erfahrung beruhendes Phänomen. Jeder Versuch, der die Intentionalität charakterisieren will und sie von der bewussten Erfahrung entkoppelt, sieht sich zwei unüberwindbaren Problemen gegenübergestellt. Erstens muss man einräumen, dass beinahe alles Intentionalität besitzt – bis hin zu den subatomaren Partikeln. Zweitens hat dies zur Folge, dass alles, was Intentionalität besitzt, viel zuviel davon besitzt – …Read more
  •  27
    Review: Précis of Mental Reality (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2). 1998.
  •  25
    Conceivability and the Silence of Physics
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12): 167-192. 2017.
    According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to know whether o…Read more
  •  22
    Owning the Past Reply to Stokes
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4): 3-4. 2011.
  •  17
    The mechanism—the secret—of the given
    Synthese 1-20. forthcoming.
    There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. It examines an early account by Charles Augustus Strong of why The Myth is a myth. It maintains that a natural and naturalistic version of empiricism is compatible with the fact that the Myth is a myth. It gives proper place to enactivist considerations. It is ) broadly in line with the Sella…Read more
  •  16
    Knowledge of the world
    Philosophical Issues 12 (1): 146-175. 2002.
  •  14
    I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject
    In S. Prosser and F. Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 202-223. 2012.
    I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fa…Read more
  •  10
    In this revised and updated edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in all philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. Strawson challenges the standard view of Hume, according to which he thinks that there is no such thing as causal influence, and that there is nothing more to causation than things of one kind regularly following things things of another kind. He argues that Hume does believe in causal influence, but insists that we cannot know…Read more
  •  10
    Self and Body
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 73 287-332. 1999.
    [Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by these predicate…Read more
  •  9
    Freedom and Belief
    Noûs 24 (5): 807-810. 1990.
  •  8
    Book-Reviews
    Mind 95 (379): 400-404. 1986.
  •  7
    Episodische Ethik
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (5): 651-675. 2008.
    Der Beitrag unterscheidet zwischen episodischen und diachronischen Persönlichkeiten. Episodische Persönlichkeiten leben emotional stark in der Gegenwart und verfügen im Gegensatz zu diachronischen Persönlichkeiten nicht über ein Narrativ, welches sie ihre Gegenwart und Vergangenheit als eine Einheit empfinden lässt. Der Autor führt vor, dass episodische Persönlichkeiten trotz ihres psychologisch nur schwach ausgeprägten Verhältnisses zu ihrer eigenen Vergangenheit moralfähig sind
  •  7
    Introduction
    Social Philosophy Today 21 1-14. 2005.
  •  6
    Book review of 'The ethics of memory' by A. Margalit.
  •  6
    Freedom and Belief: Revised Edition
    Oxford University Press UK. 2010.
    This is a revised and updated edition of Galen Strawson's groundbreaking first book, where he argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility. This conclusion is very hard to accept. On the whole we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are truly morally responsible for what we do. Strawson devotes much of the book to an attempt to explain why this is so. He examines various aspects of the 'cognitive …Read more
  •  5
    Mental Reality
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 433-435. 1994.