Gail Presbey

Grace Lee Boggs (1915–2015) was a philosopher and activist influenced by Hegel, Marx, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and her collaborators C. L. R. James and Jimmy Boggs. During her long career, she inspired a generation of young thinker-activists to establish institutions and practices in Detroit to promote community and justice. The article gives an overview of her life and accomplishments, discusses the social and political philosophy set forth in her book The Next American Revolution: Sustainable Activism for the Twenty-first Century, and reviews the documentary about her by director Grace Lee, American Revolutionary: The Evolution of Grace Lee Boggs.

The challenges of building community based on a common identity that also respects differences has two different kinds of chasms to cross. There is the division of ethnic groups, and there is also the generational gap. Given recent problems of ethnic violence that broke out during the December 2007 elections, can contemporary Kenyans build community, coming to common understanding with others on issues such as value and identity? This is not a new problem. It has often been expressed as the need to develop a common Kenyan “national culture.” After a survey including Okot p’Bitek, Frantz Fanon, Bethwell Ogot and Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s contribution to the topic in the context of the 1960s and 70s, I will then go on to discuss the contribution of Kenyan Philosophy professor Henry Odera Oruka, who was greatly influenced by the ongoing discussions regarding national culture when he began his sage philosophy project – a project he clearly described as being able to play a role in the creation of Kenyan national culture. I explore some of Odera Oruka’s unpublished work on this topic. Chaungo Barasa has continued this project. I move on to survey how current academics in Kenya are working to describe and forge national values as a meaningful alternative to Kenyan government ongoing endeavors to promote culture as a tourist commodity.

Arendt is realistic: Our century has witnessed terrible atrocities, such as the rise of totalitarianism and the slaughter of millions for purely racist reasons. At the same time her position is one of profound hope, based on the human capacity to act politically, to begin, in concert with others, something new. My dissertation fills a gap in Arendt scholarship. My work attempts to appropriate Arendt from a left political perspective, gleaning all of her insights that will be of benefit to political activists and revolutionaries. At the same time I must criticize her for what I consider her most blatant mistakes, such as her disregard for human suffering and economic injustice, points on which Arendt could learn much from the left. The major conceptual movement of the dissertation is from theory to practice, from abstract to concrete. Arendt's theoretical framework in which she classifies all of human activity is the starting point. Political action is seen in the broad context of contemplation, thought, work and labor. The focus proceeds to a narrower contrast between political action in the public realm and the various economic and personal relationships in the private realm. The theories unfold to express themselves in a certain kind of political practice. The two most basic characteristics are that action is free, not determined, and based on speech, not violence. Furthermore, correct political action is motivated by a concern for the whole and fueled by that power which arises from the consent and support of the people. Finally the concrete structures and practices of politics is discussed. Arendt criticizes contemporary politics, both the two-party systems of liberal democracies and one-party revolutionary governments. She then proposes an alternative, modeled on the council system of direct participation and federation, and describes both how to found and how to structure such an alternative political realm.

In critical thinking we learn the importance of being fair, and opening up closed and biased minds. In practical philosophy we must learn how to find our happiness in a world where others act with evil intentions. In contemporary Kenya one major challenge is how to react to those who might use witchcraft to try to harm oneself or one’s family. Regardless of whether witchcraft is “real” or not, it is possible to discern the root cause of witchcraft practices as due to jealousy and selfishness. By addressing the root problem, cases of witchcraft practice will diminish. The paper uses Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka’s “sage philosophy” methodology, to interview rural sages who have reputations as being wise in their communities, so that professional philosophers can learn from their wisdom. For example, Saulo Namianya sees his role as helping to “level tongues” that had been high-pitched in their anger, so that people can discern the cause of a dispute and have it resolved. Adala Otuko emphasizes controlling one’s fear when one first sights a charm. Ngaimarish ole Mulo explains how to encourage parties who are sparring with each other to stop and consider the perspective of the other party. The sages are shown to be wise counselors who encourage critical thinking in their communities.

In this article, Presbey engages in the discussion about consensus oriented political systems in Africa, how they can be understood as democratic, and how a currently recommendable system of democracy could be inspired by them. With reference to some interviews that she herself conducted with Akan queenmothers in Ghana, utilizing the sage philosophy approach, Presbey discusses Wiredu's and Gyekye'e recent evaluations of the consensus principle in the political system of the Akan. The discussion also takes up critical remarks of Eze on Wiredu, and proposes some fertile comparative views on the political theory of Hannah Arendt

Hannah Arendt misrepresented Africans at the same time that she criticized the actions of those who harmed them. Arendt's 1951 work, The Origins of Totalitarianism aimed to show how Hitler's (and Stalin's) practices of totalitarian rule in Europe could be understood in the context of its predecessors, anti-Semitism and imperialism. As a middle stage in her argument, she focussed on the case of the Cape Colony in South Africa. Arendt's study includes: the distinctions she made between colonization and imperialism; her comments on race-thinking and racism; and her evaluation of labor practices, or the lack of labor, among the indigenous Africans, the trekboers, and the gold diggers. While making some valuable points regarding each of these topics, she nevertheless on occasion repeats some of the popular misconceptions regarding Africa. In addition, she advocates a position regarding labor that calls indigenous African practices into question as much as the adventures of the colonizers.

