•  485
    On Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge
    Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 (6): 191-203. 2011.
  •  19
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 20 (1): 63-66. 2007.
  •  123
    Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?
    Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2): 31-45. 2015.
    Some moral claims strike us as objective. It is often argued that this shows morality to be objective. Moral experience – broadly construed – is invoked as the strongest argument for moral realism, the thesis that there are moral facts or properties.See e.g. Jonathan Dancy, “Two conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 : 167–187. Realists, however, cannot appropriate the argument from moral experience. In fact, constructivists argue that to validate the ways we e…Read more
  •  203
    Value in the guise of regret
    Philosophical Explorations 3 (2). 2000.
    According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regr…Read more
  •  38
    Morality as Compromise vs. Morality as a Constraint
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1): 159-169. 2014.
  •  316
    The Authority of Reflection
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 43-52. 2007.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-ref…Read more
  •  64
    with Gabriele Usberti
    Topoi 21 (1-2): 1-10. 2002.
    The articles of this volume address only some aspects of Nozick's philosophy: his conception of argument, knowledge, rationality, and identity. In examining Nozick's approach to these topics, one has to take issue, ultimately, with his peculiar conception of philosophy whose manifesto appears at the outset of Philosophical Explanations and is echoed in the introduction to philosophical method of Invariances . To transform philosophy into a science or build an impeccable deductive system was not …Read more
  •  55
    Rooted in the Past, Hooked in the Present: Vulnerability to Contingency and Immunity to Regret
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3): 763-770. 2016.
    The perspective of deliberative choice is constitutively from here. This simple truth carries significant implications for our agency and integrity, some of which are the focus of Wallace's thought-provoking essay. Wallace is concerned with the discrepancy between our present attachments and the rational justification of past decisions, which threatens our personal and moral integrity. In what follows, I raise some questions about Wallace's claim that attachments make us immune to regret and, ul…Read more
  •  9
    Review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality (review)
    Philosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.
  •  2
    In this chapter, I examine the concept of vulnerability as a complex constitutive feature of human agency and argue that it is both a constraint on and a resource for practical reasoning. When discussed as an ontological feature of human agency, vulnerability is primarily understood as an aspect of embodiment, which is problematic in different respects. First, in relation to the situatedness of human agency, vulnerability indicates that human agents are subjected to contextual contingencies. Sec…Read more
  • “Moral Dilemmas”
    International Encyclopedia of Ethics. 2012.
  •  4
    In this chapter, I offer a constructivist account of practical reasoning as both generative and transformative in response to calls from philosophers as diverse as Iris Murdoch and Gilbert Harman, who have urged the development of a more nuanced picture of reasoning that incorporates revisionary and revelatory changes in viewpoint. Within this context, I describe sensitivity to facts as a form of emotional engagement that is also partially constitutive of facts. I consider both the epistemologic…Read more
  •  105
    The exploration of moral life
    In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, philosopher, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to fully appreciate the n…Read more
  •  30
    L'autorita' Della Morale
    Feltrinelli. 2007.
    Capitolo I Il rispetto e l'ideale morale 1.1. Angeli, bruti e agenti 1.2. Il rispetto dell'altro 1.3. Il rispetto di sé 1.4. Auto−riflessione e auto−legislazione 1.5. Autonomia e individualità 1.6. Il rispetto e l'attenzione 1.7. Il rispetto e l'amore.
  •  107
    Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 307-329. 2001.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Ka…Read more
  •  13
    Discussione su "Ruling Passions. A Theory of Practical Reasoning" di Simon Blackburn
    with Eugenio Lecaldano and Marzio Vacatello
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 13 (2): 411-432. 2000.
  • Attenzione congiunta e salienze condivise
    with Clotilde Calabi
    Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 23 (1): 35-48. 2005.
  •  142
    Morality as practical knowledge
    Analytic Philosophy 53 (1): 61-70. 2012.
    In his original essay, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I will focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tensio…Read more
  •  120
    The appeal of Kantian intuitionism
    European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  79
    Blackburn sulla questione normativa”
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 30. 2000.
    Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce …Read more
  •  70
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
  •  230
    Respect and loving attention
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.
    On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
  •  29
    Hume Studies Referees, 2007–2008
    with Donald Ainslie, Donald Baxter, Tom Beauchamp, Helen Beebee, Martin Bell, Deborah Boyle, John Bricke, Deborah Brown, and Dorothy Coleman
    Hume Studies 34 (2): 323-324. 2008.
  •  174
    In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or …Read more
  •  1
    Defeaters and Practical Knowledge
    Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/S11229-016-1095-Z 195 (7). 2018.
    This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of moral principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of d…Read more