-
693Two Kinds of PossibilityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1): 1-22. 2004.I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
-
90The applicability of bayesian convergence-of-opinion theorems to the case of actual scientific inferenceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2): 160-161. 1976.
-
58The philosophical problem of vaguenessLegal Theory 7 (4): 371-378. 2001.Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. "There is no such point", is a natural thought: one color just shades gradually into the next
-
87Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating CounterfactualsStudia Logica 102 (4): 691-707. 2014.The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals
-
13The Mystery of the Missing BoundaryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 704-711. 2005.
-
129We provide an introduction to some of the key issues raised in this volume by considering how individual chapters bear on the prospects of what may be called a ‘counterfactual process view’ of causal reasoning. According to such a view, counterfactual thought is an essential part of the processing involved in making causal judgements, at least in a central range of cases that are critical to a subject’s understanding of what it is for one thing to cause another. We argue that one fruitful way of…Read more
-
1MACKIE, J. L. "Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic" (review)Mind 85 (n/a): 303. 1976.
-
21The Pragmatics of the Logical ConstantsIn Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768--793. 2006.The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we…Read more
-
136Counterfactuals and the benefit of hindsightIn Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Routledge. 2003.Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey w…Read more
-
252Possible knowledge of unknown truthSynthese 173 (1). 2010.Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unkno…Read more
-
21The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 220. £2.10.)Philosophy 47 (182): 375-. 1972.
-
Un argumento de Orayen en favor del condicional materialRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 13 (1): 54. 1987.
-
116
-
3Conditionals, truth and assertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
1Sorensen on Vagueness and ContradictionIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |