Chenyang Li

Freedom is intrinsic to a good life. An account of the Confucian conception of the good life must include a reasonable conception of freedom. Studies in Chinese ideas of freedom, however, have been focused mostly on Daoism. A quick survey of some fine books on Chinese philosophy shows little result on Confucian freedom.1 In this essay, I argue that attributing a notion of “free will” to Confucian philosophy has serious limitations; it will be more fruitful to draw on contemporary feminist theories of freedom and autonomy, particularly the notion of autonomy competency, in explicating Confucian freedom. Thus, I articulate the Confucian notion of freedom in terms of choosing , and advance a Confucian ..

This essay studies equality and inequality in Confucianism. By studying Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, and other classic thinkers, I argue that Confucian equality is manifested in two forms. Numerical equality is founded in the Mencian belief that every person is born with the same moral potential and the Xunzian notion that all people have the same xing and the same potential for moral cultivation. It is also manifested in the form of role-based equality. Proportional equality, however, is the main notion of equality in Confucian philosophy. Proportional equality is realized in moral, economic, and political realms. On the basis of these notions of Confucian equality, I propose two Confucian political principles for contemporary society. The first is the inclusive principle of general election by citizenry, and the second is the exclusive principle of qualification for public offices.

Harmony is a concept essential to Confucianism and to the way of life of past and present people in East Asia. Integrating methods of textual exegesis, historical investigation, comparative analysis, and philosophical argumentation, this book presents a comprehensive treatment of the Confucian philosophy of harmony. The book traces the roots of the concept to antiquity, examines its subsequent development, and explicates its theoretical and practical significance for the contemporary world. It argues that, contrary to a common view in the West, Confucian harmony is not mere agreement but has to be achieved and maintained with creative tension. Under the influence of a Weberian reading of Confucianism as "adjustment" to a world with an underlying fixed cosmic order, Confucian harmony has been systematically misinterpreted in the West as presupposing an invariable grand scheme of things that pre-exists in the world to which humanity has to conform. The book shows that Confucian harmony is a dynamic, generative process, which seeks to balance and reconcile differences and conflicts through creativity. Illuminating one of the most important concepts in Chinese philosophy and intellectual history, this book is of interest to students of Chinese studies, history and philosophy in general and eastern philosophy in particular.

The materialist thesis that there is a type-type identity between certain mental phenomena and certain physical phenomena has encountered serious criticisms. This paper is to propose a revised form of mind-body identity theory which moves forward from the token identity theory and can stand the major criticism made against the type-type identity theory. In the first part of the paper, through a very brief review of the issue I show what needs to be done; in the second part, I show how my solution avoids the difficulties that have troubled the type-type identity theory.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-MingChenyang LiUnderstanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming. By Shu-hsien Liu. Westport and London: Praeger, 1998. Pp. xii + 273.Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming, by Shu-hsien Liu, a leading contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar, aims to present the Confucian tradition [End Page 312] from a contemporary Neo-Confucian perspective and purports to provide some background clues to what has led to the Third Epoch of Confucianism, that is, the emergence of the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement.As its title suggests, the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with Classical Confucianism, and part 2 is a study of Sung-Ming Confucian philosophy. The Classical period begins with an informative chapter on the historical background to the emergence of Confucian philosophy, which is particularly useful if the book is to be used as a university-level text. The historical chapter is followed by chapters on Confucius (Kong Zi), Mencius (Meng Zi), The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Changes. Part 1 ends with a chapter on the transformation of Confucianism since the Han dynasty. Compared with similar books on Confucian philosophy, the chapter on Confucius appears sketchy, but its treatment of Confucius' central concept, jen (ren), is first-rate, clear, and insightful. The chapter on Mencius is more elaborate. It surveys virtually every key concept of Mencius' philosophy. As with similar works by Chinese scholars, the sheer number of quotations in this chapter may appear excessive to Western readers. Hsün Tzu (Xun Zi), another key classical Confucian philosopher, is only mentioned in passing, although this is not surprising in a book written from a Neo-Confucian perspective; in the Neo Confucian tradition Hsün Tzu is considered unorthodox.The chapter on the Book of Changes is a breath of fresh air in that it has adopted a developmental point of view. The author argues that there are four layers of meaning in the work: it offers a system of mystical symbolism, a system of rational/natural symbolism, a system of cosmological symbolism, and finally a system of ethics/metaphysical symbolism. Professor Liu says of the four systems, "each one succeed[s] the other and yet interpenetrate[s] the other" (p. 74). Overall, Classical Confucianism is analyzed according to three inseparable aspects—spiritual, political, and popular—which define the heritage as well as the burden of this tradition.At first I was a bit surprised to see that the chapter on "The Characteristics and Contemporary Significance of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian Philosophy" is at the beginning, not at the end, of part 2 on Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy. But it turns out that this chapter contains a brief survey of some major Neo-Confucian philosophers of the period and serves well as an introduction to part 2. Recognizing Chu Hsi's (Zhu Xi) contribution to the movement of the Second Epoch, Liu spends two chapters out of six on this great Sung philosopher. The chapter on Wang Yang-ming aims "to destroy the myth once and for all that there is no discrepancy between Lu [Hsiang-shan] and Wang and that there is not a close relationship between Wang and Chu [Hsi]" (p. 198). This goes against a widespread (mis)conception that Wang and Chu represent two distinct lines of Neo-Confucianism.Part 2 ends with a chapter on Huang Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi), arguably the most liberal of all Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers. Liu regards Huang as the culmination of an unfinished Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophical tradition, from which the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement should take up the cause. Altogether, part 2 is not as systematic in introducing Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy as is part 1 on Classical Confucianism. [End Page 313]As a synthesis of various articles previously published by the author over a twenty-five-year period, the book bears both the strengths and the weaknesses of works of this kind: there are in-depth studies focused on specific topics of particular interest in the Neo-Confucian movement, but there is occasionally a lack of smooth transition from one chapter to another or...

