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30Pasado, presente y futuro del tiempo de la conciencia: de Husserl a Varela y más alláInvestigaciones Fenomenológicas 17 295. 2021.En el desarrollo de una fenómenología enactivista, el análisis de la conciencia del tiempo necesita ser conducido hacia un enfoque totalmente enactivista. Así, intento impulsar este análisis hacia una fenomenología enactivista más completa de la conciencia del tiempo. Además, sostengo que el análisis de Varela motiva un examen más detallado de los aspectos fenomenológicos de la estructura temporal intrínseca de la experiencia, al entenderla en términos de una fenomenología encarnada y orientada …Read more
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30From the Transcendental to the EnactivePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2): 119-121. 2012.
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30Identity or Dynamic Structure?Constructivist Foundations 11 (2): 363-364. 2016.Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: It is not clear what Kirchhoff and Hutto mean by identity when they claim that there is no gap between the phenomenal and the physical. Understanding the relation between causation and diachronic constitution, I suggest that phenomenal-physical existence is better characterized as a dynamically articulated form,…Read more
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30Comment: Three Questions for StueberEmotion Review 4 (1): 64-65. 2012.In response to Stueber’s “Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience, and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate,” I identify three areas for further discussion: the frame problem, diversity, and an altogether different variety of empathy
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29The unaffordable and the sublimeContinental Philosophy Review 55 (4): 431-445. 2022.In this paper I examine a set of exceptional aesthetic experiences that remove us from our pragmatic everyday life and involve a specific type of unaffordability. I then extend this notion of unaffordability to experiences of awe and its relation to the sublime. My analysis is guided by considerations of the phenomenologically inspired enactivist approach that supports an affordance-based accounts of aesthetic experience. I review some recent neurophenomenological studies of the experience of aw…Read more
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29Action and InteractionOxford University Press. 2020.Shaun Gallagher presents a ground-breaking interdisciplinary account of action. He shows that in order to understand human agency and the aspects of mind that are associated with it, we need to grasp the crucial role of context or circumstance in action, and the normative constraints of social and cultural practices.
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29The Self and its DisordersOxford University Press. 2024.The Self and its Disorders develops a philosophical and interdisciplinary approach to the formulation of an “integrative” perspective in psychiatry. In contrast to some integrative approaches that focus on narrow brain-based conceptions, or strictly on symptomology, this book takes its bearings from embodied and enactive conceptions of human experience and builds on a perspective that understands self as a self-pattern—a pattern of processes that include bodily, experiential, affective, cognitiv…Read more
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29The body in social context: Some qualifications on the ‘warmth and intimacy’ of bodily self-consciousnessGrazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1): 91-121. 2012.
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28Another look at intentions: A response to Raphael van Riel’s “On how we perceive the social world”Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2): 553-555. 2008.
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28Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive SciencesCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement): 93-132. 2003.e argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of is…Read more
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28The Senses of a Bodily SelfProtoSociology 36 414-433. 2019.I focus on the sense of ownership and ask whether this experience is something over and above one’s bodily experiences, or something intrinsic to them. I consider liberal, deflationary, and phenomenological accounts of the sense of ownership, and I offer an enactive or action-oriented account that takes the sense of ownership to be intrinsic to the phenomenal background and our various bodily senses, including the sense of agency.
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28The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and e…Read more
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27Phenomenology and Pragmatism: From the End to the BeginningEuropean Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (2). 2022.I trace back the relation between phenomenology and pragmatism from contemporary discussions about a pragmatic turn in embodied-enactive cognitive science to the earliest associations between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Peirce. I argue against the claim that there has been a pragmatic turn per se in either phenomenology or cognitive science. Pragmatism, and a form of phenomenological pragmatism had already been informing debates in cognitive science from the very beginning. On the one han…Read more
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27Phronesis and Psychopathy: The Moral Frame ProblemPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4): 345-348. 2013.
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26Intersubiectivity and psychopathologyIn K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 258. 2013.This chapter provides a review of theory of mind approaches to explaining certain dysfunctions of intersubjectivity in pathologies such as autism and schizophrenia. ToM approaches such as theory theory and simulation theory focus on mindreading but fail to explain important aspects of online intersubjective interaction. A phenomenological approach, focusing on embodied interaction, offers an alternative account of intersubjective processes and specific dysfunctions in pathology. Further research…Read more
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25Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of CognitionIn Matthias Jung & Roman Madzia (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation, De Gruyter. pp. 17-34. 2016.
