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220Counterfactuals and the benefit of hindsightIn Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Routledge. 2003.Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey w…Read more
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67The Pragmatics of the Logical ConstantsIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768--793. 2006.The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we…Read more
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857The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of PossibilityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1): 1-22. 2004.I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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51The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 220. £2.10.)Philosophy 47 (182): 375. 1972.
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266Mellor on chance and causation (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 411-433. 1997.Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to…Read more
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216
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4Conditionals, truth and assertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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336Vagueness by DegreesIn Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader, Mit Press. 1996.Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If yo…Read more
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54Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and TruthIn Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors o…Read more
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224X*—Meaning, Bivalence and RealismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 153-174. 1981.Dorothy Edgington; X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 153–174, https://doi.org/1.
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60Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some PuzzlesIn Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73. 1992.
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The pragmatics of the logicalIn Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768. 2005.
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15And AssertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 283. 2009.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Probability |