Emmanuel Alloa

Im Zeitalter der Hochspezialisierung sind sie selten geworden, die Philosoph*innen, die an der Universität wie im Feuilleton gleichermaßen zuhause sind. Dieter Thomä ist einer dieser Wenigen. Ob in leichtfüßigen Kolumnen oder in tiefschürfenden Studien zur Geistesgeschichte - stets gilt sein Interesse den Unruheherden innerhalb von Ordnungen, den Umschlagspunkten, an denen ein System kippt. In vier Jahrzehnten publizistischer Tätigkeit hat er der Philosophie neue Gegenstände erschlossen und die Öffentlichkeit mit provokativen Zeitdiagnosen bereichert. Anlässlich seines 60. Geburtstags werden die Denkanstöße gewürdigt, die von seiner beherzten theoretischen Quertreiberei ausgingen.

The article focuses on a controversy between historians and psychoanalysts around the testimonial value of a Holocaust survivor (Serena N.). The survivor’s account of the Auschwitz uprising includes factual exaggerations, which has led historians to discard it. Psychoanalysts on the contrary stressed that the testimony accounted for something else: the possibility of resistance in the concentration camp, which gave the inmates hope in their struggle for survival. Survivors’ testimonies, so the argument, have both an epistemological and an ethical content. While philosophy’s insistence on the epistemological dimension of testimony has long generated a disregard for this ethical dimension, it would be equally wrong to construe a pure ethicality of testimony. Testimony is, first and foremost, an entangled social practice, which has tobe acknowledged in its agonal, its aporetic and its performative implications.

Dans son oeuvre tardive, Merleau-Ponty a souligné les convergences entre une pensée philosophique et une pensée s’exprimant par l’écriture littéraire, considérant que toutes deux répondent à une tâche commune liée à la description du monde. Ses premiers écrits théoriques – Simone de Beauvoir comme Jean-Paul Sartre l’ont souligné – sont quant à eux marqués par une distance plus nette vis-à-vis de la pratique littéraire. Pourtant, bien avant de publier ses premières monographies, Merleau-Ponty est l’auteur d’un livre écrit pour le compte d’un autre : Nord. Récit de l’arctique, paru en 1928 chez Grasset. Le roman qui traite de la vie d’un explorateur dans le grand nord canadien, entre commerce de fourrures entre rencontre avec les Inuits, n’est qu’un travail de commande, que Merleau-Ponty ne revendiquera jamais. On trouve cependant dans cet écrit de jeunesse quelques motifs intéressants qui préfigurent sa pensée à venir. In his late writings, Merleau-Ponty stressed the convergences between philosophy and literature, highlighting their “common task” of describing the world. His early philosophical texts though – both Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre pointed this out – insist on demarcating themselves from literature. However, well before publishing his first monographs, Merleau-Ponty had already written a book on someone else’s behalf: Nord. Récit de l’arctique, published in 1928 by French publisher Grasset. The novel, which deals with the life of an explorer in Canada’s far north, between fur trade and encounters with the Inuit, is the result of ghostwriting, carried out for a friend. Merleau-Ponty later never stood to that book. There are nonetheless some interesting motifs in this early piece of writing that prefigure his future thinking.Nei suoi ultimi scritti, Merleau-Ponty ha sottolineato le convergenze tra filosofia e letteratura, evidenziando il loro “comune compito” nel descrivere il mondo. I suoi primi testi filosofici – lo hanno sottolineato sia Simone de Beauvoir che Jean-Paul Sartre – insistono però a distinguersi dalla letteratura. Tuttavia, ben prima di pubblicare le sue monografie, Merleau-Ponty aveva già scritto un libro per conto terzi: Nord. Récit de l’arctique, pubblicato nel 1928 per le stampe di Grasset. Per questo romanzo, che tratta della vita di un esploratore nell’estremo nord canadese, tra commercio di pellicce e incontri con gli Inuit, Merleau-Ponty fa da ‘ghostwriter’ ad un amico. Mentre ulteriormente, egli non si avvalse mai della paternità del romanzo, questo primo scritto contiene già alcuni spunti che prefigurano il suo pensiero futuro.