When asked why we are friends with someone, we often point to her good virtues as reasons. If these are the reasons, we have equal reasons to be friends with anyone with such virtues, and we can even replace current friends with anyone with the same or better virtues without substantive loss in friendship. However, it does not seem right that a particular friend is replaceable by just any other person with the same or better virtues. This is the fungibility problem of friendship. This essay outlines a Confucian response to the problem on the basis of the Confucian family-based conception of friendship and the Confucian understanding of particularized virtues. First, in the Confucian understanding, true friends are like family members, toward whom we have special obligations. Family members are nonfungible, and so are friends. Second, even though virtues are general traits that can be shared, the formations and practices of virtues are particularized. Confucian thinkers hold that each person configures virtues and exercises virtues in his or her own way depending on specific circumstances, and that persons with the same virtues may nevertheless possess them in varied fashions and exercise different shades of them in particular ways. Thus, persons of the same generic virtues will still retain their particularities as distinctive individuals. We become friends and remain friends with people in part because of their virtues practiced in ways that we appreciate. This notion of particularly exercised virtues makes it practically impossible for two persons to be identical in virtues. On such an understanding, virtuous friends are nevertheless unique and nonfungible.

Daniel A. Bell's recent book The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy makes a significant contribution to political theory, political philosophy, and China studies. The book has already drawn a variety of responses, some of which I believe are due to utter misreadings and misunderstandings. It is therefore important for us to spell out explicitly what kind of work we are dealing with here before we dive into other substantive issues. We should not take this book as an apologetics for the Chinese Communist Party even though it offers both positive and negative assessments of the Chinese communist regime, as any...

It has been three decades since comparative philosophers began to associate the Confucian concept of ren 仁 with contemporary Western care ethics. It would be useful to revisit the issue and to reassess related debates. In this essay, I first contextualize this discourse by tracing the emergence of care as a philosophical concept in the West and explicate the Confucian concept of ren in terms of care as it is formulated in classic texts. Then I respond to challenges, including opposing views from influential care ethicists Nel Noddings and Virginia Held. I also discuss some promising studies to further this discourse.

In this paper I argue that Fan Ruiping’s explication of the Confucian notion of li 禮 is problematic in several ways. First, his division of human activities into “social” and “natural” is less than illuminating, as human “natural” activities are already inescapably social. Second, I question the appropriateness for him to characterize li in terms of “closed activities,” as some rituals are evidently open-ended. Third, he seems to have overemphasized the constitutive function of li and understated its regulative function. Fourth, contrary to Fan’s claim, Confucian li accomplishes “external goals” in human life as well as “internal goals.” Finally, Fan’s requirement for being a Confucian with respect to the observance of li is unrealistically high and makes it difficult for people to qualify as Confucian

The rise of China, along with problems of governance in democratic countries, has reinvigorated the theory of political meritocracy. But what is the theory of political meritocracy and how can it set standards for evaluating political progress? To help answer these questions, this volume gathers a series of commissioned research papers from an interdisciplinary group of leading philosophers, historians and social scientists. The result is the first book in decades to examine the rise of political meritocracy and what it will mean for political developments in China and the rest of the world. Despite its limitations, meritocracy has contributed much to human flourishing in East Asia and beyond and will continue to do so in the future. This book is essential reading for those who wish to further the debate and perhaps even help to implement desirable forms of political change.

In recent years, the adverse implications of organizational identification (OID) have received significant attention in the field of organizational behavior research, particularly as it is considered a critical factor in unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB). Nevertheless, the findings of previous studies are inconsistent. To explain these discrepancies, we performed a meta-analysis of 54 independent studies from January 2010 to April 2023, comprising a total of 14,836 samples, to investigate the impact of OID on UPB and the moderating effects of cultural context. The results of our study demonstrated that individualism, power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and indulgence play moderating roles in the OID – UPB relationship. This study makes noteworthy theoretical and practical contributions and lays the foundation for future research.

At the twenty-second World Congress of Philosophy held in Seoul, Korea, from July 29 to August 5, 2008, a panel was convened to debate the ideas for a "democracy with Confucian characteristics'' in Daniel A. Bell's Beyond Liberal Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). While all participants welcome the attempt to remedy the shortcomings of liberal democracy with Confucian teachings, Fred Dallmayr worries that Bell's political thinking for an East Asian context may "point beyond democracy tout court/' For Sor-hoon Tan, Bell's chapter 6, "Taking Elitism Seriously: Democracy with Confucian Characteristics" may not be so much an alternative to liberalism as it is a challenge to the democratic value of equality that overlooks the dangers of an imperfect meritocracy. Chenyang Li, on the other hand, approaches Bell's proposal of combining a Confucianism-inspired Upper House of Talent and Virtue selected through competitive examinations with a lower house of democratically elected representatives from the concern that it surrenders the Confucian requirement of virtuous leadership. This feature review also concludes with a spirited reply from Daniel Bell.

Abstract:The Confucian classic Great Learning (Daxue 大學) articulates in a sequence eight human aims for the good life. There have been various interpretations of the relations of these aims. This essay problematizes these interpretations and proposes a solution that the sequence of these Confucian human aims is developmentally temporal yet not stage-exclusive. I illustrate such an account by drawing on the model of Erik Erikson's developmental theory. Accordingly, while there is a temporal progression in achieving these aims, they nevertheless should be pursued concurrently throughout most of a person's life.

Joseph Chan’s Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times is a milestone in the contemporary study of Confucian political philosophy. In this remarkable work, Chan presents his version of Confucian perfectionism, aiming to balance liberalism and Confucianism as a solution to reconstructing a political philosophy in response to contemporary challenges. I am sympathetic to much of what Chan has to say in the book. I agree that, rather than merely being an ethical theory, Confucianism can and should have a place in political philosophy. I also agree that Confucianism can coexist with democracy1 and that human rights can and should be instituted as a fallback apparatus. This essay is not...

This volume of new essays is the first English-language anthology devoted to Chinese metaphysics. The essays explore the key themes of Chinese philosophy, from pre-Qin to modern times, starting with important concepts such as yin-yang and qi and taking the reader through the major periods in Chinese thought - from the Classical period, through Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, into the twentieth-century philosophy of Xiong Shili. They explore the major traditions within Chinese philosophy, including Daoism and Mohism, and a broad range of metaphysical topics, including monism, theories of individuation, and the relationship between reality and falsehood. The volume will be a valuable resource for upper-level students and scholars of metaphysics, Chinese philosophy, or comparative philosophy, and with its rich insights into the ethical, social and political dimensions of Chinese society, it will also interest students of Asian studies and Chinese intellectual history.

It is a great honor to have colleagues engaging in a meaningful discussion of my book. I appreciate my critics’ thoughtful and constructive criticisms as well as exceedingly generous praises. Due to space limitations, I will confine my response to some key issues raised here. I will begin with Yao Xinzhong’s criticism of my claim and argument on the centrality of harmony in Confucian philosophy. Yao reads my view as being that harmony is the central concept or ideal in Confucian philosophy, which I take to mean that harmony has been the central concept or ideal in Confucian philosophy up to this point. Understood this way, that is not my argument in the book. My claims in the book are more...