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33Engaging the Plural Parts of Science: Assessing Flat and Aspect Realization through an Integrative Pluralist LensJournal of Consciousness Studies 29 (7-8): 195-217. 2022.
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23Infinitism Redux? A Response to KleinPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 709-717. 2003.Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non‐repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls “Intinitism”—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerab…Read more
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20Symposium on Mechanisms in MindJournal of Philosophical Research 32 1-2. 2007.One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” propert…Read more
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19Why Constitutive Mechanistic Explanation Cannot Be CausalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 57 (1): 31-50. 2020.In his “New Consensus” on explanation, Wesley Salmon (1989) famously argued that there are two kinds of scientific explanation: global, derivational, and unifying explanations, and then local, ontic explanations backed by causal relations. Following Salmon’s New Consensus, the dominant view in philosophy of science is what I term “neo-Causalism” which assumes that all ontic explanations of singular fact/event are causal explanations backed by causal relations, and that scientists only search for…Read more
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10On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive PhysicalismIn T. O'connor & A. Corradini (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 6--25. 2009.
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9Peter A. Morton, ed., A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Readings with Commentary Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 18 (1): 50-51. 1998.
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3The metaphysics of mechanisms and the challenge of the new reductionismIn Maurice K. D. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction, Blackwell. 2007.Over the last century, as Figure 1 graphically illustrates, scientific investigations have given us a detailed account of many natural phenomena, from molecules to manic depression, through so-called
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Naturalization: Scientific Theory Appraisal and the Warrant of PhysicalismDissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick. 1997.My thesis addresses the status of 'naturalizations' of intentionality and the recent debate about their importance. After formulating an account of scientific theory appraisal I argue, contrary to recent critics of naturalization, that there is a place for the use of 'interlevel' properties in assessing scientific theories, but that this takes a more modest form than that assumed by the physicalist proponents of naturalization. Although I argue that we should be agnostic about the truth of the p…Read more
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Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 369 pp (review)Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4-6): 363. 2002.
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On the implications of scientific composition and completenessIn Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 25--45. 2010.
DeKalb, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |