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157Tense and Singular PropositionsIn Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan, Oxford University Press. pp. 331--392. 1989.
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197Two Conceptions of SemanticsIn Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 317-328. 2004.
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252That FPhilosophical Studies 141 (2). 2008.Jeffrey King's principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails
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134Tense and IntensionIn Aleksandar Jokić & Quentin Smith (eds.), Time, Tense, and Reference, Mit Press. pp. 107-154. 2003.
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36Reference and information content: names and descriptionsIn Dov M. Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 409--461. 1983.
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429RecurrencePhilosophical Studies 159 (3): 407-441. 2012.Standard compositionality is the doctrine that the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of the semantic contents of the contentful component expressions. In 1954 Hilary Putnam proposed that standard compositionality be replaced by a stricter version according to which even sentences that are synonymously isomorphic (in the sense of Alonzo Church) are not strictly synonymous unless they have the same logical form. On Putnam’s proposal, the semantic content of a compound express…Read more
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370Recurrence AgainPhilosophical Studies 172 (2): 445-457. 2015.Kit Fine has replied to my criticism of a technical objection he had given to the version of Millianism that I advocate. Fine evidently objects to my use of classical existential instantiation in an object-theoretic rendering of his meta-proof. Fine’s reply appears to involve both an egregious misreading of my criticism and a significant logical error. I argue that my rendering is unimpeachable, that the issue over my use of classical EI is a red herring, and that Fine’s original argument commit…Read more
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118Quantifying into the unquantifiable: the life and work of David KaplanIn Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford University Press. pp. 25. 2009.
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158Three Perspectives on Quantifying InIn Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford University Press. pp. 64. 2010.
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110Points, complexes, complex points, and a yachtIn Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting", Routledge. 2008.
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719Numbers versus NominalistsAnalysis 68 (3). 2008.A nominalist account of statements of number (e.g., ‘There are exactly two moons of Mars’) is rebutted.
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322On DesignatingMind 114 (456): 1069-1133. 2005.A detailed interpretation is provided of the ‘Gray's Elegy’ passage in Russell's ‘On Denoting’. The passage is suffciently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitabl…Read more
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193Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox: A Reply to David overPhilosophical Books 25 (1): 7-11. 1984.
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218Julius Caesar and the NumbersPhilosophical Studies 175 (7): 1631-1660. 2018.This article offers an interpretation of a controversial aspect of Frege’s The Foundations of Arithmetic, the so-called Julius Caesar problem. Frege raises the Caesar problem against proposed purely logical definitions for ‘0’, ‘successor’, and ‘number’, and also against a proposed definition for ‘direction’ as applied to lines in geometry. Dummett and other interpreters have seen in Frege’s criticism a demanding requirement on such definitions, often put by saying that such definitions must pro…Read more
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402Illogical BeliefPhilosophical Perspectives 3 243-285. 1989.A sequel to the author’s book /Frege’s Puzzle/ (1986).
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365GeneralityPhilosophical Studies 161 (3): 471-481. 2012.A distinction is drawn among predicates, open sentences (or open formulas), and general terms, including general-term phrases. Attaching a copula, perhaps together with an article, to a general term yields a predicate. Predicates can also be obtained through lambda-abstraction on an open sentence. The issue of designation and semantic content for each type of general expression is investigated. It is argued that the designatum of a general term is a universal, e.g., a kind, whereas the designatu…Read more
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419Demonstrating and NecessityPhilosophical Review 111 (4): 497-537. 2002.My title is meant to suggest a continuation of the sort of philosophical investigation into the nature of language and modality undertaken in Rudolf Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity and Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. My topic belongs in a class with meaning and naming. It is demonstratives—that is, expressions like ‘that darn cat’ or the pronoun ‘he’ used deictically. A few philosophers deserve particular credit for advancing our understanding of demonstratives and other indexical words. Thou…Read more
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University of California, Santa BarbaraRetired faculty
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APA Western Division
Los Angeles, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Language, Misc |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic in Philosophy |