This article is an attempt to circumscribe Georges Didi-Huberman’s inimitable practice of theory. It argues that Didi-Huberman’s ethics of looking represents a decided shift away from the traditional position of the critic as a dispassionate, objective observer. A Copernican revolution looms, which inverts the Kantian one: no longer are things adapting to their conceptual scheme, no longer is it the adaequatio rei ad intellectum, but its opposite. Didi-Huberman’s “discourse on method” is to be found in the book Phasmes, where such an “inverted intentionality” is described in terms of the mimicry of the phasmid insects: instead of assimilating the environment to himself, the subject assimilates himself to the environment. Phasmid thinking is the thought of disparateness, i.e., of dis-paring. This means to un-learn or, as it were, to un-prepare oneself in order to see what we believed we were seeing and which we in fact saw precisely because we knew. In drawing comparisons to similar methodological considerations in Adorno’s “snuggling up to the object,” the article attempts to locate Didi-Huberman’s critical epistemology at the intersection of French and German intellectual traditions.

This article defends the thesis that the reflection which Ricœur conducts on the notion of testimony is not one research topic among others, but forms one of the keys to understanding the Ricœurian project as such. The notion of testimony enables one to get beyond the polarity of description and ascription, in order to return to the question of the real. Through an examination of the quadruple grammar of testimony that Ricœur proposes and its context in the dialogue with historiography and theology, the article advances the thesis that with testimony, we broach the limit point of hermeneutics, a “non-interpretable” at the heart of interpretation. This “non-interpretable” acquires a quasi-transcendental status, because it allows interpretation to broach the thing it is dealing with and not another interpretation. Lastly, it will be important to show how Ricœur’s thought on testimony also reflects an ethics: this ethics prohibits treating the testimony as a mere source, referring to a positivity, but as a trace, within an experience, which as such is unrepeatable.

Webrova vznemirljiva teza iz dela Protestanska etika in duh kapitalizma, ki sprva izgleda tako neverjetno, je bila od svoje prve objave deležna številnih kritik, spodbijajo pa jo vse do danes. Ena izmed številnih kritik, pa ostaja še posebej nepopustljiva: če je duh samoodpovedovanja primeren za kapitalistično podjetništvo, pa ekonomije ne poganjajo samo podjetniki; ekonomija potrebuje tudi potrošnike, ki so pripravljeni kupiti več od tega, kar predstavlja njihove dejanske potrebe. Po Benjaminu je kapitalizem religija brez dogme ali teologije in ni nič drugega kot čisti kult. Kot takšen sestoji v nenehnem slavljenju vernika, ki svojo vero udejanja skozi porabo in potrošnjo. V nadaljevanju bi rad izpostavil tezo, da nam vzporejanje dveh momentov krize – krize Druge svetovne vojne in krize 2008 –, omogoča na novo osvetliti Webrovo slavno tezo o asketski naravi kapitalizma, ter podal novo razlago tega, zakaj investicijski kapitalizem in potrošniški kapitalizem sploh nista protislovna, temveč konec koncev popolnoma sovpadata. Med drugo svetovno vojno sta namreč vladi Združenih držav Amerike in Kanade izdali niz propagandnih plakatov, katerih cilj je bil zmanjšati porabo in preusmeriti finančne sile gospodinjstev v prid skupnega vojnega napora. Mnogi od teh plakatov, ki so jih naredili nekateri najbolj zviti oglaševalci tistega časa, so črpali iz najgloblje zakoreninjenih načel puritanizma Nove Anglije: dolžnosti samoomejevanja. Sporočilo je bilo v naslednjem: vaši prihranki bodo odrešljivi ob koncu vojne, to pa le malce premesti Calvinovo perspektivo varčevanja, ki omogočajo odrešitev v času ob koncu sveta. Danes bi bilo dobro, če bi premislili eshatološke implikacije teh prerokov, ki predpisujejo najboljše obnašanje ob dogodku konca krize.

En philosophie, l'impossible a un nom : c'est, depuis Kant, la "chose en soi". La notion n'a pas bonne presse. A peine introduite, elle a connu un discrédit durable. Curieuse idée en effet que celle d'une réalité reconnue comme inconnaissable sans être pour cela impensable. Et pourtant, la chose en soi résiste et ne cesse de revenir sous diverses dénominations : "matière", "facticité", "résistance", "inconstructible", etc. Aujourd'hui encore, son idée hante les débats, du côté de la philosophie comme des sciences de la nature ou de l'anthropologie, chez les métaphysiciens comme chez les philosophes les plus réalistes. Il fallait donc la traiter pour de bon : c'est chose faite avec cette compilation, qui regroupe parmi les plus grands noms de la philosophie contemporaine afin de régler cette question qui touche à l'absolu, donc à toute pensée.

