Carla Bagnoli

University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
  •  8
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
  •  14
    The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.
    A critical review of R. Audi
  •  118
    Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem
    Philosophia 44 (4): 1229-1246. 2016.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some …Read more
  •  66
    Rooted in the Past, Hooked in the Present: Vulnerability to Contingency and Immunity to Regret
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3): 763-770. 2016.
    The perspective of deliberative choice is constitutively from here. This simple truth carries significant implications for our agency and integrity, some of which are the focus of Wallace's thought-provoking essay. Wallace is concerned with the discrepancy between our present attachments and the rational justification of past decisions, which threatens our personal and moral integrity. In what follows, I raise some questions about Wallace's claim that attachments make us immune to regret and, ul…Read more
  •  14
    Review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality (review)
    Philosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.
  • The Claims of Reason: Engstrom’s account of practical knowledge
    Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 197-203. 2011.
  • “Moral Dilemmas”
    International Encyclopedia of Ethics. 2012.
  •  890
    Constructivism in metaethics
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
    Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct-- constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical or idealiz…Read more
  •  35
    L'autorità Della Morale
    Feltrinelli. 2007.
    Capitolo I Il rispetto e l'ideale morale 1.1. Angeli, bruti e agenti 1.2. Il rispetto dell'altro 1.3. Il rispetto di sé 1.4. Auto−riflessione e auto−legislazione 1.5. Autonomia e individualità 1.6. Il rispetto e l'attenzione 1.7. Il rispetto e l'amore.
  •  106
    The exploration of moral life
    In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, philosopher, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to fully appreciate the n…Read more
  •  121
    Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 307-329. 2001.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Ka…Read more
  •  19
    Discussione su "Ruling Passions. A Theory of Practical Reasoning" di Simon Blackburn
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 13 (2): 411-432. 2000.
  •  617
    On Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge
    Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 (6): 191-203. 2011.
  •  159
    Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?
    Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2): 31-45. 2015.
    Some moral claims strike us as objective. It is often argued that this shows morality to be objective. Moral experience – broadly construed – is invoked as the strongest argument for moral realism, the thesis that there are moral facts or properties.See e.g. Jonathan Dancy, “Two conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 : 167–187. Realists, however, cannot appropriate the argument from moral experience. In fact, constructivists argue that to validate the ways we e…Read more
  •  162
    Morality as practical knowledge
    Analytic Philosophy 53 (1): 61-70. 2012.
    In his original essay, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I will focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tensio…Read more
  •  125
    The appeal of Kantian intuitionism
    European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  79
    Blackburn sulla questione normativa”
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 30. 2000.
    Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce …Read more
  •  83
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
  •  260
    Respect and loving attention
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.
    On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
  •  3
    Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason
    In Christine Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability in Context, Routledge. pp. 13-32. 2016.
    In this chapter, I examine the concept of vulnerability as a complex constitutive feature of human agency and argue that it is both a constraint on and a resource for practical reasoning. When discussed as an ontological feature of human agency, vulnerability is primarily understood as an aspect of embodiment, which is problematic in different respects. First, in relation to the situatedness of human agency, vulnerability indicates that human agents are subjected to contextual contingencies. Sec…Read more
  •  176
    In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or …Read more
  •  4
    Change in view: sensitivity to facts in prospective rationality
    In Giancarlo Marchetti, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Sharyn Clough & Ruth Anna Putnam (eds.), La contingenza dei fatti e l'oggettivita dei valori, Mimesis. pp. 137-158. 2013.
    In this chapter, I offer a constructivist account of practical reasoning as both generative and transformative in response to calls from philosophers as diverse as Iris Murdoch and Gilbert Harman, who have urged the development of a more nuanced picture of reasoning that incorporates revisionary and revelatory changes in viewpoint. Within this context, I describe sensitivity to facts as a form of emotional engagement that is also partially constitutive of facts. I consider both the epistemologic…Read more
  •  30
    La mente morale. Un invito alla rilettura di Iris Murdoch
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 17 (1): 47-64. 2004.
    Iris Murdoch's conception of the moral mind, deliberation and agency.
  •  41
    Critical Review of 'The Form of Practical Knowledge', by Stephen Engstrom.