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E. J. Lowe
(1950 - 2014)

PhD: University of OxfordLast affiliation: Durham University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    354
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    74

 More details
  • Durham University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1975
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Physical Science
1 more
  • All publications (354)
  •  73
    The psychology of freedom by Thomas pink. Cambridge university press, 1996, pp. X + 284. £35.00
    Philosophy 73 (2): 305-324. 1998.
    The WillFree Will and Psychology
  •  200
    Entity, identity and unity
    Erkenntnis 48 (2): 191-208. 1998.
    I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the same K…Read more
    I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the same K as y?’ and ’How many Ks are there satisfying condition C?’, even if we may sometimes be unable in practice to discover what these answers are. But other entities apparently lack either determinate identity, or determinate countability, or both. In these terms I try to explain certain important ontological differences between familiar macroscopic objects and various rather more esoteric entities, such as the ‘particles’ of quantum physics, quantities of material stuff, and tropes or property instances.
    Material ObjectsIdentity, Misc
  •  457
    The definition of endurance
    with Storrs McCall
    Analysis 69 (2): 277-280. 2009.
    David Lewis, following in the tradition of Broad, Quine and Goodman, says that change in an object X consists in X's being temporally extended and having qualitatively different temporal parts. Analogously, change in a spatially extended object such as a road consists in its having different spatial parts . The alternative to this view is that ordinary objects undergo temporal change in virtue of having different intrinsic non-relational properties at different times. They endure, remaining the …Read more
    David Lewis, following in the tradition of Broad, Quine and Goodman, says that change in an object X consists in X's being temporally extended and having qualitatively different temporal parts. Analogously, change in a spatially extended object such as a road consists in its having different spatial parts . The alternative to this view is that ordinary objects undergo temporal change in virtue of having different intrinsic non-relational properties at different times. They endure, remaining the same object throughout change, whereas Lewis's temporally extended 4D objects perdure.It is impossible to come down on one side or the other of the endurance/perdurance debate without a clear and unambiguous understanding of what ‘endurance’ is. ‘Perdurance’ is clear enough. Every 4D object of non-zero temporal thickness perdures simply by having temporal extension, i.e. by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times. But Lewis muddies the waters by giving a confused and ultimately untenable definition of endurance.His first step is to cover both perduring and enduring by offering the neutral word persist. ‘Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times’ . Something then perdures if it persists by having different temporal parts at different times, no one part being wholly present at more than one time. In contrast, a thing endures if it persists by being wholly present at more than one …
    EnduranceThree- and Four-Dimensionalism
  •  336
    Reply to le poidevin and Mellor
    Mind 96 (384): 539-542. 1987.
    In ‘Time, Change and the “Indexical Fallacy”’,1 Robin Le Poidevin and D. H. Mellor criticize an earlier paper of mine2 both for failing to rebut an argument of McTaggart's and for failing to explain why time is the dimension of change. I consider that their criticisms miss the mark on both scores, partly through misrepresentation of my views and partly through defective argumentation
    Time
  •  217
    Locke: Compatibilist event-causalist or libertarian substance-causalist? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3). 2004.
    Towards the end of Chapter XXI of Book II of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke remarks, with all the appearance of sincerity and genuine modesty, that.
    The Nature of ActionLocke: Free Will
  •  449
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind
    Cambridge University Press. 2000.
    In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and di…Read more
    In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and distinctive in giving equal attention to deep metaphysical questions concerning the mind and to the discoveries and theories of modern scientific psychology. It will be of interest to any reader with a basic grounding in modern philosophy.
    Philosophy of Mind, General Works
  •  79
    The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World
    Philosophical Books 34 (1): 33-34. 1993.
    Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
  •  354
    Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism and Metaphysical Realism
    Metaphysica 14 (2): 265-274. 2013.
    Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their…Read more
    Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their defence of existence monism and support a common-sense pluralist ontology of ‘ordinary objects’ as being fully consistent with a thoroughgoing metaphysical realism.
    Vagueness and IndeterminacyMonism
  •  231
    Conditional probability and conditional beliefs
    Mind 105 (420): 603-615. 1996.
    Indicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesConditional Probability
  •  299
    What is 'conditional probability'?
    Analysis 68 (3): 218-223. 2008.
