•  238
    Intentionality and Intentional Action
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exer…Read more
  •  1
    Why We Are Not All Novelists
    In Frederik Stjernfelt & Peer F. Bundgaard (eds.), Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art, Springer Verlag. 2015.
  •  2
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2012.
    This new introduction by Shaun Gallagher gives students and philosophers not only an excellent concise overview of the state of the field and contemporary debates, but a novel way of addressing the subject by looking at the ways in which phenomenology is useful to the disciplines it applies to. Gallagher retrieves the central insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others), updates some of these insights in innovative ways, and s…Read more
  •  81
    Self-agency and mental causality
    In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.
    I want to explore one small corner of the concept of mental causality. It’s the corner where discussions about mind-body interactions and epiphenomenalism take place. My basic contention is that these discussions are framed in the wrong terms because they are infected by a mind-body dualism which defines the question of mental causality in a classic or standard way: How does a mental event cause my body to do what it does? Setting the question in this way has consequences for ongoing interdiscip…Read more
  •  822
    Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11): 162-174. 2004.
    Hermeneutics is usually defined as the theory and practice of interpretation. As a discipline it involves a long and complex history, starting with concerns about the proper interpretation of literary, sacred, and legal texts. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics broadens to include the idea that humans are, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985). In contrast to the narrowly prescriptive questions of textual interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, as develop…Read more
  •  615
    The self in contextualized action
    with Anthony J. Marcel
    In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies, Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 273. 2002.
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the se…Read more
  •  647
    Neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology
    Phenomenology 2005. 2007.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
  •  39
    From action to interaction
    with Marc Jeannerod
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1): 3-26. 2002.
    Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, n…Read more
  •  174
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of essays that address questions in all of these areas.
  •  177
    Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3): 195-214. 1997.
    The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) …Read more
  •  1168
    Joint attention in joint action
    with Anika Fiebich
    Philosophical Psychology 26 (4): 571-87. 2013.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex join…Read more
  •  85
    Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults
    with Daniel J. Povinelli
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 145-169. 2012.
    We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
  •  1
    The Inordinance of Time
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 190 (4): 524-525. 2000.
  •  677
    Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory
    In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 63--78. 2006.
    Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulat…Read more
  •  629
    Philosophical antecedents of situated cognition
    In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 35--53. 2009.
  •  187
    Direct perception in the intersubjective context
    Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2): 535-543. 2008.
    This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory and simulation theory , both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and …Read more
  •  186
    Intersubjectivity in perception
    Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2): 163-178. 2008.
    The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
  •  268
    Body image and body schema in a deafferented subject
    with Jonathan Cole
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4): 369-390. 1995.
    In a majority of situations the normal adult maintains posture or moves without consciously monitoring motor activity. Posture and movement are usually close to automatic; they tend to take care of themselves, outside of attentive regard. One's body, in such cases, effaces itself as one is geared into a particular intentional goal. This effacement is possible because of the normal functioning of a body schema. Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that pla…Read more
  •  95
    Gesture-first, but no gestures?
    with David McNeill, Bennett Bertenthal, and Jonathan Cole
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2): 138-139. 2005.
    Although Arbib's extension of the mirror-system hypothesis neatly sidesteps one problem with the “gesture-first” theory of language origins, it overlooks the importance of gestures that occur in current-day human linguistic performance, and this lands it with another problem. We argue that, instead of gesture-first, a system of combined vocalization and gestures would have been a more natural evolutionary unit.
  •  24
    Social cognition and primacy of movement revisited
    with Jonathan Cole and David McNeill
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (4): 155-156. 2002.
  •  428
    How the Body Shapes the Mind
    Oxford University Press UK. 2005.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of int…Read more
  •  94
    Ways of knowing the self and the other
    with Stephen Watson
    In Shaun Gallagher & Stephen Watson (eds.), Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum, Publications De L'université De Rouen.. pp. 1-25. 2004.
    Introduction to S. Gallagher and S. Watson. (2004). _Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity_ . Rouen: Presses Universitaires. Originally published in 2000 as a special issue of the online journal _Arobase: Journal des lettres et sciences humaines,_ 4 (1-2).