This book critically engages with the idea of transparency whose ubiquitous demand stands in stark contrast to its lack of conceptual clarity. The book carefully examines this notion in its own right, traces its emergence in Early Modernity and analyzes its omnipresence in contemporary rhetoric. Today, transparency has become a catchword outplaying other Enlightenment values like empowerment, sincerity and the notion of a public sphere. In a suspicious manner, transparency is entangled in the discourses on power, surveillance, and self-exposure. Bringing together prominent scholars from the emerging field of Critical Transparency Studies, the book offers a map of the various sites at which transparency has become virulent and connects the dots between past and present. By studying its appearances in today’s hyper-mediated economies of information and by linking it back to its historical roots, the book analyzes transparency and its discontents, and scrutinizes the reasons why it has become the imperative of a supposedly post-ideological age.

When translating phantasia as ‘imagination’, one commits a dangerous anachronism: interpreting the Greek concept from the vantage point of a modern, post-Kantian framework which sees imagination as a faculty mediating between sensibility and reasoning. A close reading of the Aristotelian sources shows why phantasia cannot be identifi ed as a distinct faculty, but rather designates a transversal power common to all psychic acts. The article argues that a more adequate translation of phantasia would be ‘visualization’.

Si les analyses merleau-pontiennes sont aujourd’hui fréquemment utilisées dans les études postcoloniales, notamment les analyses du corps, on n’a toujours pas prêté suffisamment attention à l’importance qu’eut pour sa pensée la confrontation avec la réalité du colonialisme, au fil de divers voyages vers la moitié des années 1950. Dans l’article, il s’agit en particulier de faire émerger le rôle exemplaire qu’au pu avoir la confrontation avec la réalité de Madagascar, en 1957, et ses effets en retour sur un certain nombre de catégories philosophiques et politiques. Outre la reconstruction historique des circonstances de ce voyage, l’article se focalise sur trois notions centrales dont cette « épreuve de l’étranger » aura permis de faire apparaître la nature dialectique : les notions d’altérité, d’universalité, et d’autodétermination. L’altérité n’est plus une relation frontale, mais résulte d’une expérience de « décentrement » ; l’universalité doit être problématisée, en direction d’un « universel latéral » tandis que l’idée même de l’autodétermination soulève des questionnements autant politiques qu’ontologiques : dans la lutte pour une indépendance immédiate des colonies, Merleau-Ponty soupçonne le spectre d’une pensée libérale qui masque les liens de dépendance qui persistent sous d’autres formes. If Merleau-Pontian analyses – notably the analyses of the body – are, today, frequently used in post-colonial studies, sufficient attention was not always paid to the importance that the confrontation with the reality of colonialism had for his thought in the course of various travels during the mid-1950’s. This article is concerned, in particular, with shedding light on the exemplary role that the confrontation with the reality of Madagascar in 1957 could have had, and its effects in return on quite a number of philosophical and political categories. More than a historical reconstruction of the circumstances of that journey, the article focuses on three central notions whose dialectical nature is made apparent by this “experience of the foreign”: the notions of alterity, universality, and self-determination. Alterity is no longer a frontal relation, but results from an experience of “decentering,” universality must be problematized in the direction of a “lateral universality,” and the very idea of self-determination raises questions as much political as ontological. In the struggle for an immediate independence for the colonies, Merleau-Ponty senses the specter of a liberal thought that conceals the relations of dependence that persist in other forms. Se oggi le riflessioni merleau-pontiane, in particolare sul corpo, sono utilizzate di frequente negli studi postcoloniali, non si è mai prestata sufficiente attenzione all’importanza che ebbe, per il pensiero di Merleau-Ponty, il confronto con la realtà del colonialismo nel corso dei diversi viaggi effettuati dal filosofo verso la metà degli anni ’50. In quest’articolo ci proponiamo di far emergere il ruolo esemplare che poté avere il confronto con la realtà del Madagascar nel 1957 e le sue ripercussioni su un certo numero di categorie filosofiche e politiche. Oltre che sulla ricostruzione storica delle circostanze di questo viaggio, l’articolo si concentra su tre nozioni di cui questa esperienza avrebbe permesso di far apparire la natura dialettica: le nozioni di alterità, di universalità e di autodeterminazione. L’alterità non è più una relazione frontale, bensì risulta da un’esperienza di “decentramento”; l’universalità deve essere problematizzata nella direzione di un “universale laterale”, mentre l’idea stessa di autodeterminazione solleva un interrogarsi tanto politico che ontologico: nella lotta per un’indipendenza immediata delle colonie, Merleau-Ponty intravvede infatti lo spettro di un pensiero liberale volto a mascherare i legami di dipendenza per farli così persistere sotto altre forme.

