-
255Frege’s puzzle and Frege cases: Defending a quasi-syntactic solutionCognitive Systems Research 9 76-91. 2008.There is no doubt that social interaction plays an important role in language-learning, as well as in concept acquisition. In surprising contrast, social interaction makes only passing appearance in our most promising naturalistic theories of content. This is particularly true in the case of mental content (e.g., Cummins, 1996; Dretske, 1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Millikan, 1984); and insofar as linguistic content derives from mental content (Grice, 1957), social interaction seems missing fr…Read more
-
236Representation in extended cognitive systems : does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.forthcoming in R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind
-
197On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thoughtSynthese 117 (1): 95-131. 1998.Naturalistically minded philosophers hope to identify a privileged nonsemantic relation that holds between a mental representation m and that which m represents, a relation whose privileged status underwrites the assignment of reference to m. The naturalist can accomplish this task only if she has in hand a nonsemantic criterion for individuating mental representations: it would be question-begging for the naturalist to characterize m, for the purpose of assigning content, as 'the representation…Read more
-
188Realization, Completers, and C eteris Paribus Laws in PsychologyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1): 1-11. 2007.University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she sudd…Read more
-
187In this essay, it is argued that naturalism of an even moderate sort speaks strongly against a certain widely held thesis about the human mental (and cognitive) architecture: that it is divided into two distinct levels, the personal and the subpersonal, about the former of which we gain knowledge in a manner that effectively insulates such knowledge from the results of scientific research. An empirically motivated alternative is proposed, according to which the architecture is, so to speak, flat…Read more
-
187Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical AppraisalPhilosophy Compass 6 (9): 630-639. 2011.This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are…Read more
-
178Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition (review)Philosophical Psychology 23 (1): 113-123. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
-
157Coining Terms In The Language of ThoughtJournal of Philosophy 98 (10): 499-530. 2001.Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
-
145Cognitive Systems and the Extended MindOup Usa. 2009.Robert Rupert argues against the view that human cognitive processes comprise elements beyond the boundary of the organism, developing a systems-based conception in place of this extended view. He also argues for a conciliatory understanding of the relation between the computational approach to cognition and the embedded and embodied views.
-
143Review of Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (3). 2011.In recent years, much has been written about situated cognition, a movement in cognitive science that appears to have important philosophical implications (Robbins and Aydede 2009). Agents of this situated turn expound a variety of positive views; thus, at least initially, the movement may be best explained in terms of what its practitioners reject. The great majority of situated theorists direct their philosophical ire at a computer-based vision of human thought that came to prominence in the 1…Read more
-
134According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC, hereafter), human cognitive processing extends beyond the boundary of the human organism.1 As I understand HEC, it is a claim in the..
-
130Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor’s Theory of ContentPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3): 325-349. 2000.According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, …Read more
-
124Innateness and the situated mindIn P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 96--116. 2009.forthcoming in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge UP)
-
111The best test theory of extension: First principle(s)Mind and Language 14 (3). 1999.This paper presents the leading idea of my doctoral dissertation and thus has been shaped by the reactions of all the members of my thesis committee: Charles Chastain, Walter Edelberg, W. Kent Wilson, Dorothy Grover, and Charles Marks. I am especially grateful for the help of Professors Chastain, Edelberg, and Wilson; each worked closely with me at one stage or another in the development of the ideas contained in the present work. Shorter versions of this paper were presented at the 47th Annual …Read more
-
56Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwiseBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2): 145-146. 2014.
-
52Review of J. T. Ismael, The Situated Self (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10). 2007.
-
46Review of Raymond W. Gibbs, jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8). 2006.
-
24Review of Nicholas Shea's Representation in Cognitive Science (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C): 260-263. 2022.
-
These ten lectures articulate a distinctive vision of the structure and workings of the human mind, drawing from research on embodied cognition as well as from historically more entrenched approaches to the study of human thought. On the author’s view, multifarious materials co-contribute to the production of virtually all forms of human behavior, rendering implausible the idea that human action is best explained by processes taking place in an autonomous mental arena – those in the conscious mi…Read more
Boulder, Colorado, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Social Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
Intentionality |