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81Free will and the dialectic of selfhood: Can one make sense of a traditional free will requiring ultimate responsibility?Ideas Y Valores 58 (141): 25-43. 2009.For four decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to which agents are required to be ultimately responsible for the creation or formation of their own wills (characters and purposes). The aim of this paper is to explain how a free will of this traditional kind -which..
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72Responsibility, indeterminism and Frankfurt-style cases: A reply to Mele and RobbIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 91--105. 2003.
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69Free Will: New Directions for an Ancient Problem: A Reply to Allen and RogersProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 291-302. 2007.Over the past three decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will motivated by a desire to reconcile a non-determinist view of free will with modern science as well as with recent developments in philosophy. A view of free will of the kind I defend did not exist in a developed form before the 1980s, but is now discussed in the philosophical literature as one of three chief options an incompatibilist or libertarian view of free will might take. As such, this view has been the su…Read more
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57Interview by Simon CushingJournal of Cognition and Neuroethics (Philosophical Profiles). 2017.Simon Cushing conducted the following interview with Robert Kane on 24 August 2017.
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52Precis of The Significance of Free WillThe Significance of Free WillPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 129. 2000.
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44Do We Have Free Will?: A DebateRoutledge. 2021.In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will? Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will.
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43New directions on free willIn The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 135-142. 1999.Libertarian or incompatibilist conceptions of free will (according to which free will is incompatible with determinism) have been under withering attack in the modern era of Western philosophy as obscure and unintelligible and have been dismissed as outdated by many twentieth century philosophers and scientists because of their supposed lack of fit with modern images of human beings in the natural and human sciences. In a recent book (The Significance of Free Will), I attempt to reconcile incomp…Read more
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42Ethics and the quest for wisdomCambridge University Press. 2010.Modernity has challenged the ancient ideal of a universal quest for wisdom, and today's world of conflicting cultures and values has raised further doubts regarding the possibility of objective ethical standards. Robert Kane refocuses the debate on the philosophical quest for wisdom, and argues that ethical principles about right action and the good life can be seen to emerge from that very quest itself. His book contends that the search for wisdom involves a persistent striving to overcome narr…Read more
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39Free WillProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 291-302. 2001.Over the past three decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will motivated by a desire to reconcile a non-determinist view of free will with modern science as well as with recent developments in philosophy. A view of free will of the kind I defend did not exist in a developed form before the 1980s, but is now discussed in the philosophical literature as one of three chief options an incompatibilist or libertarian view of free will might take. As such, this view has been the su…Read more
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37Free will, bound and unbound: reflections on Shaun Nichols’ boundPhilosophical Studies 174 (10): 2479-2488. 2017.Nichols’ Bound presents interesting new angles on traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility, relating them to the latest empirical research in psychology, social sciences and experimental philosophy. In experimental philosophy, he cites numerous recent studies showing that there are strong incompatibilist strands in folk intuitions about free will and responsibility, taking issue with other recent studies claiming that folk intuitions are predominantly compatibilist. But he al…Read more
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36Charles Hartshorne, 1897-2000Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (5). 2001.An obituary notice outlining the main aspects of Charles Hartshorne's life, career, and thought.
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36These three papers are exceptionally rich and varied and I will be selective in responding. My aim is to relate the psychological research they discuss to the broader context of current philosophical debates about free will
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35Deontic Acts, Frankfurt-Style Examples, and "'Ought' Implies 'Can'"The Journal of Ethics 4 (4): 357-360. 2000.
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34Excerpts from Robert Kane's Discussion with Members of the AudienceThe Journal of Ethics 4 (4). 2000.
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31Liberation from Self: A Theory of Personal AutonomyPhilosophical Review 106 (4): 599. 1997.Perhaps the best way to understand the novelty of Berofsky’s approach is to discuss two prevailing views about autonomy he rejects. On one of these views, we have the following picture: Autonomous agents develop powers to critically reflect upon and evaluate their past and present motivations. Such reflection inevitably leads to conflicts between reflective evaluation and existing motivation. The workaholic judges that he should spend more time with his family; the smoker does not want to have t…Read more
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29Oxford Handbook on Free Will (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2001.This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as…Read more
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27Liberation from Self (review)Philosophical Review 106 (4): 599-601. 1997.Perhaps the best way to understand the novelty of Berofsky’s approach is to discuss two prevailing views about autonomy he rejects. On one of these views, we have the following picture: Autonomous agents develop powers to critically reflect upon and evaluate their past and present motivations. Such reflection inevitably leads to conflicts between reflective evaluation and existing motivation. The workaholic judges that he should spend more time with his family; the smoker does not want to have t…Read more
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25Non-constraining control and the threat of social conditioningThe Journal of Ethics 4 (4): 401-403. 2000.
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24Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism (review)Review of Metaphysics 36 (4): 948-950. 1983.This book defends a libertarian theory of freedom of will, requiring the incompatibility of free decisions and neurophysiological determinism. A revised version of a doctoral thesis presented at Oxford in 1976, it is written with uncommon fluency and contains more than a few ingenious arguments advancing the libertarian cause. In the end, the author must rely on a theory of agency, or agent causality, that is a trifle too obscure to convince most compatibilists. But this is a common problem amon…Read more
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23Searching for Wisdom About the Good in Theory and PracticeSocial Theory and Practice 39 (2): 328-342. 2013.
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21God, Free Will and Morality (review)Review of Metaphysics 39 (2): 374-375. 1985.The early chapters of this book deal with what the author calls the "dilemma of obligability.". The apparent dilemma is that obligability is not compatible with either determinism or indeterminism. The author believes the dilemma can be avoided by denying the principle that "'ought' implies 'can'," or the principle that obligability entails substitutability. This is because, as the dilemma is presented in the book, it is generated by the assumption that obligability entails substitutability toge…Read more
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19Freedom, Will, and NatureProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 291-302. 2007.
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