Tim Mulgan

Il cambiamento climatico presenta caratteristiche inedite che mettono in discussione il pensiero morale cui siamo abituati. In questo saggio, si ricostruiscono le modifiche che sarebbero necessarie per pensare le questioni morali poste dalla prospettiva di un mondo che subisca gli effetti del cambiamento climatico: si potrebbe trattare di un mondo in frantumi, dove non ci sono piů le condizioni minime di benessere, e le nozioni cui siamo abituati - come certi diritti o l'ideale dell'eguaglianza - non valgono piů e debbono venire sostituite da una nuova etica, che non potrÀ piů affidarsi a intuizioni morali, per quanto solide e radicate.

The majority of contemporary political philosophy is based on three assumptions, that (1) interests of present people can be reconciled under “favourable conditions” (Rawls), (2) things will go better for the next generation and (3) favourable conditions will continue indefinitely. But what if they don’t? The paper is exploring the hypothesis of a “broken world” where there is no hope to establish liberal institutions that can both meet basic needs and protect basic liberties. It argues that Mill’s liberal utilitarianism is suited to a broken world because of its flexibility and of its reliance on an objective list of essential components of a flourishing human life that can be shared by present and future generations.

Many themes of late twentieth century ethics are prefigured in Sidgwick’s Method of Ethics. In particular, Sidgwick’s ‘Dualism of Practical Reason’ sets the scene for current debates over the demands of morality. Many philosophers agree that Sidgwick uncovers a deep and troubling conflict at the heart of utilitarian ethics. But Sidgwick’s own response to that conflict is treated, not as a live philosophical option, but as a historical oddity. In the twenty-first century, few philosophers see the intimate connection between the dualism of practical reason and the investigation of psychic phenomena that played such a large role in Sidgwick’s life. The aim of this paper is to investigate Sidgwick’s own approach to the dualism of practical reason. Its general conclusion is that a non-dualistic morality demands less than a theistic religion, contrary to what Sidgwick worried - especially as concerns personal immortality and freedom

Il cambiamento climatico presenta caratteristiche inedite che mettono in di- scussione il pensiero morale cui siamo abituati. In questo saggio, si rico- struiscono le modifiche che sarebbero necessarie per pensare le questioni morali poste dalla prospettiva di un mondo che subisca gli effetti del cam- biamento climatico: si potrebbe trattare di un mondo in frantumi, dove non ci sono più le condizioni minime di benessere, e le nozioni cui siamo abi- tuati – come certi diritti o l'ideale dell'eguaglianza – non valgono più e debbono venire sostituite da una nuova etica, che non potrà più affidarsi a intuizioni morali, per quanto solide e radicate.Climate change has new features that challenge our standard ethical thought. In this paper, the changes that are needed to deal with the moral is- sues raised in a world affected by the consequences of climate change are outlined. A climate-change-affected world might be a broken world, where no favorable conditions hold and notions which we were used to – such as rights or the ideal of equality – are no longer valid and should be replaced with a new ethic. No appeal to entrenched moral intuitions will work in such a new world