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25Intentionalität und intentionales handelnSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.Diejenigen, die behaupten, der freie Wille sei Illusion, sind im Unrecht. Sie begründen ihre Behauptung auf einem wissenschaftlichen Beweis, der die falsche Ebene der Deskription des intentionalen Handelns testet. Der freie Wille bezieht sich nicht auf subpersonale neuronale Prozesse, Muskelaktivierung oder grundlegende Körperbewegungen, sondern auf kontextualisierte Handlungen in einem System, das größer ist als viele zeitgenössische Geistesphilosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler anne…Read more
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24Word as Object: A View of Language at HandJournal of Cognition and Culture 14 (5): 373-384. 2014.Here we develop a view of language as a form of material engagement, one that foregrounds its embodied and ecological character. Achieving such a view, however, requires disabusing ourselves of certain received and deeply entrenched notions. We present a thought experiment meant to illuminate the materiality of language, as a technological activity on par with the construction and manipulation of artifacts. We explore its implications, justifying the comparison with actual languages while emphas…Read more
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24Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of MindConstructivist Foundations 14 (1): 8-21. 2018.Context: Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. Problem: Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment. Meth…Read more
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23Review of mark Rowlands, Body Language: Representation in Action (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9). 2007.
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22A cognitive way to the transcendental reductionJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3): 230-232. 1999.[opening paragraph]: Natalie Depraz builds on Iso Kern's distinctions to outline three different motivational pathways to the phenomenological reduction -- the Cartesian way, the psychological way, and the way of the life-world. I would like to suggest a fourth one that may appeal to cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists, theorists who, for the most part, are not ordinarily motivated to pursue phenomenological methodologies
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22Joint attention, joint action, and participatory sense makingAlter: revue de phénoménologie 18 111-123. 2010.Developmentally, joint attention is located at the intersection of a complex set of capacities that serve our cognitive, emotional and action-oriented relations with others. It forms a bridge between primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthan 1978, 1998; Trevarthan and Hubley 1979). Primary intersubjectivity consists in a set of sensory-motor abilities that allow us to understand the meaning of another person’s movements, gestures, facial expressions, eye direction,...
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22Mindful PerformanceIn Antonino Pennisi & Alessandra Falzone (eds.), The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity, Springer Verlag. pp. 43-58. 2019.In this chapter I explore several variations of mindfulness in performance, and I focus specifically on variations of self-awareness in these practices. I take an enactivist approach, clarifying first why enactivism is not a form of behaviorism. I argue that phenomenologically inspired enactivist conceptions of perception and action are neither mindless, in a naïve behavioristic way, nor overly cognitivist, but do involve aspects of mindfulness that support embodied performance. I’ll look at exa…Read more
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22An unsettled debate: Key empirical and theoretical questions are still openBehavioral and Brain Sciences 40. 2017.
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20Models of the self: Editors' introductionJournal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6): 5-6. 1997.There is a long history of inquiry about human nature and the nature of the self. It stretches from the ancient tradition of Socratic self-knowledge in the context of ethical life to contemporary discussions of brain function in cognitive science. At the beginning of the modern era, Descartes was led to the conclusion that self-knowledge provided the single Archimedean point for all knowledge. His thesis that self is a single, simple, continuing, and unproblematically accessible mental substance…Read more
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20Critical social philosophy, Honneth and the role of primary intersubjectivityEuropean Journal of Social Theory 15 (2): 243-260. 2012.Gesellschaftskritik, or social philosophy that aims to provide firm criticism of pathological social practices, requires normatively grounded evaluative principles. In this article, we assess different possibilities for such principles with focus on a model that takes specific patterns of intersubjective interaction as its point of reference. We argue that in order to understand the full significance of this ‘intersubjective turn’ for social philosophy, and to strengthen the normative foundation…Read more
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19An unsettled debate: Key empirical and theoretical questions are still open – CORRIGENDUMBehavioral and Brain Sciences 41. 2018.
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19Introduction to the special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionalitySouthern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1): 1-7. 2023.This essay introduces the 40th Annual Spindel Conference special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality. Autonomy is often discussed in contexts of individual intention formation and moral decision making. When we consider collective intention formation and the decision-making practices of institutions, a number of questions can be raised: How does the individual autonomy of participants affect the collective process? How do such collective processes modulate the autonomy of …Read more
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19Getting interaction theory together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches to social interactionInteraction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 13 (3): 436-468. 2012.We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the ‘social mind’ is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached ‘social cognition’ is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. We draw on the…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |