Theodor Ebert

Die hier vorliegende Neuübersetzung von Platons Menon enthält eine ausführliche Einführung, in der die Umstände der Abfassung, die möglichen Adressaten, die Figuren des Dialogs sowie dessen Thema und Fragestellung erörtert werden. Die Übersetzung beruht auf dem griechischen Text von Bluck. Daher sind in dem reproduzierten griechischen Text die Änderungen eingearbeitet, die sich aus dem Text von Bluck ergeben. Darüber hinaus werden an einer Reihe von Stellen Änderungen für den griechischen Text vorgeschlagen, teils aufgrund eigener oder fremder Konjekturen, teils aufgrund anderer Lesarten in den Handschriften, von denen einige auch für das philosophische Verständnis des Dialogs von Bedeutung sind. Die Erläuterungen legen zum einen Wert auf eine genaue Analyse der Argumente des Gesprächs, zum anderen auf die literarischen Aspekte. Hierbei sprechen die Bezüge zu sizilischen Autoren zusammen mit den an die Komödie erinnernden Elementen dafür, dass Platon bei der Abfassung ein sizilisches Publikum vor Augen hatte. Aus diesen Voraussetzungen ergibt sich ein neues Verständnis verschiedener Positionen, die diesem Dialog zugeschrieben werden.

This paper argues that Plato’s Meno does not offer evidence for a belief, commonly attributed to Plato, that we when learning something recollect what we learn from previous existences. This “theory of recollection” is a construct based on a reading of the relevant passages in the Meno which does not take into account the dialectical aspect of Socrates’ discussion with his interlocutor. And in one passage (81e3) it is based on a variant reading for which a better and better attested reading is available. The reference to recollection is used to make Meno agree to an absurd position.

Die hier vorliegende Neuübersetzung von Platons Menon enthält eine ausführliche Einführung, in der die Umstände der Abfassung, die möglichen Adressaten, die Figuren des Dialogs sowie dessen Thema und Fragestellung erörtert werden. Die Übersetzung beruht auf dem griechischen Text von Bluck. Daher sind in dem reproduzierten griechischen Text die Änderungen eingearbeitet, die sich aus dem Text von Bluck ergeben. Darüber hinaus werden an einer Reihe von Stellen Änderungen für den griechischen Text vorgeschlagen, teils aufgrund eigener oder fremder Konjekturen, teils aufgrund anderer Lesarten in den Handschriften, von denen einige auch für das philosophische Verständnis des Dialogs von Bedeutung sind. Die Erläuterungen legen zum einen Wert auf eine genaue Analyse der Argumente des Gesprächs, zum anderen auf die literarischen Aspekte. Hierbei sprechen die Bezüge zu sizilischen Autoren zusammen mit den an die Komödie erinnernden Elementen dafür, dass Platon bei der Abfassung ein sizilisches Publikum vor Augen hatte. Aus diesen Voraussetzungen ergibt sich ein neues Verständnis verschiedener Positionen, die diesem Dialog zugeschrieben werden.

In this paper I argue that the Stoic theory of signs as reported by Sextus Empiricus in AM and in PH belongs to Stoic logicians which precede Chrysippus. I further argue that the PH-version of this theory presupposes the version in AM and is an attempt to improve the older theory. I tentatively attribute the PH-version to Cleanthes and the AM-version to Zeno. I finally argue that the origin of this Stoic theory is to be found in the Dialectical school (probably Philo of Megara) whose theory of signs has been preserved in Pseudo-Galen, Historia philosopha cap. 9.

In this paper, I take my start from certain distinctions Aristotle made use of in his analysis of prudence (phronesis) in the Nicomachean Ethics, but I then move away from Aristotle’s claims, in particular because I find fault with Aristotle’s exclusion of technical achievements from the realm of prudence. It is not the type of action which serves as a criterion to differentiate prudent acts from merely skilful ones, since in building a house you may act skilfully as well as prudently; yet whereas in acting skilfully you look not farther than to the intended aim of the action, in acting prudently you take options and possible aims into account which are beyond the aim of the actual action.

Kahn tries to do justice to the contribution Pythagoras and his followers might have had for Greek science. Thus he downplays the religious figure so prominent with Burkert's groundbreaking study "Lore and Science". He sees the transformation Pythagorean ideas may have undergone in Plato's Academy as pivotal for the developments of Pythagoreanism in later antiquity as well as in Renaissance speculation, e. g. Kepler. The book offers a good overview for the history of Pythagoreanism from its founder to modern times.

The text at Phaedo 100a is a well-known crux: Socrates seems to claim as for his use of a hypothesis: whatever does not follow from my hypothesis, I put down as not true (hos ouk alethe). Since there may be pairs of contradictory propositions, both of which do not follow from his hypothesis, Socrates would have to claim that both are false, although of two contradictory propositions only one can be false. I argue, using a reading already proposed by Henricus Aristippus, that Plato had Socrates claim: (...) I do not put down as true (ouch hos alethe).

This paper discusses passages in Plato’s Phaedo which seem to contradict each other: at Phaedo 65a-d and at 66e-67a Plato seems to rule out that sense perception can be of any help in the acquisition of knowledge, whereas at Phaedo 74b-75a it is claimed that we get our knowledge of (the form of) equality only via the perception of equal things. I argue that the incompatibility of these passages is only apparent since in the first group of texts (all taken from Socrates’ so-called apology) Socrates is made to represent the ‚true philosophers‘ (probably the Pythagoreans), whereas in the latter passages (from the recollection argument) he speaks in propria persona. I then discuss the question why Plato did insert in his dialogue a position which he does not share, and I finally argue that Plato did not believe in the recollection of the form of equality.

This is a review of a book by the physician Uwe-Christian Arnold pleading for the right to assisted suicide. Arnold who has accompanied several patients to their end opens his book with several case studies. In the second part A. discusses the arguments against assisted suicide. One of the arguments is based on a reading of the Hippocratic Oath which is shared also by A. As against this reading, I argue that in this text the doctor is not committed to withholding a poison from his patient, but rather to be no part as an accomplice in a poisoning ordered or wished for by a third party. Given the very painful dying caused by the poisons known in antiquity it is in itself rather unlikely that a patient wanting to commit suicide did asked his doctor for a poison. In the third part of the book, A. argues against the slippery slope argument brought forward by people like the catholic philosopher R. Spaemann. Pointing to empirical evidence from US-states as Oregon, A. insists that allowing assisted suicide has helped to enhance palliative medical care and reduced the number of suicides.