Max Emil Deutsch

Radical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth‐value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, there was not a single argument for it. Theodore Sider and David Braun (2006) have tried to provide the missing argument, but, I argue, their attempt fails. I conclude that we (still) have no reason to be Radical Millians.

Materialism about the mind is the view that the mind and its properties are physical. Many believe that there is a serious problem for materialism about the mind stemming from the phenomenon of conscious experience. It is alleged by some that conscious experiences possess features that cannot be possessed by any physical thing. And, even many materialists agree that conscious experiences possess features that make it difficult to see how conscious experiences could be physical things. Consciousness and the Insignificance of Materialism examines this supposed clash between consciousness and physicality. The conclusion reached is that the clash is an illusion. It is an illusion fostered by certain false assumptions, made by materialists and anti-materialists alike, about the nature of physicality. However, it is argued that this is a hollow victory for materialism about the mind. Once the nature of physicality is appropriately characterized, materialism about the mind is revealed as true, but uninterestingly true. In other words, materialism about the mind is an insignificant view concerning the nature of the mind and mentality.