•  47
    Time, Emotion, and Depression
    Emotion Review 4 (2): 127-132. 2012.
    I examine several aspects of the experience of time in depression and in the experience of different emotions. Both phenomenological and experimental studies show that depressed subjects have a slowed experience of time flow and tend to overestimate time spans. In comparison to patients in control conditions, depressed patients tend to be preoccupied with past events, and less focused on present and future events. Recent empirical findings in studies of emotion perception show different degrees …Read more
  •  40
    This special issue of Janus Head explores a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary dimensions of the theme, the situated body. The body, of course, is always situated in so far as it is a living and experiencing body. Being situated in this sense is different from simply being located someplace in the way a non-living, non-experiencing object is located. That the body is always situated involves certain kinds of physical and social interactions, and it means that experience is always both …Read more
  •  19
    A cognitive way to the transcendental reduction
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3): 230-232. 1999.
    [opening paragraph]: Natalie Depraz builds on Iso Kern's distinctions to outline three different motivational pathways to the phenomenological reduction -- the Cartesian way, the psychological way, and the way of the life-world. I would like to suggest a fourth one that may appeal to cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists, theorists who, for the most part, are not ordinarily motivated to pursue phenomenological methodologies
  •  8
    Defining consciousness
    Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3): 561-569. 2010.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and mot…Read more
  •  184
    Sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.
    By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content,…Read more
  •  238
    Intentionality and Intentional Action
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exer…Read more
  •  48
    We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2): 95-110. 2017.
    The basic approach to understanding shared agency has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have so…Read more
  •  1
    Why We Are Not All Novelists
    In Frederik Stjernfelt & Peer F. Bundgaard (eds.), Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art, Springer Verlag. 2015.
  •  2
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2012.
    This new introduction by Shaun Gallagher gives students and philosophers not only an excellent concise overview of the state of the field and contemporary debates, but a novel way of addressing the subject by looking at the ways in which phenomenology is useful to the disciplines it applies to. Gallagher retrieves the central insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others), updates some of these insights in innovative ways, and s…Read more
  •  115
    Body schema and intentionality
    In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self, Mit Press. pp. 225--244. 1995.
  •  81
    Self-agency and mental causality
    In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.
    I want to explore one small corner of the concept of mental causality. It’s the corner where discussions about mind-body interactions and epiphenomenalism take place. My basic contention is that these discussions are framed in the wrong terms because they are infected by a mind-body dualism which defines the question of mental causality in a classic or standard way: How does a mental event cause my body to do what it does? Setting the question in this way has consequences for ongoing interdiscip…Read more
  •  822
    Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11): 162-174. 2004.
    Hermeneutics is usually defined as the theory and practice of interpretation. As a discipline it involves a long and complex history, starting with concerns about the proper interpretation of literary, sacred, and legal texts. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics broadens to include the idea that humans are, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985). In contrast to the narrowly prescriptive questions of textual interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, as develop…Read more
  •  31
    Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie, it highlights that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. The implications of these results for a theor…Read more
  •  615
    The self in contextualized action
    with Anthony J. Marcel
    In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies, Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 273. 2002.
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the se…Read more
  •  647
    Neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology
    Phenomenology 2005. 2007.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
  •  39
    From action to interaction
    with Marc Jeannerod
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1): 3-26. 2002.
    Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, n…Read more
  •  158
    The neuronal platonist
    with Michael S. Gazzaniga
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6): 706-717. 1998.
    Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common …Read more
  •  174
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of essays that address questions in all of these areas.
  •  177
    Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3): 195-214. 1997.
    The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) …Read more
  •  1168
    Joint attention in joint action
    with Anika Fiebich
    Philosophical Psychology 26 (4): 571-87. 2013.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex join…Read more
  •  85
    Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults
    with Daniel J. Povinelli
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 145-169. 2012.
    We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
  •  1
    The Inordinance of Time
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 190 (4): 524-525. 2000.
  •  677
    Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory
    In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 63--78. 2006.
    Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulat…Read more
  •  186
    Intersubjectivity in perception
    Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2): 163-178. 2008.
    The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
  •  629
    Philosophical antecedents of situated cognition
    In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 35--53. 2009.