•  21
    Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
    with Francisco J. Varela
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement): 93-132. 2003.
    e argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of is…Read more
  •  69
    The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics
    Philosophy Today 37 (3): 298-305. 1993.
    The conception of paralogy, which Jean-Francois Lyotard develops in The Postmodern Condition, motivates a number of questions concerning justice and the moral life. In this paper I suggest that Lyotard's account fails to provide an adequate answer to these questions, and that a more satisfactory account of justice in paralogy can be developed by exploring the concept of phronesis. John Caputo's "ethics of dissemination," in some respects, leads us in this direction. Although both theorists attem…Read more
  •  149
    Models of the Self (edited book)
    Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 1999.
    A comprehensive reader on the problem of the self as seen from the viewpoints of philosophy, developmental psychology, robotics, cognitive neuroscience,...
  •  54
    On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections
    with Manos Tsakiris and Simone Schütz-Bosbach
    Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3): 645-660. 2007.
    The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sen…Read more
  •  32
    Is it possible to develop a discourse that describes human experience but avoids theoretical concepts such as consciousness and qualia, and do so in such a way that the difficult problems are resolved? It strikes me that Gordon Globus is attempting to do something like this. It seems an honorable project from the perspectives of both the analytic philosophy of mind and the postmodern celebration of multiple discourses. I want to suggest, however, that in his account the problems of qualia and co…Read more
  •  9
    Editor's Introduction
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1): 1-2. 2015.
  •  13
    L'intentionnalité et l'activité intentionnelle
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.
    Ceux qui affirment que le libre arbitre est une illusion n’ont pas raison. Ils fondent leur affirmation sur une preuve scientifique établie à un niveau impropre de description de l’activité intentionnelle. Le libre arbitre ne s’exerce pas sur les processus neuronaux sub-personnels, l’activation musculaire ou les mouvements élémentaires du corps, mais sur des activités contextualisées au sein d’un système qui est nettement plus grand que ne le pensent bon nombre de philosophes de l’esprit, de psy…Read more
  •  19
    A cognitive way to the transcendental reduction
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3): 230-232. 1999.
    [opening paragraph]: Natalie Depraz builds on Iso Kern's distinctions to outline three different motivational pathways to the phenomenological reduction -- the Cartesian way, the psychological way, and the way of the life-world. I would like to suggest a fourth one that may appeal to cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists, theorists who, for the most part, are not ordinarily motivated to pursue phenomenological methodologies
  •  8
    Defining consciousness
    Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3): 561-569. 2010.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and mot…Read more
  •  47
    Time, Emotion, and Depression
    Emotion Review 4 (2): 127-132. 2012.
    I examine several aspects of the experience of time in depression and in the experience of different emotions. Both phenomenological and experimental studies show that depressed subjects have a slowed experience of time flow and tend to overestimate time spans. In comparison to patients in control conditions, depressed patients tend to be preoccupied with past events, and less focused on present and future events. Recent empirical findings in studies of emotion perception show different degrees …Read more
  •  40
    This special issue of Janus Head explores a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary dimensions of the theme, the situated body. The body, of course, is always situated in so far as it is a living and experiencing body. Being situated in this sense is different from simply being located someplace in the way a non-living, non-experiencing object is located. That the body is always situated involves certain kinds of physical and social interactions, and it means that experience is always both …Read more
  •  2
    Phenomenology
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2012.
    This new introduction by Shaun Gallagher gives students and philosophers not only an excellent concise overview of the state of the field and contemporary debates, but a novel way of addressing the subject by looking at the ways in which phenomenology is useful to the disciplines it applies to. Gallagher retrieves the central insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others), updates some of these insights in innovative ways, and s…Read more
  •  115
    Body schema and intentionality
    In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self, Mit Press. pp. 225--244. 1995.
  •  184
    Sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.
    By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content,…Read more
  •  238
    Intentionality and Intentional Action
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exer…Read more
  •  1
    Why We Are Not All Novelists
    In Frederik Stjernfelt & Peer F. Bundgaard (eds.), Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art, Springer Verlag. 2015.
  •  81
    Self-agency and mental causality
    In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.
    I want to explore one small corner of the concept of mental causality. It’s the corner where discussions about mind-body interactions and epiphenomenalism take place. My basic contention is that these discussions are framed in the wrong terms because they are infected by a mind-body dualism which defines the question of mental causality in a classic or standard way: How does a mental event cause my body to do what it does? Setting the question in this way has consequences for ongoing interdiscip…Read more
  •  822
    Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11): 162-174. 2004.
    Hermeneutics is usually defined as the theory and practice of interpretation. As a discipline it involves a long and complex history, starting with concerns about the proper interpretation of literary, sacred, and legal texts. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics broadens to include the idea that humans are, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985). In contrast to the narrowly prescriptive questions of textual interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, as develop…Read more
  •  615
    The self in contextualized action
    with Anthony J. Marcel
    In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies, Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 273. 2002.
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the se…Read more
  •  647
    Neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology
    Phenomenology 2005. 2007.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
  •  1165
    Joint attention in joint action
    with Anika Fiebich
    Philosophical Psychology 26 (4): 571-87. 2013.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex join…Read more
  •  186
    Direct perception in the intersubjective context
    Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2): 535-543. 2008.
    This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory and simulation theory , both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and …Read more
  •  39
    From action to interaction
    with Marc Jeannerod
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1): 3-26. 2002.
    Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, n…Read more
  •  174
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of essays that address questions in all of these areas.