Guenter Zoeller

Kivy distinguishes between three different claims to authenticity in the historical performance movement: authenticity with respect to the composer’s intention, authenticity with regard to sound, and authenticity in matters of performance practice. To this, Kivy adds a fourth notion of authenticity that does not figure in the idealized self-description of the historical performance movement but rather points to an alternative kind of authenticity championed by Kivy himself: the authenticity that a performance might have due to the sincerity of the artist or artists performing it. Kivy proposes to examine each of those four notions of authenticity in two sets of four chapters each—with the first set operating at the descriptive level of conceptual analysis and the second set moving on to the evaluative level of aesthetic judgment.

Patt's study attempts to explain Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism through a detailed examination of Kant's theory of sensible intuition. The center of the book is a minute textual exegesis of Kant's direct proof for the doctrine of transcendental idealism in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, focusing on the arguments concerning the nature of space and time and the conclusions that Kant draws from them. This middle part is preceded by three smaller chapters that examine the Kantian distinction between appearances and things in themselves, the relation between intuition and sensation, and the function of intuition in synthetic judgments. The study concludes with an analysis of Kant's indirect proof of the doctrine of transcendental idealism in the "Transcendental Dialectic," with an emphasis on the treatment of the first two antinomies. No detailed consideration is given to the role of intuitions in Kant's theory of categories and principles in the "Transcendental Analytic."

Der Beitrag eruiert den Metaphysikbegriff Kants in der systematischen Spanne zwischen Wissenschaftslehre und Weisheitslehre. Der erste Abschnitt erörtert das architektonischmethodologische Verhältnis von transzendentaler Kritik und theoretischer Metaphysik beim kritischen Kant, insbesondere in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Der zweite Abschnitt präsentiert Kants kritische Konzeption einer limitativen Metaphysik des Anti-Materialismus, Anti-Determinismus und Anti-Fatalismus in den Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik. Der dritte Abschnitt behandelt Kants kritische Konzeption einer praktisch-dogmatischen Metaphysik des "Übersinnlichen in uns, über uns und nach uns" im Fragment der Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik.

This essay seeks to present Fichte as a political thinker of European significance. To this end, the first section elucidates the basic political profile of Fichte’s philosophy. The second section further investigates the political character of Fichte’s philosophy by recourse to the triple motto of the French Revolution – „Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” – and its correlation with Fichte’s trinity of „I”, „You” and „We“. The final section addresses the mediating and transitional role and function of the political in Fichte, for whom the state is not a final end but always only a means.Der Beitrag mochte J. G. Fichte als politischen Denker von europaischem Format vergegenwartigen. Zu diesen Zweck exponiert der erste Abschnitt den politischen Grundzug von Fichtes Philosophieren. Der zweite Abschnitt verfolgt die politische Pragung von Fichtes Philosophieren im Ruckgriff auf das triplizitare Motto der Franzosischen Revolution – „Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite“ –, dem die Fichtesche Triade von „Ich“, „Du“ und „Wir“ zugeordnet wird. Der abschliesende Abschnitt behandelt die mediale und transitorische Stellung und Funktion des Politischen bei Fichte, fur den der Staat niemals Selbstzweck und immer nur Mittel zum Zweck ist.

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell’s neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden. 2 The focus is on Kant’s twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions

The paper assesses Martin’s recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian’s “Allegory of Prudence”, the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin’s views on Kant’s logic in general and his theory of singular existential judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin’s key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject.

El presente artículo compara a Kant y a Fichte en la perspectiva doble de identidad y diferencia referida a dos pensadores a quienes une una primera relación de maestro y alumno y a quienes separa una posterior difamación mutua. En el centro de la presentación se encuentra la relación entre espíritu de libertad y forma del sistema que une a Kant y a Fichte más allá de divergencias metódicas y de diferencias doctrinales. La comparación crítica entre Kant y Fichte se desarrollará en cuatro etapas: partirá de la ubicación general de Kant dentro del idealismo alemán y se extenderá a la empresa doble de Kant, expresada de forma crítica, de una doctrina de los principios apriorística de naturaleza y libertad, para después ir a la concepción enfáticamente reclamada por Fichte de un “primer sistema de la libertad”,[1] y de ahí a las manifestaciones de la libertad en el sistema filosófico de Fichte, teniendo como punto de vista rector el contraste con Kant.[2] Palabras clave: [1] En la forma de citación de la Gesamtausgabe de Fichte se señalará el tomo y el volumen con números romanos y arábigos respectivamente, y después el número de página en cuestión. [2] El presente artículo es parte de un proyecto de carácter más amplio, cuyo tema es la dilucidación del aporte filosófico de Kant y de Fichte; de ahí que se haga continua referencia a publicaciones particulares de mi autoría.