David Cooper

I shall not try to deal with all of the interesting points Mr. R. S. Downie raises against my paper, Collective Responsibility . I shall deal with a matter of clarification, one of the lesser issues between us, and the major issue between us. . On one point, surely, Downie has simply misunderstood what I said. He claims that my criticisms do not work against the common view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness; but only apainst the claim that Responsibility is analytically tied to the efficacy of blame. Well, I hope so. For it was meant to be clear that I was only attacking the view, to be found in Nowell-Smith's Ethics , that Responsibility is to be analysed in terms of the efficacy of blame and punishment. Far from attacking the view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness , I quoted, with full approval, a passage from Brandt, according to which Responsibility entails the “fittinsness” of blaming and praising attitudes

A striking feature of philosophy in the century just passed is the scale of attention paid to questions concerning the natural environment and technology—a scale so large that any brief survey of the development, current state and possible future of such attention would degenerate into telegrammatic reportage. I shall indeed address the question why philosophical concern with environment and technology has ‘taken off’, and with some confidence that its answer will enable a reasonable estimate of the central issues which deserve continuing reflection. But that question, too, is unmanageably large as it stands. So I need to do something to restrict it.

On 18–19 May 2018, a symposium was held in the Research Institute of Irish and Scottish Studies at the University of Aberdeen to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of Ronald W. Hepburn (1927–2008). The speakers at this event discussed Hepburn’s oeuvre from several perspectives. For this book, the collection of the revised versions of their talks has been supplemented by the papers of other scholars who were unable to attend the symposium itself. Thus this volume contains contributions from eighteen notable scholars of different disciplines, ranging from contemporary aesthetics and art theory through to philosophical approaches to religion, education and social anthropology. It also includes a bibliography of Hepburn’s writings. The essays were first published in two special issues of the Journal of Scottish Thought, vols. 10–11 (2018–2019). Ronald William Hepburn was born in Aberdeen on 16 March 1927. He went to Aberdeen Grammar School, then he graduated with an M.A. in Philosophy (1951) and obtained his doctorate from the University of Aberdeen (1955). His tutor at Aberdeen was Donald MacKinnon (1913– 1994), a Scottish philosopher and theologian, the author of A Study in Ethical Theory (1957) and The Problem of Metaphysics (1974). Hepburn taught as Lecturer at the Department of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen (1956–60), and he was also Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at New York University (1959–60). He returned from the United States as Professor of Philosophy at Nottingham University. In 1964, he was appointed as a Chair in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and between 1965 and 1968 he was also Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Cambridge. From 1975 until his retirement in 1996, he held the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. He died in Edinburgh on 23 December 2008. His philosophical interests ranged from theology and the philosophy of religion through moral philosophy and the philosophy of education to art theory and aesthetics. Notably, Hepburn is widely regarded as the founder of modern environmental and everyday aesthetics as a result of the influence of papers in the 1960s which pioneered a new approach to the aesthetics of the natural world.

Identifying what is wrong with the demise of wildlife requires prior identification of the human sentiment which is offended by that demise. Attempts to understand this in terms of animal rights (individual or species) and the benefits of wildlife to human beings or the wider environment are rejected. A diagnosis of this sentiment is attempted in terms of our increasing admiration, in the conditions of modernity and postmodernity, for the 'harmony' or 'at homeness' of wild animals with their environments. The diagnosis is defended against certain misunderstandings, and implications are tentatively drawn from it for environmental education and the management of wildlife

Meaning is one of our most central and most ubiquitous concepts. Anything at all may, in suitable contexts, have meaning ascribed to it. In this wide-ranging book, David Cooper departs from the usual focus on linguistic meaning to discuss how works of art, ceremony, social action, bodily gesture, and the purpose of life can all be meaningful. He argues that the notion of meaning is best approached by considering what we accept as explanations of meaning in everyday practice and shows that in these situations we are explaining the appropriate fit of an item - whether a word or an artwork - with something larger than or outside of itself. This fuller account of meaning explores questions of the meaning of meaning and tackles issues such as whether meaning is just a misleading 'folk' term for something more basic, whether there really is meaning at all, and whether we should strive for meaning or let our lives 'just be' rather than mean. By taking the problem of meaning out of the technical philosophy of language and providing a more general account, Cooper is able to offer new insights into the import, function, and status of meaning that will be of interest not only to philosophers of language but to students and philosophers working in areas such as epistemology and metaphysics.

This paper develops the idea, articulated by Martin Buber among others, that a religious sense cannot be identified independently of sensory and practical engagement with the world of ordinary experience. It begins by rejecting the ‘doxastic’ model’ on which religiousness is equated with propositional belief. Criticisms, however, are made of some attempts to soften the contrast between belief and practice. The religious sense, which need not be a theistic one, is understood in terms of a sense of the mystery or ineffability of things – one that has become occluded in modernity. This sense, in turn, is understood in terms of how it may be cultivated and exemplified in and through practices. This claim is elaborated by considering the East Asian notion of ‘Ways’ – practices, like ‘The Way of Tea’, that aim at self-cultivation and spiritual enlightenment. Gardening, in particular, has been regarded as an exemplary Way through which a sense of mystery is cultivated and shaped. The paper concludes by proposing that, when engaged in appropriately and mindfully, almost any ordinary practice may both reflect and confirm an attunement to a mystery that is diffused over the world at large.

Efforts to conserve endangered species of animal are, in some important respects, at odds with Buddhist ethics. On the one hand, being abstract entities, species cannot suffer, and so cannot be proper objects of compassion or similar moral virtues. On the other, Buddhist commitments to equanimity tend to militate against the idea that the individual members of endangered species have greater value than those of less-threatened ones. This paper suggests that the contribution of Buddhism to the issue of species conservation should not, however, be discounted. It argues, on the contrary, that Buddhist traditions, in reminding us of the moral significance of the suffering of individual animals, add an important dimension to debates concerning the ethical justification of efforts to conserve endangered species.

Educational policy and discussion, in Britain and the USA, are increasingly dominated by the confused ideology of egalitarianism. David E. Cooper begins by identifying the principles hidden among the confusions, and argues that these necessarily conflict with the ideal of educational excellence - in which conflict it is this ideal that must be preserved. He goes on to criticize the use of education as a tool for promoting wider social equality, focussing especially on the muddles surrounding 'equal opportunities', 'social mix' and 'reverse discrimination'. Further chapters criticize the 'new egalitarianism' favoured, on epistemological grounds, by various sociologists of knowledge in recent years and 'cultural egalitarianism' according to which standard criteria of educational value merely reflect parochial and economic interests. -- Amazon.com.

Several philosophers have argued, against the hypothesis of alternative logical mentalities, that it is not conceivable that there should be peoples who reject the law of non-contradictlon. In reply, I argue first that these philosophers are lending an unwarranted pre-eminence to this law, and second that their case is made to look stronger than it is by confusing different senses in which a logical law might be 'rejected'. Finally, I consider some remarks of Wittgenstein which suggest that 'acceptance' of contradictions might not be unintelligible.