Tom Sorell

Les usages que fait Hobbes de l’état de nature sont souvent mal compris par les philosophes anglo-américains contemporains, y compris par des commentateurs distingués comme Gauthier et Hampton. À la différence de Gauthier, je soutiens que Hobbes ne se soucie nullement de naturaliser le fondement de la motivation morale, et je conteste l’interprétation de Hampton qui considère que le contractualisme hobbesien a plus de pertinence pour nous aujourd’hui que le contractualisme kantien. Il existe certes des liens entre une juste interprétation de Hobbes et la philosophie politique du XXe siècle, mais je suggère que ces derniers résident dans un usage déflationniste de la redescription. C’est dans cette perspective que je m’efforce de montrer qu’il existe une comparaison valide entre Hobbes et le philosophe britannique John Gray.Hobbes’s uses of the state of nature are often misunderstood by Anglo-American philosophers, even distinguished Hobbes commentators like Gauthier and Hampton. Contrary to Gauthier, I argue that Hobbes is not notably interested in naturalising the basis of moral motivation, and I dispute Hampton’s interpretation of the lasting value of Hobbesian as opposed to Kantian contractualism. There are connections between Hobbes as he ought to be understood and twentieth century political philosophy, but I suggest these lie in a certain use of deflationary redescription. In this respect Hobbes and John Gray are comparable, as I try to show.

Harman has devised examples which suggest that not only justified true belief, but also knowledge, can co-exist with defeating evidence. Briefly, further evidence can be evidence against what one knows. If that is right, the presence or absence of defeating evidence cannot make the difference between non-knowledge and knowledge. So defeasibilism seems to fail-provided there is such a thing as knowing a truth there is further evidence against. And about that there is an air of paradox. Is it true that 'If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true'? Unless to know is to know that one knows, so that evidence against h is evidence against something I can tell is true because known, the conditional seems to hold only when the second occurrence of 'I know that' is dropped. But then there is no paradox. I argue that the puzzle can be made independent of the iteration principle (sections I and II), and that it trades instead on a long-standing dogma in the theory of knowledge (sections V and VI). The dogma can be stated as the thesis of the stability of knowledge.

Agents sometimes feel free to resort to underhand or brutal measures in coping with an emergency. Because emergencies seem to relax moral inhibitions as well as carrying the risk of great loss of life or injury, it may seem morally urgent to prevent them or curtail them as far as possible. I discuss some cases of private emergency that go against this suggestion. Prevention seems morally urgent primarily in the case of public emergencies. But these are the responsibility of defensibly partisan agents, and call for the exercise of powers that are legitimately hard to control. Philosophical standards for dealing with public emergency often ignore these facts, and are unduly moralistic as a result

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I ask whether there is a human right to be spared extreme poverty. The answer is ‘Not necessarily’ if a human right is a legal right, and I argue that ‘human right’ either means a right in international law and associated policy, or else the term has an unacceptably wide sense. In the second section I consider microcredit as a poverty-alleviating mechanism, distinguishing between extreme and relative poverty in developing countries. I argue that credit may not be a good way of alleviating extreme poverty, and that methods of collecting debt used by microcredit providers may have moral drawbacks. In the third section I consider the fit between the class of agents currently involved in offering financial services to the poor, and the class of agents recognized as duty-bearers by human rights law and policy. Unless states become highly involved in microcredit, it is not clear that microfinance providers are or can be human rights duty bearers.

In this study, Tom Sorell seeks to rehabilitate views that are often instantly dismissed in analytic philosophy. His book serves as a reinterpretation of Cartesianism and responds directly to the dislike of Descartes in contemporary philosophy. To identify what is defensible in Cartesianism, Sorell starts with a picture of unreconstructed Cartesianism, which is characterized as realistic, antisceptical but respectful of scepticism, rationalist, centered on the first person, dualist, and dubious of the comprehensiveness of natural science and its supposed independence of metaphysics. Bridging the gap between history of philosophy and analytic philosophy, Sorell also shows for the first time how some contemporary analytic philosophy is deeply Cartesian, despite its outward hostility to Cartesianism.

