-
10Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02912
-
49Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7). 2008.
-
31Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justificationPhilosophical Books 50 (2): 112-123. 2009.
-
39Peacocke on semantic valuesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
-
70Meaning, Mind, and KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2014.This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge
-
50Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
-
Introspection and the skepticIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
-
723There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454. 1999.Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows
-
42Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 50-51. 1993.
-
Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itselfIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 249--272. 2006.
-
35Ow! The Paradox of PainIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
-
108Harman on self referential thoughtsPhilosophical Issues 16 (1): 346-357. 2006.I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. M…Read more
-
118Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
-
69ConsciousnessCambridge University Press. 2009.This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to …Read more
-
114Perceptual RelativityPhilosophical Topics 44 (2): 179-200. 2016.Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.
-
136Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December): 254-65. 1981.
-
856Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Studies 87 (1): 61-85. 1997.
-
106
-
38Can Carey answer Quine?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
-
11Raw Feelings: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Books 37 (2): 127-130. 1996.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |