Jaegwon Kim

(1934 - 2019)

For the physicalist, the mind-body problem is the problem of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. What does “fundamentally physical” mean? I think any physicalist will accept at least the following two claims. First, the world contains nothing but bits of matter and aggregates of bits of matter. There are no Cartesian souls, or Hegelian spirits, or neo-vitalist entelechies—as the emergentist C. Lloyd Morgan put it, no “alien influx” into the natural order. This ontological thesis is sometimes called “ontological physicalism”. Second, we have the supervenience thesis: physical facts determine all the facts, and the physical properties of a thing determine all its properties. At this point, then, the world looks like this: all the things that exist are physical things—either basic bits of matter or wholly made up of bits of matter. These physical things have properties. What properties? First, there are basic physical properties, like mass, size, shape, electric charge, and so on—properties and magnitudes in terms of which laws of physics are formulated. But some properties of complex physical systems, like biological organisms, seem prima facie nonphysical—at least, they are not among the properties investigated in physics or the physical sciences. Prominent among them are mental properties—beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, and the rest. The supervenience thesis says that such properties are fixed by the physical properties of the systems that have them; once the physical properties of a system are fixed, that fixes all of its properties. And yet property dualists, or nonreductive physicalists, maintain that although certain non-physical properties are determined by physical properties, they are irreducible to, and remain distinct from, physical properties. Although thoughts and pains are determined by the biology, and ultimately physicochemistry, of an organism, they are not biological/physical properties themselves, and there exists a special autonomous science of psychology, or cognitive science, that is responsible for investigating them.

Thirty-two years ago W. V. Quine proposed a definition of 'logical truth' that has been widely repeated and reprinted. Quine himself seems to have recognized that this definition is wrong in detail; in section 1 we eliminate this fault. What has perhaps been less widely observed is that, in abandoning the model-theoretic account of logical truth in favor of a "substitutional" account, Quine's definition swells the ranks of the logical truths and makes the classification of a sentence as a logical truth dependent both on the interpretation of its extralogical words and on the extralogical vocabulary available in the language.

Is social science ‘reducible’ to individual psychology, and ultimately to some physical theory? If a sociological theory, that is, a theory dealing with group phenomena, is ‘reduced’ in a relevant and appropriate sense to individual psychology, could we then say that the social phenomena in the domain of the sociological theory are just psychological phenomena of individuals? Conversely, if social events and processes are just individual psychological events and processes, then does it follow that any theory dealing with the former is ‘reducible’ to some theory dealing with the latter? Analogously, if psychological theory is ‘reducible’ to physical theory, say the neurological theory of the brain and the associated organs, could we say that psychological phenomena are just neurological phenomena in the brain? What of the converse of this question? Further, what is the bearing on these questions of the thesis that there are laws correlating types of social phenomena with types of individual psychological phenomena, or types of psychological phenomena with types of neurological phenomena?

New and thoroughly updated, Epistemology: An Anthology continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on 'The Structure of Knowledge and Justification', 'The Non-Epistemic in Epistemology', and 'The Nature of the Epistemic' Includes many of the most important contributions made in recent decades by several outstanding authors.

Une des doctrines centrales de l’émergentisme est la thèse selon laquelle certaines propriétés d’un tout sont émergentes, en ce sens qu’elles sont irréductibles aux propriétés de base dont elles émergent — c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne peuvent ni être prédites, ni être expliquées à partir de leurs conditions sousjacentes. Pour comprendre et évaluer cette thèse correctement, il est essentiel que nous disposions d’un concept adéquat de réduction. Nous examinons d’abord le modèle classique de la réduction interthéorique de Nagel, et nous soutenons qu’il ne nous fournit pas une base adéquate pour comprendre la thèse émergentiste. Nous proposons ensuite un autre modèle de réduction, celui de la « réduction fonctionnelle », et nous montrons qu’il constitue une base adéquate permettant d’évaluer la thèse émergentiste. Nous concluons avec une brève discussion de la question de savoir si les propriétés phénoménales d’expériences conscientes, ou qualia , sont émergentes.A central doctrine of emergentism is the thesis that some properties of wholes are emergent in the sense that they are irreducible to the “basal” properties from which they emerge — that is, they are neither predictable nor explainable in terms of their underlying conditions. To understand and properly evaluate this claim, it is essential that we have at hand an appropriate concept of reduction. This paper first examines the classic Nagel model of inter- theoretic reduction and finds it wanting as a basis for understanding the emergentist claim. Another model of reduction, “functional reduction”, is proposed, and it is argued that this model does provide an appropriate basis for evaluating the claim that certain properties of wholes are emergent. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the question whether qualia , or the phenomenal properties of conscious experience, are emergent

The paper discusses Ted Honderich's ?Hypothesis of Psychoneural Correlation?, one of the three fundamental ?hypotheses? of his Theory of Determinism. This doctrine holds that there is a pervasive system of psychoneural laws connecting every mental event with a neural correlate. Various questions are raised and discussed concerning the formulation of the thesis, Honderich's concepts of ?mental? and ?physical?, and the possible grounds for accepting the thesis. Finally, Honderich's response to Donald Davidson's well?known arguments for psychophysical anomalism is discussed

Mental events enter into causal relations with bodily events. The philosophical task is to explain how this is possible. Descartes’ dualism of mental and material substances ultimately founders on the impossibility of pairing mental events with physical events as causes and effects. This is what I have called “the pairing problem.” Many contemporary views also fail to explain mental causation. In the end, we are left with a dilemma. If mental phenomena are irreducible to physical phenomena, then mental phenomena lose their causal efficacy. However, if mental phenomena are reducible to physical phenomena, then casts doubt on the very existence of mental phenomena.

The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim’s Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students, Philosophy of Mind focuses on the mind/body problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The second edition features a new chapter on Cartesian substance dualism-a perspective that has been little discussed in the mainstream philosophy of mind and almost entirely ignored in most introductory books in philosophy of mind. In addition, all the chapters have been revised and updated to reflect the trends and developments of the last decade. Throughout the text, Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, the author’s own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair, Philosophy of Mind is a model of philosophical exposition. It is a major contribution to the study and teaching of the philosophy of mind

States of affairs constitute a basic ontological category in Chisholm's metaphysical system, and yield events and propositions as subclasses. Qua events, they enter into causal relations, and qua propositions, they are objects of our intentional attitudes. This paper expounds and critically examines Chisholm's conception of a state of affairs and his constructions of events and propositions. Various difficulties with some of Chisholm's definitions and procedures are pointed out and discussed. The last section contains a set of suggested modifications to the theory to avoid these difficulties.

Rene Descartes's theory of mind is the best known, and most influential, form of mind‐body dualism. This chapter summarizes the major tenets of Cartesian dualism. The dualist view of persons that Descartes defended is a form of substance dualism, the doctrine that there are substances of two fundamentally distinct kinds in this world, namely, minds and bodies and that a human person is a composite of a mind and a body, each an entity in its own right. Dualism of this form contrasts with monism, which holds that all things in the world are substances of one kind. The chapter reviews some considerations that are Cartesian in that they can be traced one way or another to Descartes's Second and Sixth Meditations, and that all are at least Cartesian in spirit.

States of affairs constitute a basic ontological category in Chisholm's metaphysical system, and yield events and propositions as subclasses. Qua events, they enter into causal relations, and qua propositions, they are objects of our intentional attitudes. This paper expounds and critically examines Chisholm's conception of a state of affairs and his constructions of events and propositions. Various difficulties with some of Chisholm's definitions and procedures are pointed out and discussed. The last section contains a set of suggested modifications to the theory to avoid these difficulties.