Rene Descartes had a remarkably short working life, yet his contribution to philosophy and physics have endured to this day. He is perhaps best known for his statement, "Cogito, ergo sum," the cornerstone of his metaphysics. Descartes did not intend the metaphysics to stand apart from his scientific work, which included important investigations into physics, mathematics, and optics. In this book, Sorell shows that Descarates was, above all, an advocate and practitioner of the new mathematical approach to physics, and that he developed his philosophies to support his discoveries in the sciences.

Business Ethics is intended for business practitioners and students of business at all levels and is written in a lively and accessible style. It redresses the balance of buisness ethics writing which, up to now, has been weighted heavily in favour of American cases. There are numerous references to real businesses - from multi-national chains to French restaurants, from manufacturing giants to driving schools. Ethically 'hot' topics such as the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, the new EC directives, entry of the countries of the former Soviet Union into the world market economy, privatization and the 'green' environment are just some of the more general issues discussed. Companies covered in the book are: Allied Lyons, Apple Corporation, Avon, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Barlow Clowes, Benetton, Body Shop, British Airways, British Rail, Cadbury-Schweppes, Ecology Building Society, Fiat, Gateway Foodmarkets, Grand Metropolitan, Guinness, ICI, John Lewis, Kingfisher, Ladbrokes, Lloyds Bank, Management Week, Marks & Spencer, Mirror Group Newspapers, Nestle, Polly Peck, Price Waterhouse, Scott Bader, Securicor, Traidcraft, United Biscuits, Virgin, Worldwide Fund for Nature...and many more. Packed with excellent examples from many international companies Written in a lively and accessible style

This is a book about Hobbes's philosophy as a whole, viewed through the lens of his philosophy of science. Political philosophy is claimed to have a certain autonomy within Hobbes's scheme of philosophy and science as a whole, and in particular, a kind of autonomy in relation to natural sciences. Hobbes's moral and political philosophies guide action --of both individual subjects and sovereigns. They have a role in a special kind of rhetorical product called counsel. In natural science Hobbes probably exaggerates the explanatory powers of mechanics --the theory of matter in motion-- including by an attempted assimilation of geometry to the sciences of motion.

What God creates is perfectly stable and never needs to be corrected or improved upon. Although God might have created any order, the one he actually creates is willed immutably. Human beings are supposed to try and suit their theoretical understanding and their practical choices to this order: when they succeed, they confine their theoretical judgments to what is intellectually evident rather than to what the senses make plausible, and they confine their practical choices to what reason permits or recommends?not to the promptings of appetite. This lessens the conflict between the human judgment and the human will, and undoes the subordina tion of the judgment to sensory impulse, leaving a judgment that grasps the true and a will that chooses the good to the fullest extent possible for human beings. Subjects who develop a judgment and a will along these lines are supposed to enjoy an ideally stable knowledge and contentment. It is this ideal of stability of mind, inherited from Descartes's theory of God's nature, that I want to suggest is suspect when transferred to human beings

In a welfare states, no typical user of health care services is only a patient; and no typical provider of these services is simply a doctor, nurse or paramedic. Occupiers of these roles also have distinctive relations and responsibilities as citizens to medical services, responsibilities that are widely acknowledged by those who live in welfare states. Outside welfare states, this fusion of civic consciousness with involvement in health care is less pronounced or missing altogether. But the globalisation of avery comprehensive understanding of human rights, including rights to state-provided health care, will make welfare state thinking, for better or worse, more of an orthodoxy worldwide than it is now. Medical ethics needs to reflect this

In this book Tom Sorell argues that emergencies can justify types of action that would normally be regarded as wrong. Beginning with the ethics of emergencies facing individuals, he explores the range of effective and legitimate private emergency response and its relation to public institutions, such as national governments. He develops a theory of the response of governments to public emergencies which indicates the possibility of a democratic politics that is liberal but that takes seriously threats to life and limb from public disorder, crime or terrorism. Informed by Hobbes, Schmitt and Walzer, but substantially different from them, the book widens the justification for recourse to normally forbidden measures, without resorting to illiberal politics. This book will interest students of politics, philosophy, international relations and law.