Fabian Freyenhagen

In this paper, we take up two objections Raymond Geuss levels against John Rawls' ideal theory in Philosophy and Real Politics. We show that, despite their fundamental disagreements, the two theorists share a common starting point: they both reject doing political philosophy by way of applying an independently derived moral theory; and grapple with the danger of unduly privileging the status quo. However, neither Rawls' characterization of politics nor his ideal theoretical approach as response to the aforementioned danger is adequate - or so we argue. Moreover, contrary to received opinion, Geuss' political philosophy is the more reflective and the more philosophical of the two. In a final section, we highlight another agreement: both think that political philosophers should develop conceptual innovations as a way of clarifying and overcoming practical problems. We demonstrate that Geuss could offer a number of reasons for finding Rawls' conceptual innovations wanting.

© 2015 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy. In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I show that the common distinction between content-neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy. At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value and norm implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content-neutral, procedural or input-focused. Finally, I demonstrate how substantive constraints are compatible with, or even implied in, the notion of autonomy at play in political liberalism. Overall, I present a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberalism, drawing on case law and statutes from England and Wales.

Can one both be an Aristotelian in ethics and a negativist, whereby the latter involves subscribing to the view that the good cannot be known in our social context but that ethical guidance is nonetheless possible in virtue of a pluralist conception of the bad? Moreover, is it possible to combine Aristotelianism with a thoroughly historical outlook? I have argued that such combinations are, indeed, possible, and that we can find an example of them in Adorno's work. In this paper, I reply to three critics who cast doubt on this proposal. I also reply to other concerns they raise, regarding immanent critique, negativism, the role of social theory in Adorno's work, and the danger of being co-opted. I stress the holism of Adorno's position, and, amid some more deflationary moves, insist on the distinctiveness of the Aristotelian position that results.

The literature on Adorno and anti‐Semitism presents a somewhat curious state of affairs. On the one hand, concern with anti‐Semitism is presented as pivotal to his views and major works, at least post‐1940. On the other hand, the account of anti‐Semitism offered by Adorno – and Horkheimer – faces trenchant criticisms for failing to do justice to the complex phenomena at issue. In this Chapter, I re‐examine and re‐evaluate this account. In particular, I argue that they navigate well two central dilemmas intrinsic to any endeavor of making sense of anti‐Semitism and the events for which the name “Auschwitz” stands.

To read Adorno as a negativist Aristotelian was always going to be controversial. It is, thus, unsurprising that the common critical concern running through the three reviews assembled here is the Aristotelianism I ascribe to Adorno. I am immensely grateful for these generous and thoughtful contributions, and in what follows I will try to do justice to the concerns they raise. I focus on the ascription of Aristotelianism as the major concern, but I also discuss related and wider comments, regarding immanent critique, negativism, the role of social theory in Adorno’s work, and the danger of being co-opted. Elsewhere, I have clarified the structure of the book and the aims of the different parts of it, and readers of this current reply might find it helpful to consult this other text first.

Lukács hat einst provokativ auf seine Frage „Was ist der orthodoxe Marxismus“ geantwortet, dass er in einer bestimmten Methode bestehe. Was aber wenn wir heute fragen, worin orthodoxe kritische Theorie besteht? Meine Antwort ist hierbei nicht eine bestimmte Methode, aber dafür nicht weniger provokant. Was die kritische Theorie kritisch macht ist auch nicht – trotz der vorherrschenden Meinung – ein Begründungsprogram. Im Gegenteil, nur ohne ein Begründungsprogram ist kritische Theorie angemessen kritisch. Ich umreiße meine Antwort mit Rückgriff auf Horkheimers Schriften der ’30er Jahre. Das vorgebrachte Verständnis der kritischen Theorie ist orthodox auch in einem weiteren Sinn: darin, dass es ein bestimmtes Interesse – das Interesse an der Abschaffung von Unrecht, Elend, und Unfreiheit – als konstitutiv für kritische Theorie erachtet, und somit, obwohl nicht religiös, doch etwas mit Strenggläubigkeit zu tun hat. Dieser Ansatz wird zum Schluss skizzenhaft auf die Idee der Sozialpathologie angewendet.