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Dorothy Edgington

Birkbeck, University of London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    82
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  •  Events
    13
  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Birkbeck, University of London
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Probability
  • All publications (82)
  •  220
    Counterfactuals and the benefit of hindsight
    In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Routledge. 2003.
    Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey w…Read more
    Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we actually live in: can one theory of causation cover all instances of cause and effect?
    Subjunctive Conditionals, MiscPossible-World Theories of CounterfactualsCounterfactual Theories of C…Read more
    Subjunctive Conditionals, MiscPossible-World Theories of CounterfactualsCounterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  67
    The Pragmatics of the Logical Constants
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768--793. 2006.
    The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we…Read more
    The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we may be puzzled or misled when we wonder why the mathematician is taking some particular step. But this is hardly a compulsory topic in the philosophy of language.
    Logical Constants
  •  857
    The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of Possibility
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1): 1-22. 2004.
    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
    Epistemic PossibilityMetaphysical NecessityVarieties of Modality, MiscNomological NecessityApriority…Read more
    Epistemic PossibilityMetaphysical NecessityVarieties of Modality, MiscNomological NecessityApriority and Necessity
  •  51
    The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 220. £2.10.)
    Philosophy 47 (182): 375. 1972.
  •  266
    Mellor on chance and causation (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 411-433. 1997.
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to…Read more
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to the standard calculus has wider application than the causal instances to which Mellor's notion is restricted (Section 8). Other topics discussed may be gleaned from the headings below. 1 Review of D.H. Mellor [1995]: The Facss of Causation, London, Routledge, International Library of Philosophy.
    Probabilistic CausationChance and Objective Probability, MiscStatistical Theories of Causation
  •  216
    General conditional statements: A response to kölbel
    Mind 109 (433): 109-116. 2000.
    Conditionals
  •  4
    Conditionals, truth and assertion
    In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Conditionals
  •  336
    Vagueness by Degrees
    In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader, Mit Press. 1996.
    Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If yo…Read more
    Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If you remove one grain from a heap of sand, surely you must be left with a heap. Yet apply this principle repeatedly as you remove grains one by one, and you end up, absurdly, with a solitary grain that counts as a heap. This anthology collects papers in the field. After an introduction that surveys the field, the essays form four groups, starting with some historically notable pieces. The 1970s saw an explosion of interest in vagueness, and the second group of essays reprints classic papers from this period. The following group of papers represent current work on the logic and semantics of vagueness. The essays in the final group are contributions to the continuing debate about vague objects and vague identity.
    Degree Theories of Vagueness
  •  13
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 83 (331): 461-462. 1974.
  •  338
    Truth, objectivity, counterfactuals and Gibbard
    Mind 106 (421): 107-116. 1997.
    Subjunctive Conditionals, Misc
  •  54
    Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and Truth
    In Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors o…Read more
    Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show how relevant it is to present-day concerns. Each of the ten essays addresses fundamental and contentious issues, including success semantics, propositions, infinity, conditionals, conceptual analysis, decision theory, and intergenerational justice. They also shed light on the intellectual context in which Ramsey developed his thought, including his relationship with such leading thinkers as John Maynard Keynes, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The volume will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the recent history of philosophy and economics, as well as for practitioners and students of logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, decision theory, and welfare economics.
    Epistemic Accounts of Indicative Conditionals
  •  71
    Logic and Philosophy: A Modern Introduction
    Philosophical Quarterly 20 (81): 406. 1970.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousLogic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works
  •  95
    Explanation, Causation and Laws
    Critica 22 (66): 55-73. 1990.
    Causation and Laws of NatureExplanation and Laws of Nature
  •  224
    X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 153-174. 1981.
    Dorothy Edgington; X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 153–174, https://doi.org/1.
    Vagueness and Indeterminacy
  •  60
    Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles
    In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73. 1992.
    Belief Revision
  • The pragmatics of the logical
    In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768. 2005.
    Logics, MiscPragmatics, Misc
  •  95
    The Logic of Uncertainty
    Critica 27 (81): 27-54. 1995.
    Degree Theories of Vagueness
  •  15
    And Assertion
    In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 283. 2009.
    Assertion
  •  49
    No Title available: PHILOSOPHY
    Philosophy 47 (182): 375-377. 1972.
    British PhilosophyGödelian Arguments Against AI
  •  55
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152): 365-370. 1988.
  •  222
    Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions
    Cr'itica 18 (52): 3-30. 1986.
    Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsIndicative Conditionals and Conditional Probabi…Read more
    Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsIndicative Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities
  •  197
    Validity, Uncertainty and Vagueness
    Analysis 52 (4). 1992.
    Epistemic Theories of VaguenessDegree Theories of Vagueness
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