La priorité que la phénoménologie classique accorde à la première personne se voit déplacée de différentes manières par les penseurs post-phénoménologiques, dont Jacques Derrida. L’article a pour but d’indiquer la fonction stratégique qu’occupe dans la pensée derridienne la figure du témoin, que ce soit en tant que tiers qui déstabilise la métaphysique de la présence dans ses premiers écrits mais surtout, comme figure spéculative dans l’œuvre tardive, entre foi et savoir. Des remarques dispersées de Derrida sur le témoignage, on peut dégager une petite grammaire du témoignage, avec ses trois paradoxes constitutifs: la substituabilité de l’insubstituable, la fondation de l’infondable, la répétition de l’irrépétible. En faisant apparaître la logique constitutive du témoignage, Derrida indique comment la figure du témoin en appelle à une complication de la phénoménologie, qu’on peut résumer par la notion de remédiation.

For a long time, Gilbert Simondon’s work was known only as either a philosophy restricted to the problem of technology or as an inspirational source for Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. As Simondon’s thinking is now finally in the process of being recognized in its own right as one of the most original philosophies of the twentieth century, this also entails that some critical work needs to be done to disentangle it from an all too hasty identification with Deleuzian categories. While both Simondon and Deleuze have made crucial contributions towards a theory of differential individuation that significantly diverges from other authors associated with French poststructuralism insofar as they insist on the dynamic and vital dimension of difference, they also differ on crucial points. Whereas Simondon sees the process of becoming as transductive amplification, Deleuze theorizes it as intensifying involution, leading to two notably distinct concepts of difference.

During World War II, both the US and Canadian governments issued a series of propaganda posters aimed at reducing spending and redirecting private households’ financial expenditures into the general war effort. Many of those posters, developed by some of the cleverest advertisers of the time, drew on Puritanism’s most deeply rooted principle: self-restraint. One propaganda poster succinctly exemplifies the underlying logic: as an elegant couple looks up at a gigantic elephant for sale, the caption sternly reminds them to be thrifty: “If you don’t need it … don’t buy it!”.If you don’t need it, don’t buy it. Propaganda Poster WWII. Ottawa...

Aunque fueron muchos los intentos en la modernidad de superar el dualismo cuerpo y mente, las teorías filosóficas del lenguaje en muchos casos lo reintrodujeron de manera sutil pero no menos eficaz. El artículo discute varios teoremas para pensar la materialidad del signo y muestra la preponderancia, desde Kierkegaard hasta el estructuralismo post-Saussuriano, de pensar la materialización como algo necesario, pero arbitrario en su modalidad. En esta concepción, el cuerpo del lenguaje no es solamente aquello que se puede sino aquello que se debe poder modificar: la corporalidad de la expresión es lo que debe poder ser absolutamente sustituible para conservar la unidad del sentido. Sin embargo, en muchos casos, el sentido emerge precisamente de la singularidad insustituible, de la configuración de los signos en la poesía o de la gestualidad inimitable del actor. El articulo argumenta en favor de introducir, en esta discusión, la distinción fenomenológica entre Kó'rper y Leib, que - como Husserl sugirió - también puede pueden pensarse según la diferencia entre lo representable y lo irrepresentable, entre lo que no tiene papel constituyente y que desde luego puede ser sustituido, y lo que permite ser representado por otro porque es insustituible. Although in the modern age there were plenty of attempts to overcome the mind-body dualism, its philosophical theories of languages reintroduced it in a subtle but not less effective way. In this article several theorems to think on the materiality of the sign are discussed, and the preponderance, from Kierkegaard to the post-Saussurean structuralism, of thinking the materialization as something necessary but arbitrary in its modality, is shown. The body of language under this understanding is not only that which can be modified, but that which must be modifiable: the corporeality of the utterance must be substitutable in order to preserve the unit of meaning. Nevertheless, in many cases, the meaning comes precisely from the unsubstitutable singularity, from the configuration of the signs in poetry or from the inimitable actor's gestures. The article argues for introducing in this discussion the phenomenological distinction between Kórper and Leib, which - as Husserl suggested - may also be thought from the difference between the representable and the irrepresentable, between what does not have a constituent role and hence can be substituted, and what allows to be represented by another because it is unsubstitutable