Henry Odera Oruka was one of the most influential figures in 20th-century African philosophy. During the early years of the decolonization of African countries, as universities worked to redefine themselves, Odera drove changes to curricula and research. A tireless advocate for democracy and human rights in Africa, he repeatedly intervened in the political debates of his time. This is the first critical biography of both the man himself and African philosophy in the context of changing times, taking us through his early life, scholarly training, and Oruka's way of transforming the field of philosophy as it was taught in Kenya. The narrative unfolds from the personal to the global, from Africa to the world, and from African philosophy to the wider field of philosophy. Biographical material is woven with narratives of the social conditions and live questions as they arise in Oruka's life in Kenya, Sweden, and the United States. We are introduced to his understanding of philosophy as a critique of society. Exposing prison practices in Africa and targeting capitalists, Oruka sought to remedy social problems on a global scale, from institutional racism and ethnic division to the wealth gap between rich and poor nations. Through archival material, personal interviews and primary texts, this book shines a light on Oruka's monumental contribution to African philosophy and global justice. Finally we can see how Oruka's insights are still relevant to how we think about poverty, philosophy and human rights today.

The paper explores the insights of Mahmood Mamdani regarding recent U.S. military actions in Iraq and the U.S. role in setting up a new government there. The majority of the paper does not, however, rely on sources of Mamdani addressing this topic directly. Rather the author consults Mamdani's work on colonialism and imperialism to find clues as to what is at heart wrong with the colonial approach to ruling. Four key attributes of colonialism that also play a role in recent U.S. actions in Iraq are the use of indirect rule, the politicization of indigeneity, economic domination, and the »civilizing mission.« While some advocates of imperialism such as Niall Ferguson think that there can be a good imperial power, Mamdani's analysis leads to a different conclusion. In Mamdani's early works we find that colonialism always sows the seeds of its own destruction; this insight is applied to the current Iraq situation as a cautionary tale.

With the recent death of Prof. H. Odera Oruka, founder of the ‘sage philosophy’ school of research based at the University of Nairobi, there is a need to look at some now-problematic issues. I suggest that the original impetus for starting the sage philosophy project-the defense against Euro-American skeptics who thought Africans incapable of philosophizing-has been outgrown. The present need for studies of African sages is to benefit from their wisdom, both in Africa and around the world. I also suggest that the title ‘sage’ has to be problematized. While there were good reasons to focus earlier on rural elders as overlooked wise philosophers, the emphasis now should be on admiring philosophical thought wherever it may be found—in women, youth, and urban Africans as well. In such a way, philosophy will be further relevant to people’s lives, and further light will be shed and shared regarding the lived experience in Africa.

Antón Donoso was a teacher and scholar devoted to studying North American, Latin American and Iberian philosophy, along with Marxism from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He explored the works of Jose Ortega y Gasset, Julian Marais, John Dewey, Miguel de Unamuno and others. He was active in philosophical societies that promoted the study of Latin American philosophy, and often wrote review articles that introduced English-speakers to the key new ideas from Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. In a series of journal articles he traced the influence of philosophies across continents, such as Dewey’s influence in Iberia and South America.

Both Gandhi and Fanon used divergent medical models to come up with their analogies for political action. For Gandhi, non-invasive medicine (such as fasting), prayer, and vigil took a key role in his response to individual illness of the body. He counseled similar tactics to challenge ‘illness” or error in the body politic. Fanon, a psychiatrist trained also in medicine referred to colonialism as a gangrene germ that threatened the life of the body politic, and therefore needed to be amputated or surgically removed. Hence, he had greater willingness to use violence to achieve the goals of liberation. Mandela respected both of these views and walked a fine line between them, deciding his movement would engage in violence against property while trying its best to minimize human casualties.

H. Odera Oruka responded to Lansana Keita's challenge and used philosophical skills to tackle economic issues. He uses a rights approach (based on the "right to life") to demand a "moral minimum," siding with the 'basic needs approach' in development theory. But, this acceptance of a "minimum" is in conflict with his earlier writings that demand economic equality. Oruka emphasizes rights rather than charity because he thinks the latter is dependent on inducing self-pity, which erodes respect. However, his theory, which leaves production to the economists and redistribution to the philosophers, leaves questions about production and livelihood unanswered. The paper then looks at Segun Gbadegesin's focus on the right to work instead of redistribution issues. The paper concludes by noting that the global economy has become more hostile and moved even further away from solutions proposed by Oruka and Gbadegesin.

