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36These three papers are exceptionally rich and varied and I will be selective in responding. My aim is to relate the psychological research they discuss to the broader context of current philosophical debates about free will
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72Responsibility, indeterminism and Frankfurt-style cases: A reply to Mele and RobbIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 91--105. 2003.
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1227A Contemporary Introduction to Free WillOxford University Press. 2005.Accessible to students with no background in the subject, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will provides an extensive and up-to-date overview of all the latest views on this central problem of philosophy. Opening with a concise introduction to the history of the problem of free will--and its place in the history of philosophy--the book then turns to contemporary debates and theories about free will, determinism, and related subjects like moral responsibility, coercion, compulsion, autonomy, …Read more
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25Non-constraining control and the threat of social conditioningThe Journal of Ethics 4 (4): 401-403. 2000.
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2IncompatibilismIn Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Blackwell. 2008.
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136The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilitiesPhilosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 57-80. 2000.
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557Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will"Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 20-75. 2005.REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; T…Read more
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27Liberation from Self (review)Philosophical Review 106 (4): 599-601. 1997.Perhaps the best way to understand the novelty of Berofsky’s approach is to discuss two prevailing views about autonomy he rejects. On one of these views, we have the following picture: Autonomous agents develop powers to critically reflect upon and evaluate their past and present motivations. Such reflection inevitably leads to conflicts between reflective evaluation and existing motivation. The workaholic judges that he should spend more time with his family; the smoker does not want to have t…Read more
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561Free will, determinism, and indeterminismIn Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 371--406. 2002.
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
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39Free WillProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 291-302. 2001.Over the past three decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will motivated by a desire to reconcile a non-determinist view of free will with modern science as well as with recent developments in philosophy. A view of free will of the kind I defend did not exist in a developed form before the 1980s, but is now discussed in the philosophical literature as one of three chief options an incompatibilist or libertarian view of free will might take. As such, this view has been the su…Read more
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The contours of contemporary free will debatesIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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788Responsibility, Luck, and ChanceJournal of Philosophy 96 (5): 217-240. 1999.Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.
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Agency, responsibility, and indeterminism: Reflections on libertarian theories of free willIn Ted Honderich (ed.), Freedom and Determinism, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2004.
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