    No Abstract
    Conditional ProbabilityIndicative Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities
  •  243
    Reviews seeing dark things: The philosophy of shadows by Roy Sorensen oxford university press, 2008. 310 pp. £25.99 (review)
    Philosophy 84 (4): 615-619. 2009.
    Ontology, MiscShadows
  •  213
    Indirect perception and sense data
    Philosophical Quarterly 31 (October): 330-342. 1981.
    Sense-Datum TheoriesDirect and Indirect Perception
  •  188
    Against an argument for token identity
    Mind 90 (357): 120-121. 1981.
    Token Identity
  •  75
    The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical, and Physical SciencesPaul Humphreys
    Isis 82 (4): 783-784. 1991.
    Causal ExplanationHistory of Science, MiscProbabilistic Causation
  •  233
    On a supposed temporal/modal parallel
    Analysis 46 (4): 195. 1986.
    Aspects of Time, Misc
  •  445
    Vagueness and endurance
    Analysis 65 (2): 104-112. 2005.
    EndurancePermissive Conceptions of Material ObjectsThe Argument from VaguenessVagueness and Indeterm…Read more
    EndurancePermissive Conceptions of Material ObjectsThe Argument from VaguenessVagueness and Indeterminacy, Misc
  •  123
    Review of D.m. Armstrong, Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1). 2011.
  •  110
    Intentionality: A reply to Stiffler
    Philosophical Quarterly 32 (129): 354-357. 1982.
    Intentionality, Misc
  •  107
    Does the descriptivist/anti-descriptivist debate have any philosophical significance?
    Philosophical Books 48 (1): 27-33. 2007.
    Descriptive Theories of ReferenceRigid DesignationCausal Theories of Reference
  •  1
    Sortal Terms and Natural Laws: An Essay on the Ontological Status of the Laws of Nature
    American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (4): 253-260. 1980.
    Laws of Nature, Misc
  •  367
    New directions in metaphysics and ontology
    Axiomathes 18 (3): 273-288. 2008.
    A personal view is presented of how metaphysics and ontology stand at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the light of developments during the twentieth. It is argued that realist metaphysics, with serious ontology at its heart, has a promising future, provided that its adherents devote some time and effort to countering the influences of both its critics and its false friends.
    Metaphysical RealismOntological RealismScience, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  163
    Conditionals, Context, and Transitivity
    Analysis 50 (2). 1990.
    Conditionals
  •  121
    Primitive Substances
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3). 1994.
  •  218
    How Real Is Substantial Change?
    The Monist 89 (3): 275-293. 2006.
    Ontology
  •  138
    Serious Endurantism and the Strong Unity of Human Persons
    In Ludger Honnefelder, Edmund Runggaldier & Benedikt Schick (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 67-82. 2009.
    Endurance
  •  4
    Metaphysical knowledge
    Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (4): 453--471. 2002.
    Modal Rationalism
  •  13
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 104 (413): 202-205. 1995.
  •  66
    The Routledge Guidebook to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding
    Routledge. 2013.
    John Locke is widely acknowledged as the most important figure in the history of English philosophy and _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ is his greatest intellectual work, emphasising the importance of experience for the formation of knowledge. The _Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ introduces the major themes of Locke’s great book and serves as a companion to this key work, examining: The context of Locke’s work and the background to his writing Each …Read more
    John Locke is widely acknowledged as the most important figure in the history of English philosophy and _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ is his greatest intellectual work, emphasising the importance of experience for the formation of knowledge. The _Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ introduces the major themes of Locke’s great book and serves as a companion to this key work, examining: The context of Locke’s work and the background to his writing Each part of the text in relation to its goals, meaning and impact The reception of the book when it was first seen by the world The relevance of Locke’s work to philosophy today, its legacy and influence With further reading suggested throughout, this text follows Locke’s original work closely, making it essential reading for all students of philosophy, and all those wishing to get to grips with this classic work.
    Locke, Misc
  •  188
    Peacocke and Kraemer on Butler's Problem
    Analysis 40 (3). 1980.
    ConceptsInferential Theories of Concepts
  • Forbes, G., "The Metaphysics of Modality" (review)
    Mind 95 (n/a): 135. 1986.
    Metaphysical Necessity
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