In critical thinking we learn the importance of being fair, and opening up closed and biased minds. In practical philosophy we must learn how to find our happiness in a world where others act with evil intentions. In contemporary Kenya one major challenge is how to react to those who might use witchcraft to try to harm oneself or one’s family. Regardless of whether witchcraft is “real” or not, it is possible to discern the root cause of witchcraft practices as due to jealousy and selfishness. By addressing the root problem, cases of witchcraft practice will diminish. The paper uses Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka’s “sage philosophy” methodology, to interview rural sages who have reputations as being wise in their communities, so that professional philosophers can learn from their wisdom. For example, Saulo Namianya sees his role as helping to “level tongues” that had been high-pitched in their anger, so that people can discern the cause of a dispute and have it resolved. Adala Otuko emphasizes controlling one’s fear when one first sights a charm. Ngaimarish ole Mulo explains how to encourage parties who are sparring with each other to stop and consider the perspective of the other party. The sages are shown to be wise counselors who encourage critical thinking in their communities.

This paper engages an important debate going on in the literature regarding the efficacy of nonviolence in confronting unjust regimes. I will focus on the commentators who have claimed that nonviolence, if adhered to more resolutely, would have ended South African apartheid sooner. I will contrast them to Mandela’s account that both violence and nonviolence working in tandem were needed to bring a speedy and just resolution to South Africa’s crisis of racist governance. To consider South Africa an easy case of nonviolence’s success (for example, as shown in A Force More Powerful), evades many important factors. Mandela was familiar with Gandhian nonviolence and explicitly rejected it. The ANC organized an armed faction and engaged in acts of sabotage, and over time widened the scope of violent acts condoned by their organization. South African security forces responded to nonviolent protest with extreme repression, which contradicts claims often made by nonviolent proponents that sticking to nonviolence will lessen the chances of extreme repression. And the suffering of the South African people, while perhaps dwarfed when compared to genocides in other countries, was extensive and profound. One cannot understand some aspects of the difficult aftermath of apartheid’s legacy without taking into account the high level of violence emanating from several parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, in this context of violence, a broad nonviolent campaign had many successes.

The paper explores the role of sage philosophy, founded by Prof. H. Odera Oruka of Kenya, within African philosophy and philosophy in general. The focus on wise sages raises the larger issue of the relationship of wisdom to philosophy. An early literature of wisdom philosophy, dealing with the art of living, has been marginalized by modern philosophy, where concerns for wisdom are peripheral. Kekes and Blanshard argue, however, that the reflectiveness and judgment involved in wisdom are key philosophical virtues and abilities. Kenyan critics Wanjohi and Masolo argue that philosophy in the second sense, “commitment to investigation,” is more precious than philosophy in the first sense, commitment to opinions; and they argue that while philosophy in the first sense can be easily found in traditional Africa, the second sense is rarer. Gyekye shows that the marginalization of “commitment to opinion” in philosophy is a distortion, and the idea that today’s commitments do not belie a previous investigation is ungenerous. The paper continues by giving an account of some of the wisdom of four Kenyan sages: Makindu, Masero, Manugliechi, and Ayoo. Their insights into the need for love and generosity, and other human emotions, are found to be helpful not only in their Kenyan contexts, but also for Western countries as well. The paper refers to the cautionary notes of Nielsen regarding the appropriateness of speaking of “wisdom” in our times, but concludes with Godlovitch that sages help embody the “truth in truisms” while checking our tendency for denial and forgetfulness.

This paper will put forward to new audiences the core of Claude Sumner's thesis regarding philosophy in the "broad" and "narrow" senses, the former referring to wisdom and the sapiential tradition. It will look at Sumner's role in popularizing early Ethiopian texts in a project meant to debunk preconceptions that Africa has no written history of philosophy. Nevertheless Sumner does not limit himself to written texts in the Ethiopian tradition, but has branched out into collecting and analyzing the oral traditions as well. He has argued that the written texts of Zera Yacob are examples of "religious rationality" in some ways similar to Descartes' scientific rationality. He argues that proverbs possess "figurative logic," which while different than conceptual logic is still indeed logic. Both written and oral sources of Ethiopian philosophy stretch well beyond the last fifty years, Sumner asserts, and thus African philosophy becomes known as being older than Hountondji, Okolo and others have thought. The paper argues that Sumner's contributions to the growth of the field of African philosophy should not be overlooked.