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103Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2014.Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
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86Memory demonstrativesIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory, Oxford University Press. pp. 177--194. 2001.
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70Sense and consciousnessIn Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Distributed in the U.s.a. By Humanities Press. pp. 195-211. 1986.On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of part…Read more
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68Joint attention and simulationIn Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
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65Attention and frames of reference in spatial reasoning: A reply to BryantMind and Language 12 (3-4). 1997.
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57Causation in PsychologyHarvard University Press. 2020."A blab droid is a robot with a body shaped like a pizza box, a pair of treads, and a smiley face. Guided by an onboard video camera, it roams hotel lobbies and conference centers, asking questions in the voice of a seven-year-old. "Can you help me?" "What is the worst thing you've ever done?" "Who in the world do you love most?" People pour their hearts out in response. This droid prompts the question of what we can hope from social robots. Might they provide humanlike friendship? Philosopher J…Read more
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57Joint Attention and the First PersonIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. 1998.It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extreme…Read more
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53The realism of memoryIn Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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31Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring TermPhilosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 89-104. 1999.
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21Joint Attention and the First PersonRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 123-136. 1998.It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extreme…Read more
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21Sense, Reference and Selective AttentionAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 55-98. 1997.
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13What Is It to Know What ‘I’ Refers To?The Monist 87 (2): 206-218. 2004.We can make a distinction between the conceptual role of the first person and the reference of the first person. By ‘conceptual role’ I mean the use that is made of the term: the kinds of procedures that we use in verifying judgements using the term and the kinds of actions we perform on the basis of judgements involving the term. In “Self-Notions,” Perry talks about conceptual role using the phrase, ‘epistemic/pragmatic relations’. He says there are “normally self-informative” ways of getting i…Read more
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11Institutionnal Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political EcnomyTheory and Society 27 (3): 377-409. 1998.
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8New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett (edited book)Atlanta: Rodopi. 1998.Ever since the publication of 'Truth' in 1959 Sir Michael Dummett has been acknowledged as one of the most profoundly creative and influential of contemporary philosophers. His contributions to the philosophy of thought and language, logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics have set the terms of some of most fruitful discussions in philosophy. His work on Frege stands unparalleled, both as landmark in the history of philosophy and as a deep reflection on the defining commitments of …Read more
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5Comment: Psychological Causation without Physical CausationIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 184--195. 2008.
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4The objective of this study was to compare nutrient concentration, distribution, and select components of nutrient budgets for aspen, jack pine, and black spruce forest ecosystems at the BOReal Ecosystem Atmosphere Study, southern and northern study areas near Candle Lake, Saskatchewan and Thompson, Manitoba, Canada, respectively. The vegetation in the aspen, black spruce, and jack pine stands contained 70-79%, 53-54%, and 58-67% of total ecosystem carbon content, respectively. Soil nitrogen, ca…Read more
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3An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint AttentionIn Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, The Mit Press. forthcoming.
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1Relational vs Kantian responses to Berkeley's puzzleIn Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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Manipulating colour : pounding an almondIn Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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University of California, Los AngelesRegular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |