Hallvard Lillehammer

Birkbeck College, University Of London
Birkbeck, University of London
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
  •  761
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice
  •  308
    I—Hallvard Lillehammer: Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 111-127. 2014.
    According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological questio…Read more
  •  1060
    Davidson on value and objectivity
    Dialectica 61 (2). 2007.
    According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all
  •  772
    The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions
    Philosophy 86 (2): 175-200. 2011.
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substa…Read more
  •  83
    Review: Metaethics after Moore (review)
    Mind 116 (463): 756-758. 2007.
  •  66
    Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5). 2004.
  •  604
    According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that a…Read more
  •  249
    Minding your own business? Understanding indifference as a virtue
    Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1): 111-126. 2014.
    Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
  •  8
    (Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein)
    with Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction, and Peter McLaughlin
    Erkenntnis 57 (1): 91-122. 2002.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on…Read more
  •  174
    Who is my neighbour? Understanding indifference as a vice
    Philosophy 89 (4): 559-579. 2014.
    Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
  •  22
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 105 (420): 691-694. 1996.
  •  1415
    Smith on moral fetishism
    Analysis 57 (3). 1997.
    In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. Smith’s argument fails. In showing how it fails, I shall make three claims. First, a concern for what is right, where this is read de dicto, does not amount to moral fetishism. Second, it is not always morally preferable to care about what is right, where this is read de re. T…Read more
  •  1621
    The Nature and Ethics of Indifference
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (1): 17-35. 2017.
    Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or …Read more
  •  711
    Autonomy, Value and the First Person
    In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
  •  1099
    Moral error theory
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2). 2004.
    The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue th…Read more
  •  661
    Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons
    The Journal of Ethics 14 (1): 17-26. 2010.
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.