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14Getting to the Truth through Conceptual RevolutionsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990. 1990.There is a popular view that the alleged meaning shifts resulting from scientific revolutions are somehow incompatible with the formulation of general norms for scientific inquiry. We construct methods that can be shown to be maximally reliable at getting to the truth when the truth changes in response to the state of the scientist or his society.
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9A fictional consideration of the hazards life might hold if certain theories of mind were true. Originally given as an after dinner talk at the University of North Carolina Conference.
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226Learning causes: Psychological explanations of causal explanation (review)Minds and Machines 8 (1): 39-60. 1998.I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) sho…Read more
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44The conditional intervention principle is a formal principle that relates patterns of interventions and outcomes to causal structure. It is a central assumption of the causal Bayes net formalism. Four experiments suggest that preschoolers can use the conditional intervention principle both to learn complex causal structure from patterns of evidence and to predict patterns of evidence from knowledge of causal structure. Other theories of causal learning do not account for these results.
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Causation and Statistical InferenceIn Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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The first holistic revolution: alternative medicine in the nineteenth centuryIn Douglas Stalker & Clark Glymour (eds.), Examining Holistic Medicine, Prometheus Books. pp. 29--48. 1989.
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40Poincaré’s Probabilities, Kantified, Post-Modernized (review)Biological Theory 9 (1): 113-114. 2014.One of a pair of reviews of Michael Strevens’ book, Tychomancy: Inferring Probability from Causal Structure, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013, pp 265, $39.95 hbk, ISBN 978-0674073111. See also Bookstein (2014, this issue)
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102Bootstraps and probabilitiesJournal of Philosophy 77 (11): 691-699. 1980.The Joumal 0f Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 11, Seventy—Seventh Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Nov., 1980), 691-699.
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69Theoretical Realism and Theoretical EquivalencePSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970. 1970.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/tenns.htm1. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
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76We show that if any number of variables are allowed to be simultaneously and independently randomized in any one experiment, log2(N ) + 1 experiments are sufficient and in the worst case necessary to determine the causal relations among N ≥ 2 variables when no latent variables, no sample selection bias and no feedback cycles are present. For all K, 0 < K &lt.
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158Theoretical Equivalence and the Semantic View of TheoriesPhilosophy of Science 80 (2): 286-297. 2013.Halvorson argues through a series of examples and a general result due to Myers that the “semantic view” of theories has no available account of formal theoretical equivalence. De Bouvere provides criteria overlooked in Halvorson’s paper that are immune to his counterexamples and to the theorem he cites. Those criteria accord with a modest version of the semantic view that rejects some of Van Fraassen’s apparent claims while retaining the core of Patrick Suppes’s proposal. I do not endorse any v…Read more
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32We present evidence of a potentially serious source of error intrinsic to all spotted cDNA microarrays that use IMAGE clones of expressed sequence tags (ESTs). We found that a high proportion of these EST sequences contain 5V-end poly(dT) sequences that are remnants from the oligo(dT)-primed reverse transcription of polyadenylated mRNA templates used to generate EST cDNA for sequence clone libraries. Analysis of expression data from two single-dye cDNA microarray experiments showed that ESTs who…Read more
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119Kevin T. Kelly and Clark Glymour. Why Bayesian Confirmation Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification
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156Few people have thought so hard about the nature of the quantum theory as has Jeff Bub,· and so it seems appropriate to offer in his honor some reflections on that theory. My topic is an old one, the consistency of our microscopic theories with our macroscopic theories, my example, the Aspect experiments (Aspect et al., 1981, 1982, 1982a; Clauser and Shimony, l978;_Duncan and Kleinpoppen, 199,8) is familiar, and my sirnplrcation of it is borrowed. All that is new here is a kind of diagonalizatio…Read more
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25Hans Reichenbach's probability logicIn Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, Elsevier. pp. 10--357. 2004.
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257Theory and EvidencePrinceton University Press. 1980.The Description for this book, Theory and Evidence, will be forthcoming.
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311Determinism, ignorance, and quantum mechanicsJournal of Philosophy 68 (21): 744-751. 1971.is every bit as intelligible and philosophically respectable as many other doctrines currently in favor, e.g., the doctrine that mental events are identical with brain events; the attempt to give a linguistic construal of this latter doctrine meets many of the same sorts of difficulties encountered above (see Hempel, op. cit.). Secondly, I think that evidence for universal determinism may not, as a matter of fact, be so hard to come by as one might imagine. It is a striking fact about our world …Read more
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34Causal maps and Bayes nets: A cognitive and computational account of theory-formationIn Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--132. 2002.
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23Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
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6Why I am not a BayesianIn Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. 2010.
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