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293How to Avoid Maximizing Expected UtilityPhilosophers' Imprint 19. 2019.The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.
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289An empiricist regarding science, an empiricist regarding representation (review)Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239): 413-417. 2010.No Abstract
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286In the case of Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al., Judge Jones ruled that a pro-intelligent design disclaimer cannot be read to public school students. In his decision, he gave demarcation criteria for what counts as science, ruling that intelligent design fails these criteria. I argue that these criteria are flawed, with most of my focus on the criterion of methodological naturalism. The way to refute intelligent design is not by declaring it unscientific, but by showing th…Read more
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279The problem of the many mindsMinds and Machines 16 (4): 463-470. 2006.It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum-many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particle-stuff persist through time.
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242Presentists can believe in closed timelike curvesAnalysis 63 (3). 2003.It is often thought that presentism is incompatible with time travel. I will argue that this common view is incorrect. Specifically, I will argue that presentism is compatible with some stories that involve closed timelike curves, and that some of these stories are time-travel stories.
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213Bastiaan C. Van Fraassen - Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of PerspectiveHumana Mente 4 (13). 2018.This is a review of van Fraassen's new book, _Scientific Representation_.
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201Supererogatory SuperluminalitySynthese 127 (3): 347-357. 2001.We argue that any superluminal theory Tis empirically equivalent to a non-superluminaltheory T★, with thefollowing constraints onT★ : T★ preservesthe spacetime intervals between events as entailedby T, T★ is naturalistic (as longas T is), and all the events which have causesaccording to T also have causes according toT★. Tim Maudlin (1996) definesstandard interpretations of quantum mechanicsas interpretations `according to which there wasa unique set of outcomes in Aspect's laboratory,which outc…Read more
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183Bayesian agnosticism and constructive empiricismAnalysis 58 (3). 1998.This paper addresses the question: how should the traditional doxastic attitude of agnosticism be represented in a Bayesian framework? Bas van Fraassen has one proposal: a Bayesian is agnostic about a proposition if her opinion about the proposition is represented by a probability interval with zero as the lower limit. I argue that van Fraassen's proposal is not adequate. Mark Kaplan claims that this leads to a problem with constructive empiricism; I show that Kaplan's claim is incorrect.
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120Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2007.Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 1 kapitel eller op til 5% af teksten.
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99It seems improbable that life would exist in a naturalistic universe. But if the universe were spatially infinite, then seemingly improbable events would be expected to happen; life would be expected to exist. It follows that the existence of life provides evidence that the universe is spatially infinite.
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97Did God create life? Or did life arise via naturalistic processes, along the lines of random mutation and natural selection as suggested by Darwin? Intelligent design proponents attempt to use William Dembski’s design inference to argue that the existence of intelligent life is due to design. I will argue that the design inference is flawed, because it does not take into account the fact that the universe is spatially infinite.
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97Losing Your Marbles in Wavefunction Collapse TheoriesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4). 1999.Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues that the GRW theory must violate the enumeration principle: that 'if marble 1 is in the box and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then all n marbles are in the box' ([1997], p. 321). Ghir…Read more
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89The problem of ontology for spontaneous collapse theoriesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (3): 407-421. 2004.The question of how to interpret spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics is an open one. One issue involves what link one should use to go from wave function talk to talk of ordinary macroscopic objects. Another issue involves whether that link should be taken ontologically seriously. In this paper, I ague that the link should be taken ontologically seriously; I argue against an ontology consisting solely of the wave function. I then consider three possible links: the fuzzy link, the …Read more
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81Physicist J. Richard Gott uses the Copernican principle that “we are not special” to make predictions about the future lifetime of the human race, based on how long the human race has been in existence so far. We show that the predictions which can be derived from Gott’s argument are less strong than one might be inclined to believe, that Gott’s argument illegitimately assumes that the human race will not last forever, that certain versions of Gott’s argument are incompatible with Bayesian condi…Read more
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80Discussion. Counting marbles with 'accessible' mass density: A reply to Bassi and GhirardiBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1): 155-164. 2000.
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80There are interesting parallels between some of McTaggart’s metaphysical views and developments from contemporary physics. Can McTaggart’s positive metaphysical views provide guidance in understanding how reality can be timeless at the fundamental level? I argue that the guidance McTaggart actually provides is limited – though not by any means useless.
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68Dualistic interpretations attempt to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics by postulating the existence of non-physical minds, and by giving a suitable dynamical equation for how these minds evolve. I consider the relative merits of three extant dualistic interpretations, and I defend Squires’ interpretation as preferable to the Albert/ Loewer interpretations. I also argue that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds evolve independently of the physical universe, and henc…Read more
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53ordinary macroscopic objects. Another issue involves whether that link should be taken ontologically seriously. In this paper, I argue that the link should be taken ontologically..
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36Review of Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11). 2009.
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33Design Inferences in an Infinite UniverseOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 208. 2010.This paper addresses two main questions. How does one determine that something has the features it does as a result of design, as opposed to for example chance? How are inferences to design affected when one makes the assumption that the universe is spatially infinite? I will show that arguments for the existence of God based on the improbable development of life don’t go through under the supposition that the universe is spatially infinite. I will also show that the model of design inferences p…Read more
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17Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent DesignBroadview Press. 2009.The doctrine of intelligent design is often the subject of acrimonious debate. _Seeking God in Science_ cuts through the rhetoric that distorts the debates between religious and secular camps. Bradley Monton, a philosopher of science and an atheist, carefully considers the arguments for intelligent design and argues that intelligent design deserves serious consideration as a scientific theory. Monton also gives a lucid account of the debate surrounding the inclusion of intelligent design in publ…Read more
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5Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent DesignEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1). 2011.The doctrine of intelligent design is often the subject of acrimonious debate. Seeking God in Science cuts through the rhetoric that distorts the debates between religious and secular camps. Bradley Monton, a philosopher of science and an atheist, carefully considers the arguments for intelligent design and argues that intelligent design deserves serious consideration as a scientific theory. Monton also gives a lucid account of the debate surrounding the inclusion of intelligent design in public…Read more
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Prolegomena to Any Future Physics-Based MetaphysicsIn Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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Constructive EmpiricismIn Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Metaphysics Research Lab. 2014.
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Quantum Ontology and Quantum ObserversDissertation, Princeton University. 1999.This dissertation is about the ontologies of the main interpretations and theories of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and about issues regarding how observers are represented in quantum mechanics. I have two main theses, which I don't argue for explicitly, but which are implicitly defended in the context of my discussion of the various interpretations and theories. ;My first thesis is that the ontologies of the various interpretations and theories are importantly incomplete---there are impor…Read more
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How to Avoid Maximizing Expected UtilityPhilosopher’s Imprint 19 (18). 2019.The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up (with high probability) poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibil…Read more
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Prolegomena to Any Future Physics-Based MetaphysicsOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3 (1). 2011.
Wuhan, Hubei, China