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320The layered model: Metaphysical considerationsPhilosophical Explorations 5 (1). 2002.This paper examines the idea, commonly presupposed but seldom explicitly stated in discussions of certain philosophical problems, that the objects and phenomena of the world are structured in a hierarchy of "levels", from the bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organisms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups of such creatures. Parallel to this "layered model" of the natural world is an ordering of the sciences, with physics as our "…Read more
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270Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological Naturalism”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 189-194. 1995.
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19ReferencesCritical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 18 (1-3): 331-360. 2006.. References. Critical Review: Vol. 18, Democratic Competence, pp. 331-360.
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24Supervenience for Multiple DomainsPhilosophical Topics 16 (1): 129-150. 1988.The main topic of this paper is the question of how supervenience can be understood as a relation between two families of properties each applicable to a distinct domain of individuals.
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41Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualismIn Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons, Cornell University Press. 2001.
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529Physicalism, or Something Near EnoughPrinceton University Press. 2005."This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
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26CHAPTER 5. Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don’t WorkIn Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press. pp. 121-148. 2007.
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33Honderich on mental events and psychoneural lawsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (March): 29-48. 1989.The paper discusses Ted Honderich's ?Hypothesis of Psychoneural Correlation?, one of the three fundamental ?hypotheses? of his Theory of Determinism. This doctrine holds that there is a pervasive system of psychoneural laws connecting every mental event with a neural correlate. Various questions are raised and discussed concerning the formulation of the thesis, Honderich's concepts of ?mental? and ?physical?, and the possible grounds for accepting the thesis. Finally, Honderich's response to Don…Read more
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"36. what is" naturalized epistemology?In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 359. 2003.
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5Psychophysical lawsIn Brian P. Mclaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1985.
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232'Strong' and 'global' supervenience revisitedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December): 315-26. 1987.THIS PAPER CORRECTS AN ERROR IN MY EARLIER PAPER, "CONCEPTS OF SUPERVENIENCE" ("PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH", VOLUME 45, 1984), AND PRESENTS FURTHER MATERIAL ON SUPERVENIENCE. THE ERROR IS THE CLAIM THAT "GLOBAL" SUPERVENIENCE ENTAILS "STRONG" SUPERVENIENCE. HOWEVER, IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS FAILURE OF ENTAILMENT ONLY GOES TO SHOW THE INADEQUACY OF GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE AS AN EXPLICATION OF "DEPENDENCY" OR "DETERMINATION" RELATION, AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT MATERIALISM FORMULATED IN TER…Read more
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124Naturalism and semantic normativityIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, Atascadero: Ridgeview. pp. 205-210. 1993.
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1CausationIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 2--125. 1995.
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48Reasons and the first personIn J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 67--87. 1998.
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32Events as Property ExemplificationsIn M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory, D. Reidel. pp. 310-326. 1976.
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8The Mind-Body Problem at Century's TurnIn Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Clarendon Press. pp. 129-152. 2004.A plausible terminus for the mind-body debate begins by embracing ontological physicalism—the view that there is only one kind of substance in the concrete world, and that it is material substance. Taking mental causation seriously, this terminus also embraces conditional reductionism, the thesis that only physically reducible (i.e., functionalizable) mental properties can be causally efficacious. Intentional/cognitive properties (what David Chalmers calls “psychological” aspects of mind) are ph…Read more
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80CHAPTER 2. The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and DefendedIn Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press. pp. 32-92. 2007.
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63Supervenient properties and micro-based concepts: A reply to NoordhofProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 115-118. 1999.Jaegwon Kim; Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Properties: A reply to Noordhof, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999
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10Mental CausationIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 170. 2002.
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341Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism (edited book)W. de Gruyter. 1992.Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
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1Supervenience, emergence, and realization in the philosophy of mindIn Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press. 1997.
Jaegwon Kim
(1934 - 2019)
Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |