David Weberman

(1955 - 2026)

Diese Studie will zeigen, daß die Antwort auf das Problem des historischen Erkennens nicht in der Alternative zwischen Objektivismus und Subjektivismus zu suchen ist. Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen drei zeitgenössische Philosophen, Gadamer, Habermas und Danto, die das objektivistische Modell für inadäquat halten. Dies führt zu einer weiterentwickelten Konzeption der Zukunftsorientiertheit des historischen Erkennens und strebt einer Widerlegung aller Arten des Objektivismus an, auch derjenigen in subjektivistischer Verkleidung, ohne in den Subjektivismus zurückzufallen.

Peter Geach and others suppose that change in an object's relational properties absent any change in its intrinsic properties is not a genuine change in that object but only a “mere Cambridge change.” I explain and reject two strategies challenging Geach's position. I then present my own argument against Geach which depends on the recognition of entities identified in terms of their emergent properties, i.e. properties not reducible to physical properties. I provide some examples of such entities and address the problem of finding a criterion for distinguishing genuine from nonge‐nuine change

Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein''s world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility ofthat wherein Dasein dwells.

This dissertation aims to clarify and evaluate early Heidegger's argument that traditional philosophy has fallen victim to an intellectualistic fallacy because it overlooks the fact that human beings are not merely knowers, but also historically rooted, willing agents. The argument at issue purports to show that 'care' and 'concern' are central to a proper philosophical understanding of knowledge, truth and experience. ;I begin with a detailed analysis of two key terms in Heidegger's argument, 'readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand,' in order to show that their meaning and relation have not been properly worked out. The former term must be construed not technically, but in its full-blown relation to the sphere of praxis. I then attempt to explain the 'deficiency' of presence-at-hand by going beyond Heidegger's own explanation. The result is a triadic relation whereby theory and practice are grounded, in different ways, in the same unitary structure--a structure which is itself practical. ;I then reconstruct Heidegger's argument for the priority of the practical. The argument is shown to consist of two distinct claims: first, for the priority of readiness-to-hand and the everyday world to theoretical inquiry; second, for the priority of praxis as a condition for the possibility of human experience as we know it. The argument, combining these two claims, is shown to a be a strategy relying partly on a 'non-legitimating transcendental argument' and partly on certain assumptions about human nature. It is shown that this argument leads to a purportedly non-skeptical version of historical relativism. The consistency of Heidegger's relativism is then examined. ;In the final part, I assess the degree to which Heidegger's argument and position succeeds as a critique of intellectualistic theories of experience. I argue that his strategy is successful only if we interpret it as making the claim that theoretical inquiry is shaped by everyday experience. It is then shown that Heidegger is able to formulate a unique and engaging anti-scientistic, anti-skeptical and anti-realist philosophical position

This paper re-examines the central thesis of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event, or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, this paper considers three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the literature on Gadamer, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. The paper rejects this argument as insufficient. Similarly, the paper rejects a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. The paper then articulates a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions in which it is grasped. The paper appeals to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend the position against two objections: i) that it conflates meaning and significance, and ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism